

Bruce Hopper
memo.

Wiley
file

M O S T S E C R E T

March 7, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL DONOVAN:

The enclosed memorandum emanates from an Austrian Catholic having close connections with the ecclesiastical authorities. It is sent on to you for whatever disposition you think wise. The attached is our only copy. No copy has been retained in the files of this Branch.

[Signature]
John C. Wiley

Enclosure

P.H.P. 29

March 9, 1944.

The Most Rev. Francis Joseph Beckman, Archbishop of Lumbago, has developed a new mania: he thinks that his political opponents want to kill him. He has therefore ceased to deliver public speeches and has had speeches recorded. The archbishop, a strong supporter of Father Coughlin, exposed himself extraordinarily during the isolationist campaign in 1941. He is "managed" by a group of priests who want to build him up for their own interests. Beckman became bishop not without extraordinary protection from Vatican prelates. Informed sources indicate that he donated considerable sums in R.M.E.

The Archbishop is not very fluent and is well known for his lack of diplomacy. He invested a great part of the funds of his diocese in mines - and has lost the bulk of the money. Though this is not known in his diocese, the clergy knows about it. It seems that Father Coughlin has supported the archbishop consequently with funds.

Beckman caused great embarrassment to Governor Wilson of Iowa when he invited him to the wedding of Mr. Schroeder, the bishop's secretary, last year. To the Governor's surprise Senator Burton Wheeler and General Wood were also guests. The Governor had to rectify the situation in a local newspaper. Mr. Schroeder, who is a musician in civil life, tried to put pressure on a local Federal Representative at the occasion of the ship-arming bill.

A refugee priest from Western Europe told this correspondent the following story: In May 1940 he visited Father Coughlin. When he told Coughlin that he was very much depressed about the invasion of his native country, Coughlin said that he felt that the European nations would finally be happy under Hitler domination. He said that he had such relations to German authorities that he could arrange for my informant's return to his native country.

Page 39/1.

The refugee priest succeeded to gain Coughlin's confidence by playing the naive. In a conversation of three hours Coughlin became talkative. He said that he had seen Goering in Karinhall and that he had gained a very good impression from the Marschall. He also said to have assisted to the Parteitag in Nuremberg and that he was received by Hitler himself. He said he asked Hitler to stop the persecution of the Church and that, thus, Hitler would gain the support of the Catholics in the whole world. *He added.*

P.

Foreign Nationalities Branch Memo
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February 12, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL DONOVAN:

For your convenience I summarize the personnel situation in the Foreign Nationalities Branch as it stands today. Miss Flora Lewis and Mr. August Reischer, having been approved by you, are now employed at \$7500.


Professor Robert Reynolds, of the University of Wisconsin, has been approved by you for the position of Chief of the Latin Section in the Chancery Division, at \$5800. His case is now in the hands of Mr. Opsata. We have some very important work all ready for Professor Reynolds to undertake, and I hope that word can be sent to Mr. Opsata that it is desirable to expedite the appointment.

Colonel Buxton's friend, Weston Howland, is recommended for appointment as Chief of the Division of Field Study, at \$6500. This also was cleared with you, of course, and I trust that word can be sent to Mr. Opsata.

Another case pending in Mr. Opsata's office is that of Francis F. Bowman, Jr., whom you approved some time ago and who has been working for us as a consultant. Probably you will wish to mention this case also to Mr. Opsata.

I mentioned to you today the case of Arnold D. Margolin for employment as Field Representative at \$3800, and understood that you approved and would so inform Mr. Opsata.

I believe you have also approved the employment of
Mrs. Miriam Drabkin, at \$2,000.


John C. Wilson

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION: FOREIGN NATIONALITIES BRANCH

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL DORTCH

General Robert Odie talked with the in g office on the afternoon of April 7th. The General, formerly head of the French air forces in North Africa under Weygand, came to this country last November at the invitation of United States officials. During his visit, General Weygand resigned. Odie declared his support of the Free French and soon afterwards left for London. He has just returned here, and the discussion concerned his impressions of London and his reaction to the Free French.

After paying tribute to the spirit of determination evident in all London circles, General Odie commented on the somewhat naive attitude toward Russia. Public opinion had swung from a complete distrust to an enthusiastic acceptance of Russia and all that its cause implies. General Odie believed Russia should be recognized as a powerful ally -- he had himself advocated such a course in France; but its basic and unchanging enmity toward the capitalist democracies should not, he claimed, be overlooked.

The situation among the Free French had been extremely confused and bitter when he left London. The Muselier affair had just then reached its climax. According to the General's version, de Gaulle had ordered Muselier to take St. Pierre,

SECRET

and the Free French, asserting that he was in agreement with the English on this move. The Assertion, however, was not true.

Asked for his own opinion at the time, General Odie refused to enter into discussions of policy, but on being pressed suggested that the proposed St. Pierre and Miquelon group should be considered only in relation to its effect in the war against Germany, and that it should not be undertaken merely to divide the French people or to increase the portion of the empire under Free French rule.

When Muselier returned to London after taking the islands, and found that he had been deceived into thinking that the move had been made with British approval, he offered his resignation from the Free French Committee. De Gaulle not only accepted his resignation from the Committee but deprived him also of his naval command. Some fifty-five to sixty French naval officers at once tendered their resignations in protest. De Gaulle was prepared to commit Muselier to a month's imprisonment when the English interposed their refusal. Odie was not informed of what had occurred since his leaving London three weeks ago.

General Odie proceeded to describe the general atmosphere in the Free French movement. De Gaulle is a virtual dictator. His manner is overbearing and autocratic. He rules in complete isolation. Decrees are signed by de Gaulle and one member of the National Committee (usually Pieven), thus leaving his will unchecked. In London, with very few exceptions, the

French are opposed to de Gaulle's leadership. Even the editor of the Free French, does not support him.

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Odie was convinced that de Gaulle is drunk with the power he has suddenly acquired; that it is almost necessary to label him as "crazy". He has characterized his opponents as those who would "a second time burn Jeanne d'Arc". In Odie's opinion de Gaulle is aiming at a personal dictatorship in post-war France; his continued leadership means inevitable civil war.

In these circumstances, though he had apparently taken offered a high command, Odie saw no other course than to return to America. He was non-committal about the role he would play here, saying only that he was anxious to advise whoever should want to see him, and to make useful such talents and experience as he had. He was more ready to present the Free French problem than to propose a solution, being reluctant to enter into factional disputes or to appear ambitious for leadership himself. He did not want to foster in this country such dissensions as he had seen in London.

He did suggest, however, that in the French mind the personality of de Gaulle is not linked inextricably with the idea of resistance to Germany. The French, he maintained, always respond more readily to an idea than to a man; and if propaganda to France, which made de Gaulle, were to emphasize a war of liberation, using less and less the name of de Gaulle, the way would be cleared for a change in leadership. At present, he emphasized, the Free French is more an English than a

French organization: de Gaulle was his present position, and all his efforts to the British. Still some clearly seem desirable to them, the French cannot be expected to solve the problem.

Throughout the interview Odie gave the impression of a modest soldier, profoundly shocked and burdened by the situation he had observed, and moved by a sincere desire to be of service in the French cause.

He stated that since he got into a position of objection to and open criticism of de Gaulle, he refused to entertain any suggestions that he succeed de Gaulle. He said that his criticism could only be honest if it were free from any shadow of self-interest or personal ambition. He said, he thought that a civilian could lead the French.

He agreed to prepare a memorandum on the subject and submit it within the next few days.

General Odie is seeing A. Harrison. He said he hopes to see you at your earliest convenience. Harrison will find him very interesting. He made a more serious and more serious impression on me in this interview than in our previous one. He seems to have a capacity to look at the situation as a whole and to view things with a certain detachment, even with humor.

[Signature]
John C. Wiley.

SECRET

April 1, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL DONOVAN:

Archduke Otto came to lunch yesterday. He claims to be in fairly regular communication with his representatives abroad. He claimed that the information communicated to you through W. C. B. was less than three days old. He added that he now has an entirely reliable man within the Croatian Government and was expanding his organization. He gave an impression of sincerity in discussing his activities, and he seems to believe that if effective collaboration is established he can be of real use.

In the course of a very long conversation, I was again impressed with his intelligence, poise and tact. He reviewed his relations with the British Intelligence and gave a very plausible story of British bungling. For example, the British Intelligence tried to get him involved in its activities having to do with the German Freiheit Partie, headed by a retired German General in Munich. Otto claimed that he recognized immediately that this

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alleged party was a trap and that he refused to have anything to do with it. It culminated in the German kidnapping of the two leading British Intelligence officials at the Dutch frontier, which he referred to as a vindication of his attitude.

A source of friction between him and British Intelligence, apparently, was his categorical refusal to reveal the names of his people on the continent. He said that he would under no circumstances give these names to anyone. He added that, in Paris, he had worked most intimately and effectively with British Naval Intelligence.

Count Ferdinand Czernin and Mr. Gregor Sebba, who headed the Austrian Action, had actually been working for British Intelligence (this we already knew from our own sources). Count Czernin was in reality the front and Sebba was the active figure. Indeed, the latter had been employed by British Intelligence in Vienna even before the Anschluss. Personally, in the past he had found Sebba very unreliable and on several occasions had found that Sebba had given him false information. He had, in consequence, terminated all relations with him. Sebba, he concluded, was not even an


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Austrian, but a Lithuanian of Jewish extraction.

Otto has promised to give us considerable "who's who" material on Austrian emigres, organizations and movements from his personal files and knowledge.

Otto stated definitely that the so-called Matteotti Fund existed; he believed it amounted to some fifty thousand dollars, only part of which is in the United States. The Austrian Socialists in this country, grouped around Dr. Adler, lived from this money and since Dr. Adler held the purse-strings, he was in an extremely powerful position and able to maintain very effective discipline within their ranks. Adler has always been described to us as particularly doctrinaire and difficult.

I think Otto might prove quite interesting to David Bruce.


John C. Wiley.

JCW:BJ

German Catholic Press in Germany
Catholic Press in Germany

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COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION FOREIGN NATIONALITIES BRANCH

March 11, 1942

Difficulties being experienced by the foreign language press in this country since the United States entered the war are reflected in this translation of an appeal made to its readers by the Catholic German weekly "Katholisches Wochenblatt und der Landmann" in its issue for March 3, 1942.

NEWSPAPERS IN DIFFICULTY

American newspapers, particularly those printed in German, have fallen into difficulties and embarrassment as a result of the war. Since the 7th of December nearly all advertising has disappeared. Relief must be very quickly extended. Even the financially strong "Staatszeitung und Herald" in New York City has recently raised its price from three to four cents per copy. In New York City most of the newspapers are sold day-by-day on the so-called newsstands. Subscriptions delivered through the mail have cost eight dollars a year for some time now, and this on a most strict basis of advance payment.

The Chicago "Abendpost," the only German daily paper in the biggest city in the middle section of our country, announced on February 24 a change in its price from three to five cents per copy. It declared that an increase to four cents would in itself not guarantee the continued existence of the paper. It emphasized that the receipts of the paper since the outbreak of the war have dried up almost entirely, that only through sacrifices on the part of its readers could the only daily German-American paper of the metropolis of Chicago be able to continue, and that from March 2nd on the "Abendpost" would appear in the shortened format of a tabloid. It appears in this form now.

The "Eintracht," well known organization paper of Chicago which appears weekly as an eight-page tabloid, has increased its subscrip-

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tion price from \$1.50 to \$2.00.

The "Commonweal" in New York City, a modern paper for Christian political economy which was founded by the political scientist George R. Shuster (present director of Hunter College in New York, the largest woman's school in America), seeks about 1000 readers who will each contribute \$10.00 for 1942 in order that the paper may continue to be published.

Steadily mounting manufacturing costs have led three Sunday papers on the west coast to raise their prices. The "San Francisco Chronicle," "San Francisco Examiner," and the "Oakland Tribune" announce that the price per copy has been raised from 10 to 12 cents. Many other papers of the country have predicted price increases for the future.

In Cleveland, Ohio, the "Wächter und Anzeiger" has been through a severe crisis during which it lost its large building and modern plant worth several hundred thousands of dollars; the editors, compositors, other workers and zealous citizens of German descent formed a new joint-stock corporation of \$30,000, and the necessary capital was procured to save this German paper. A small building was leased for 10 years, new machinery was obtained and other measures taken to make it possible for this paper to become a daily again. Through the brave action of these people the paper was saved.

The "Milwaukee Deutsche Zeitung," the first German daily paper in the former "German Athens," recently felt forced to raise its price. Furthermore, the German clubs of Milwaukee have given their German

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paper a fund of \$10,000 for working capital, a praiseworthy deed which should find itself emulated in other cities.

Many other newspapers and periodicals -- German, other foreign language papers, and even some in the English language -- have recently increased their prices and carried out measures to cut their size in order to effect savings that will offset their diminished receipts and make continued publication possible.

These are the signs which show that the German language papers -- which in the interest of the enlightenment of the masses and the welfare of our country in this war are more important now than ever before -- are encountering their greatest crisis since their founding in America.

Each one of our prized readers should learn from these facts that he must now take action in the interests of his paper more than ever before, that he must pay for it promptly, not fall behind in his payments, pay all back debts at once, and in particular pay in advance for a whole year's subscription without delay.

THE PUBLISHER

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

FOREIGN NATIONALITIES BRANCH

SECRET**COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION****FOREIGN NATIONALITIES BRANCH**

March 11, 1942

MEMORANDUM OF A CONVERSATION WITH GENERAL JULIUS DEUTSCH

General Julius Deutsch spoke with Mr. Poole and Mr. Heckscher in Mr. Poole's office this afternoon.

The General described his journeys, after the Austrian civil war of 1934, to Czecho-Slovakia, France, England, and finally to the United States. He now has his office with the Free World organization, for which he directs propaganda in German to South America.

As a Social Democrat, he had always been opposed to Communism, and he was unwilling to acknowledge any recent Communist gains in Austria. The Socialist party, even after 1934, had maintained its organization, and was now active in underground warfare, especially with the factory workers. So far as he knew there was no truth in the reports that the Russians are financing resistance among the working class.

Asked about the possibility of cooperation with Otto, he said that what he thought on this point was immaterial. What was important was that in Austria itself the restoration was not thought of; any questions on the subject from abroad were hardly understood. The idea of a restoration was confined to the émigrés.

General Deutsch saw no possibility of cooperating with Csernin and Zernatto. They, too, meant nothing in the political life of

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Austria. Any association with them would be used by the Germans in their propaganda to discredit Deutsch and his friends among the Austrian workers.

The only real forces in Austria were the workers and the peasants, he said; this meant the Socialists and the Catholics. Cooperation between Socialists and Catholics was practicable. He had worked in such a coalition before, and he would work in it again. That was very different from cooperating with Ternetto, the secretary general of the "Fascist front." Asked whether such a coalition could be formed in exile, he said it was impossible. There were no representatives of the Catholic peasants here. The only man with whom he could join in the formation of such a movement, Professor Joseph Dobretsberger, was not now in this country.

Asked about the future relations of Austria and Germany, General Deutsch intimated that, since Hitler, he and his followers had drawn away from the idea of Anschluss which had previously dominated their thinking. Experience had taught the workers that Anschluss might not be desirable even after the overthrow of Hitler. General Deutsch was disposed at present to look to a Danubian Confederation as the logical solution for Austria's future.

Such a confederation would have to begin with Czecho-Slovakia and Austria; the General said he was on good terms with

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Benes and saw him frequently. Later Hungary would be admitted if it became democratic; and perhaps Poland, if it were not too much under the influence of Russia.

In conclusion, the General expressed his conviction that the tradition of German trade unionism had not died, and that with the passing of Nazism the German working classes would again assert themselves.

ACF

DeWitt C. Poole

*cc to David Bruce*COORDINATOR OF INFORMATIONFOREIGN NATIONALITIES BRANCH

Todoroff 4472
Bulgaria

March 28, 1942

MEMORANDUM TO COLONEL DONOVAN

With regard to a letter of February 24, 1942, from Ralph Murray of the Political Intelligence Department at the Foreign Office to Mr. Winner, regarding a Bulgarian named Kosta Todoroff, there is attached an extract on the subject of Todoroff taken from a long report on the Bulgarian situation which we have had from Professor Cyril E. Black at Princeton. You have already examined this report but you may care, nevertheless, to have the attached extract.

There is also attached a copy of a letter on this subject sent today to Harold Hoskins in the Department of State.

KCF

Kosta Todoroff

(Extract from a report, dated February 24, 1942, by Professor Cyril E. Black of Princeton)

A lesser emigre leader is Kosta Todoroff, a former member of Stambolisky's Agrarian League, and more recently a leader of the radical (Pladne) wing of the Agrarian party.¹ Born about 1889, he joined a Macedonian band in his youth and was captured by the Turks in 1905. The following year he escaped to Russia, and was promptly arrested in Odessa for revolutionary activity. He was released from prison in 1913 and returned to Bulgaria to take up the fight against King Ferdinand's regime. When the war broke out he joined the French Foreign Legion, serving first on the Western Front, and later as a spy in Bulgaria for General Sarrail's army stationed at Salonica. Arrested in Bulgaria, he was released at the end of the war and joined Stambolisky. Under him he served as delegate to the Paris conference, and as minister to Belgrade. With the fall of the Agrarian regime in 1923, he remained in Belgrade in the pay of the Yugoslav government. In 1933 he returned to Bulgaria, but found himself at odds with the moderate Agrarians who were a part of the coalition government and formed a schismatic radical group within the party. He was

1. Kosta Todoroff, "Six times sentenced to death," *Free world*, I, no. 4 (January, 1942), 393-294; the Alliance Book Corporation promises his full-length autobiography for the late spring.

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forced to leave the country again, and has been supporting the Allied cause since the outbreak of the war. More recently, he has been broadcasting to Bulgaria from Cairo under British auspices. Todoroff appears to be making a bid for the leadership of a Free Bulgaria movement, but it cannot be said that he has any substantial support either in Bulgaria or among emigre groups. He was never prominent in Bulgaria, and he has been in the pay of too many foreign governments to command the confidence of his fellow countrymen.

SECRET

March 26, 1942

Mr. Harold Hoakins
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

Dear Harold:

From a source believed to be entirely reliable, we hear that the Bulgarian, Kosta Todoroff, concerning whom we spoke on the telephone this morning, is now on the way to Canada, traveling to Montreal with Mr. Gubrilovic, who, I believe, is Minister without Portfolio in the Yugoslav Government.

As you are aware, Todoroff is a member of the Agrarian Party in Bulgaria and, according to our information, is one of the four members of the Committee of that Party who are now outside Bulgaria. The others are George Dimitroff, Matsankieff and Ivan Kostoff.

It is understood that the attitude of all these workers is favorable to the cause of the United Nations and against any policy of collaboration with Germany. The aforementioned I understood to have been working with the British. Todoroff has been broadcasting for them, as has also Matsankieff.

Yours sincerely,

Dwight C. Poole



Colonel Donovan
Hon. James C. Dunn
Mr. William A. Kinard
Mr. David K. E. Bruce



COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

ATTACHED

Dear Colonel,

I am sure the enclosed letter from
Kosta Podgoroff will interest you.
Yours sincerely,

[Handwritten signature]

To Robert P. ...

Colonel William J. Donovan

C O P Y

POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT
OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE

24th February 1942

Dear Winner,

I would like to give you some information about a certain Bulgarian, called Kosta Todoroff, in the hope that it may be useful to you, or possibly that your organization might like to take action on it.

Kosta Todoroff is, as you probably know, one of the 4 members of the Committee of the Agrarian Party organization who are outside Bulgaria and working either with our support or in collaboration with us. The other members are: George Dimitroff (in the Near East), Natankieff and Ivan Kostoff.

Only about a year ago Kosta Todoroff was in the U.S. He was removed from there by one of our organizations in order to rejoin his friend Dimitroff, who came out of Bulgaria at that time. It appears that he left the U.S. irregularly - possibly on a passport in a false name, or without proper notification to the U.S. authorities. In any case the State Department have, on our enquiry, intimated that they do not wish him back again.

He is going now to Canada with Yugoslav support (he is a great friend of the Yugoslavs and, indeed, was supported by them for many years). He is travelling with the Minister, Cukrilovic to Montreal. He undoubtedly hopes to get in to the U.S., where he has a little money due to him from a publisher on which, he says, he can live, and where he believes he can attract interest for the Agrarian element in Bulgaria and also possibly find adherents, who (with the consent of the U.S. authorities) might lend themselves to work inside Bulgaria.

I need not expatiate upon the Bulgarian Agrarian Party. You will appreciate that it is of great importance to us that their leaders (for Dimitroff is undoubtedly a man with great powers of leadership) should be in sympathy with us and should exert themselves to call upon their followers to resist the Filoff policy of collaboration with Germany. For reasons of policy, which you can equally well appreciate, we have not been in a position to recognize the Committee which Todoroff represents, nor to give him that degree of encouragement which he expected to find in London when he was brought here from the Near East, some 6 months ago. Nevertheless, his presence

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in London has had a certain importance; he has broadcast for us a great deal, as also has his colleague Mladenoff, and he has thus won for himself a sort of de facto recognition, which, without embarrassing us in regard to the Greek and Yugoslav, has been of benefit to himself and has been an important element in propaganda to Bulgaria.

We certainly want to keep in touch with Todoroff, and do not wish to discourage him more than is necessary for reasons of policy. For example, it is quite possible that we shall attempt to receive propaganda broadcasts from him while he is in North America.

I have considerable doubts whether he will succeed in finding Bulgarians, or Bulgarian-Americans, who are, or can, work with him in the sense which he imagines. But his existence in sympathy with the cause of the United Nations is of advantage to all of us, whether he achieves his concrete aims or not.

I trust the above information may be useful to your organization in the U.S. Todoroff is something of a braggart, but is nevertheless sincere at heart. It is worth mentioning perhaps that he has established good relations with both the Greek and Yugoslav Governments, and has addressed communications to them on the subject of a future realization of a Balkan block. They have not paid much formal attention to his communications for obvious reasons; nevertheless, they look on him with a kindly eye on the whole.

Signed RALPH MURRAY

Percy Winner, Esq.,
American Embassy,
Greenwich Square.

March 27, 1942

MOST SECRETMEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL DONOVAN:

The story of Mr. Charles Levy-Savoy, so far as we know it, is as follows:

Charles Levy-Savoy states that he is 44 years of age. He is even younger in appearance. He describes himself as having been born in France and being half Jewish by race (his appearance is only slightly semitic). He claims to have had an excellent war record in the last war and to have been an "instructor of officers" in aviation. He received the Legion of Honor for war services and at the age of only 32 he was promoted to officer of the Legion of Honor, of which he has not been deprived by the Vichy Government. He continues to wear the red rosette.

He has added the name of his wife, a French woman of the Catholic faith, to his own and calls himself Levy-Savoy. He has two daughters. He and his family have been in the United States for the last 15 months.

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A close friend of Levy-Savoy tells me that he was actually born in Algiers, and this statement also appears in my memorandum to you under date of December 4, 1941. Among his other accomplishments, he speaks perfect Spanish, which he attributes to the fact that he was brought up by a Spanish nurse. It was his first language; indeed, he says he could pass for a Spaniard.

According to French press cuttings which I obtained from Mr. Bullitt's personal files and which are attached hereto, Charles Levy began his financial career at a very early age in Marseilles. It was continued in Paris with fantastic success. You may note that he is referred to as one of the "Kings of Paris".

The arrest which is discussed in some detail in the attached clippings, was one of the most sensational events of post-war France. It provoked a sharp reaction in the Bourse and involved many prominent personages. His cousin, Joseph Levy, was incarcerated with him. (Joseph was sentenced to 18 months on one charge and 6 months on another, and so far as is known is still in confinement.) According to the French press, Charles Levy was supposed to be a front (homme de paille) for the Credit Lyonnais. His company, the Societe Speciale Financiere, was accused of

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putting up clients' securities to cover large banking credits and Joseph Levy was accused -- apparently rightly so -- of manipulating a private bank debt of Frs. 6 million by juggling the company's accounts. The charge against Charles and Joseph Levy was brought by the Minister of Finance and the Bank of Indo China. The Banque des Pays-Bas was the principal bag-holder. Charles Levy appealed the judgment. The affair was associated in the press with the Stavisky case; specifically, Levy was accused of being one of the administrative council of the PETIT JOURNAL, Stavisky's paper. The case dragged on for several years. Finally, Charles Levy was acquitted with a resounding eulogy by the prosecuting attorney, the text of which I have read. The prosecuting attorney was obviously striving to vindicate Levy.

Camille Chautemps was, I believe, Prime Minister at the time of the acquittal. Charles Levy's own story of his arrest was that political enemies of Chautemps, a very close friend, were trying to get him through Levy. Actually, Levy's bank was guilty of bad financial irregularities, but, he asserts, he, himself, was not involved and knew nothing of them since he had sold the bank 2 years before and was in no way connected with it.

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Levy described his meteoric financial, political and social rise in Paris as unprecedented and stated that he had amassed some \$20 millions at the time of his arrest -- 1934. He decided, particularly because of his devotion to his two daughters, to clear his name and vindicate himself, no matter what the costs might be. He actually spent \$9 millions in the process, adding confidentially in his conversation with me that he bought and operated L'INTRANSIGENT under cover so that he could be sure that his side of the case would reach the French public. When he was vindicated, he promptly amassed another fortune. When the French were called upon by the government to repatriate funds held abroad, he brought the second fortune back to France, where it was swallowed up at the collapse of the country. At present he appears to be in the process of collecting a third fortune. Under cover of his daughter's fiance, whose name is Stern, he is operating a chrome plating factory. At the same time he is in negotiation with Odium and the Atlas Corporation with a view to the "Americanization" of Radio Imperiale, formerly Radio Tangiers. He has a front man for Radio Imperiale, whose name he did not divulge. According to Charles Levy, this man succeeded in getting the franchise reconfirmed by the Spanish Government, Petain and the Ital-

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ians, which is a most miraculous feat according to Levy. He alleges further that Radio Imperiale worked in closest collaboration with the American authorities of Tangiers. He told me that in the negotiations with Odium his man has employed Wendell Willkie as attorney and that Willkie was coming to Washington today, March 27, 1942, in connection with the matter.

From the files of the COI it appears that Charles Levy's front man from Tangiers is one Charles Michelson, who is described as "heretofore of Paris". He is further said to be effectively the owner of concessions for the installation of broadcasting stations in French possessions ranging from St. Pierre, to those in the Caribbean, the Pacific and the Indian Ocean, as well as Madagascar, Dakar and, finally, Tangiers. In Tangiers a local station has been in operation for some time. Under date of October 28, 1941, the file shows that the chairman of the Keith-Orpheum Corporation, Mr. Richard C. Patterson, Jr., at the suggestion of Roger Gilbert and Camden McVey of the Atlas Corporation, informed Colonel Donovan that they had been approached by Michelson and a Mr. Paul Winkler with a proposition to form an American company to exploit the above-mentioned concessions. Colonel Donovan queried

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Ray Atherton of the Department of State and, under date of November 12, 1941, received a reply stating that the matter might be of some interest to the Department but that Mr. Atherton did not believe that the present political situation was such that an American company could actually obtain permission from the French authorities to establish and operate radio stations as proposed. Colonel Donovan then wrote to Mr. Patterson (November 21, 1941) giving him the substance of Mr. Atherton's letter. This elicited a reply from Mr. Patterson (November 27, 1941) that in view of war conditions "we have decided temporarily to hold this proposal in abeyance unless you (Colonel Donovan) in your official capacity consider it wise to proceed with its development". Nevertheless it seems from what Charles Levy said, that negotiations are still going on.

With respect to the "miraculous" arrangement of the political situation in regard to the radio franchise, Levy alleges that it was arranged through the intermediary of Juan Beigbeder, Suñer's predecessor as Foreign Minister of Spain. (We have a little information on Beigbeder. He was an army man before the Spanish civil war and spent much time in Spanish Morocco in military service. During the civil war he became High Commissioner in that territory.

- 7 -

He is thought by many to be the greatest authority on Spanish Morocco. He became Foreign Minister of Spain in August of 1938 -- before the present world war began -- and was succeeded by Suñer in October, 1940, after the downfall of Franco. He is not particularly pro-German, not very fond of Hitler, and that is supposed to be one reason he lost his cabinet post, another reason being an alleged liaison with a British woman named Mrs. Fox. His moral reputation is not too good. However, he is believed to represent the pro-allied interests to a considerable extent. His present whereabouts and occupation are unknown.)

Levy implied in his remarks that Beigbeder had been bought. In fact, he said he could show me a letter written in Beigbeder's own handwriting with regard to the status of the radio concession, but said it would have to be treated with the greatest confidence because if the Franco people knew anything about it Beigbeder "would be shot immediately".

It is interesting to note that when Levy approached me last December he was interested in taking part in a proposed company to operate the Axis ships seized by the Mexican Government, and wanted "advice" in anticipation of the old Paris trial charges being raised against him by enemies. I referred him to the Maritime Commission. I am now in-

- 8 -

formed reliably that he was sold the ship project by one Cohen, previously one of his five Paris lawyers, presently a refugee in Mexico. Cohen has got in with the presidential clique and recently Levy has received information that Cohen's activities were more than dubious. He has consequently abandoned the promotion of the proposed company.

According to a well-informed source who has been intimately acquainted with Levy over a long period of years, the latter achieved his amazing financial success on the basis of inside information and through the influence exerted on his behalf by French cabinet ministers. He was apparently successful in bringing into camp successive Prime Ministers, and, according to Paris rumors, several French cabinets were formed in his private apartment. Levy himself told me that he always had the French Prime Minister dining at his table.

Apropos of the Latin countries of Europe and America, Levy expressed his firm conviction, based, he said, on very precise knowledge, that there was no Latin statesman who could not be persuaded to change his political attitude; that there was no Latin statesman who could not be bought, and few, if any, newspapers which could not be influenced. He explained that he had had great experience in these fields of endeavor.

- 8 -

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
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- 9 -

The foregoing gives an impression of a boastful and antipathetic personality. In fact, his ways are most winning; his personality is very agreeable, and in conversation he is extremely plausible. Beyond doubt he is a man of exceptional talents and tough and daring resourcefulness. He emphasizes his patriotic motives and his determination to do something in the good cause. If nothing more useful presents itself, he plans to enter military service. On the occasion of our conversation last December, he showed me a copy of a letter which he had addressed to de Gaulle offering his services in any capacity. He said, incidentally, speaking of his qualifications for work of a confidential nature, that although he never took notes, he had never forgotten a name or a date or a place.

He professes to be on very friendly terms with Chautemps. I hear from reliable outside sources, however, that he is trying to avoid contact with Chautemps and that he is not the source of any funds finding their way into the pocket of the former Prime Minister.

We are living in unusual times; Charles Levy-Savoy is an unusual man. He might be a trustworthy scoundrel.



John C. Wiley.

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL DORRAN

The sinking of the S. S. Struma in the Black Sea received relatively so little attention in the principal American newspapers and is, on the other hand, stirring the Hebrew and Yiddish press so violently that it has seemed worth while for us to get out a fairly long memorandum on this subject, and I believe that you will find it worth while to look through this memorandum and note particularly the attacks upon the British.

This memorandum is being sent, as usual, to the Departments of State and Justice, O.F.F., etc.

WCF
Dewitt C. Poole


Enclosure

FROM: DEWITT C. POOLE

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
WASHINGTON, D. C.
OFFICIAL BUSINESS


PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE TO AVOID
PAYMENT OF POSTAGE, \$300

Clippings Enclosed



L'enquête se poursuit
sur les agissements
de Charles Leroy
et de ses comparses

Le juge d'instruction a obtenu
de nombreux documents



Une
d
es
d'e

Georges J. B. H. H.
(Suite en 2^e page, 1^{re} colonne)

Charles Lévy & C^{ie} hauts pères de la finance

Le 15 Mars 1934

Cher Monsieur,

Je vous prie de m'excuser de ne vous avoir pas écrit plus tôt. Je suis très occupé par les affaires de la banque.

Je vous envoie ci-joint le rapport que vous m'avez demandé. J'espère qu'il vous sera utile.

Je vous prie d'agréer, Monsieur, l'assurance de ma haute estime et de ma haute confiance.

Charles Lévy

C'est grâce à son frère
oué Paul Lévy
qui fut en Espagne

LE SCANDALE
CHARLES LEVY

UT

Les opérations judiciaires

Les personnes suivantes

APRES LE DEPART

Notre camarade Pierre Bloch
demande l'invalidation
du réactif contre Lepale

son

LAIT

(F. I. O.)

Le scandale Charles Lévy n'est pas seulement une affaire judiciaire

Pendant que la juge d'instruction
s'occupe activement des délits commis
le gouvernement de son côté, devrait
fournir quelques éclaircissements



... d'une opération qui
incombe aux banques d'Etat, qui
sous le contrôle du gouvernement
à de grandes banques offrent des
garanties et que le contrôle du
verdict.

O. RENOUARD

(Suite en 2^e page, 4^e colonne)

U.S. INFLUENCE

ÉDITION
DE PARIS

LE SCANDALE CHARLES LEVY

Le scandale Charles Lévy

Suite de la première page

A l'instruction

Les magistrats de Charles Lévy ont été
chargés d'instruction et de mener à
bien l'enquête sur les opérations de
Charles Lévy. Les magistrats de la
justice ont été chargés d'instruction
et de mener à bien l'enquête sur les
opérations de Charles Lévy. Les
magistrats de la justice ont été chargés
d'instruction et de mener à bien l'enquête
sur les opérations de Charles Lévy.

Nouvelles du Parlement

La commission Stavisky ne sera
pas saisie du scandale de la Société
Spéciale Financière

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

FOURTH NATIONALITIES BRANCH

Number 9

March 18, 1948

**The Struma Catastrophe as Reported
in the Jewish-American Press**

In The Day, March 1, 1948: "Scene of the tragedy was five miles away from the city of Constantinople, former capital of Turkey. A scant month earlier a ship called the Struma docked at Constantinople with some 770 Jewish refugees from Rumania on board. Most of these refugees were from Bukovina, which formerly belonged to Soviet Russia but which in the present war has been taken over, together with Bessarabia, by the Rumanian murderers....

"770 refugees were among those who determined to exert their last strength in an effort to escape, if possible, from the Rumanian hell..... These Jews, therefore, sought out the ship Struma and began negotiations with her captain to take them to Palestine. The captain warned them the ship was old and that he could not guarantee to bring them safely to port. Besides, he pointed out to them that the ship had room for not more than 120 people.

"The unfortunate Jews, however, wanted to save themselves. The Captain's warning did not faze them, for they considered a watery grave better than to remain in Rumania to be tortured by the Rumanian murderers.

"Upon payment of a large sum of money, the captain agreed to undertake the voyage. He packed the ship with men, women and

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FOREIGN NATIONALITIES BRANCH

children much as one packs herrings in a cask. The voyage was a terrible one, and the unfortunate refugees suffered the pangs of hell. For weeks the boat wandered on the Black Sea, more than once in danger of being broken up by stormy seas. Many of the refugees fell ill, some died, some went mad. Finally, one fine morning, the exhausted wanderers saw the Turkish coast. Before the ship docked Turkish officials came on board to forbid them to land. The refugees had no visas, and the Turkish Government refused to allow them to land or to grant them transit permits for Palestine. The refugees were in despair. They immediately appealed to the Jewish Agency in Jerusalem for succor; otherwise, they were in danger of being returned to Rumania. The Jewish Agency immediately applied to the British Administration in Palestine. It also appealed to the Colonial Office in London. But both groups of officials closed their ears and their hearts and refused to listen.... The only concession made by the British Government was that London instructed her Ambassador to Turkey to issue visas to those among the refugees between the ages of 13 and 16 years of age. This, however, meant that entire families would be disrupted....

"All this took place at the beginning of February when the Struma reached Constantinople; and this week [on February 23th] the tragedy took place by which 770 refugees were released from their suffering....."

The Forward of March 3rd printed the following report as coming from a "reputable source in Jerusalem":

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FOREIGN NATIONALITIES BRANCH

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"Jerusalem, February 27th. We received the news of the Struma catastrophe on the morning of February 25th through the Vichy News Agency. At our request the Palestine government quickly cabled Ankara for a full report. Meanwhile, the government banned publication of the news about the Struma refugees. But the news spread by word of mouth. The conference of the Workers' Council, then being held in Tel Aviv, interrupted its session on account of the terrible catastrophe and immediately organized a street demonstration. In the afternoon the Workers' Youth organized another street demonstration on An-Nebi Street. The police stood by. At the request of the Vaad Leumi [National Committee] all places of amusement were closed. In the evening the Vaad Leumi held a special meeting called upon the demand of the Histadrut [Palestine Federation of Labor]. This meeting, with the agreement of the Tel Aviv municipality, determined to call a general strike and a self-imposed curfew.

"Next morning, the 26th, papers appeared with black borders and carried suitable passages from Psalms, since the censor kept forbidding publication of the Struma news. From noon to late at night the strike and self-imposed curfew were in effect throughout the country. The streets were empty; there were no demonstrations. The discipline of the community was marvelous.

"Finally, on February 27th, the press came out with full details concerning the Struma. The manifesto of the Jewish Agency was printed in large type...."

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In a front page article on March 4th, The Day announced that Dr. Abba Hillel Silver, prominent Cleveland rabbi and chairman of the United Palestine Appeal, is en route to London to demand thorough investigation of the Struma tragedy, punishment of those responsible, and adoption of policies in Palestine which will make repetition of such incidents impossible. Both Under-Secretary Sumner Welles and Ambassador Winant helped expedite Dr. Silver's arrangements for the trip, according to The Day.

Dr. Silver will also confer with leading Britains about Zionist and Jewish affairs; and he will attempt to achieve greater unity of policy and method between American and British Zionists.

On March 5th, The Forward carried an article under the date line "Jerusalem, March 5," stating that a petition demanding the appointment of a parliamentary committee to investigate details of the Struma catastrophe was being circulated in Palestine under the auspices of the Vaad Leumi. Traditional Purim celebrations, balls and parades were suspended.

Under a London date line, the same issue reports that Assistant Colonial Minister Harold MacMillan was sharply questioned on the Struma catastrophe by two members of Parliament, S. S. Silverman and Eleanor Rathbone. MacMillan indicated that, pending receipt of further details, the British Government placed full confidence in the Palestine Administration. In the United States the Emergency Committee for Zionist affairs has interested a number of Congressmen in the Struma affair, which may soon reach the floor

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

FOREIGN NATIONALITIES BRANCH

of the Senate.

*Jewish-American Press Reactions
to the Struma Catastrophe*

During the week ending March 1st, the entire Yiddish press was filled with repercussions of the Struma incident. The Zionist organizations in particular seemed determined to take full advantage of the incident to affect public opinion in the United States and Palestine, to highlight the deficiencies of British colonial administration in Palestine, and to step up the propaganda for the establishment of a Jewish army. The storm of protest in the United States culminated in a mass meeting on Sunday evening, March 1st, held in the Capitol Hotel in New York City under the auspices of the Poale Zion, the Jewish National Workers Alliance, Pioneer Women's Organization, Habonim (Labor Zionist Youth), Federation of Rumanian Jews in America, and the United Hebrew Trades. This meeting, attended by two thousand people, heard speakers denounce the conduct of British authorities in Palestine and demand changes in the British policy on refugees. Resolutions denouncing British colonial authorities were adopted and sent to the British Ambassador; copies were forwarded to President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Hull.

Yiddish press reactions of the preceding week were summarized by M. Danzis in The Day for March 1st: "This week the entire Jewish world was horrified by a terrible tragedy which occurred on the Black Sea....We do not know just how the ship was destroyed. We only know that most of the 770 refugees lost their lives. We

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FOREIGN NATIONALITIES BRANCH

also know that the guilt for this mass murder falls on the consciences of the British officials who closed the doors of Palestine in the faces of these Jewish wanderers and refused to allow them to enter the land which is called the Land of Israel....This terrible tragedy -- not the first which has taken place in connection with Palestine, not the first for which the British Government is responsible -- aroused a storm of protest in the entire Jewish world. The Agency for Palestine, which tried unsuccessfully to save these unfortunate refugees, protested; the Emergency Committee for Zionist Affairs protested; Dr. Chaim Weizmann, who conferred with the Colonial Office about the matter, protested; protest demonstrations in New York and throughout the country are being planned...."

On March 3rd, The Forward wrote that "Although the Turkish Government had dealt with the Struma refugees in a barbarous fashion, the entire blame, nevertheless, falls upon the Palestine Administration, that is, upon High Commissioner Sir Harold MacMichael. The Jewish Agency twice warned in writing that not to admit the Struma refugees would mean either certain death through the sinking of the ship or through allowing the refugees to fall into enemy hands. The fate of the refugees was determined only by the Palestine Administration, not by London, since the Administration had the authority to admit such refugees. High Commissioner MacMichael has gratuitously and to no purpose sullied the name and honor of the English people, which bears no blame for this barbarous treatment. To allow him to remain in Palestine

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FOREIGN NATIONALITIES BRANCH

cannot patiently be borne. The Yishuv [the Jewish community of Palestine] is now strongly demanding liberation of the refugees from the ship Darlan who are suffering greatly in an internment camp. Return of those deported to Mauritius, and admission of those Struma refugees who saved themselves and did not fall into enemy hands, are also among the Yishuv's present demands."

The Forward also reports in the same issue that American Zionists have telegraphed President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill to demand a change in the Mandate Powers' policy on Jewish refugees in Palestine. The telegrams support the Yishuv's demand that Sir Harold MacMichael be removed.

The Day for March 3rd devotes a full editorial column to the Struma incident, and speaks bitterly against those Jews "who are against open protest. They believe that 'quiet diplomacy' is better. But such people do not understand our Jewish masses, nor do they take into account our sentiments and feelings. They do not know that the Struma tragedy has stirred the entire Jewish world to the depths of its being; that wherever one went one heard bitter and angry speech about the catastrophe. Jewish leaders, therefore, owe an obligation to the Jewish public in the present incident and it would simply have been a crime if our masses had not been given an opportunity to come together and give expression to their accumulated distress."

The editorial maintains that protests are necessary if similar tragedies are to be averted in the future: "To such protests London will have to hearken, and will be forced to take suitable

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FOREIGN NATIONALITIES BRANCH

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action; and not only London but Washington too, which today is so highly esteemed in London, will have to hearken to these protests and let London know that such crimes....do neither Britain nor the democracies in general any good. For such a crime as this gives the lie to everything for which Britain pretends to stand, to all her pretenses that the present war is a conflict for freedom and justice...."

In the same issue of The Day a columnist, Z. Bluster, points out that if the British hope to discourage similar attempts on the part of Jews in the future by such means, their policy has already been refuted by such experiences as the Patria incident some years back. And if they hope to appease the Arabs, they are similarly due to frustration. "Why", he asks, "has this happened? Because the British Empire is yet ruled by old, marrowless bags of bones, by typical colonial officials with their moldy minds and dull brains. See what is going on now about India, and you will also understand the Struma catastrophe. India is a problem not only of today and of yesterday. Nevertheless, nothing was done until the Japanese had arrived before Rangoon and not far from Calcutta. And at the last moment, the mighty Empire which bears the white man's burden had to beg the Chinese Chiang Kai-shek to have the goodness to argue with Ghandi to lend a hand. In the Arab world Imperial victory is detained by 770 unfortunate Rumanian Jews! Dry bones and dunderheads don't know any better!"

On March 4th, The Day's editorial praises the work done thus far by the Emergency Committee for Zionist Affairs in connection with the Struma, but once again appeals for mass protest meetings.

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

FOREIGN NATIONALITIES BRANCH

March 27, 1942

MEMORANDUM TO COLONEL DONOVAN

An interesting feature in the development of the Foreign Nationalities Branch is the aid which so far we have been able to obtain from volunteer helpers at Princeton and Harvard and from Lithgow Osborne and his group at Albany. Since Bowman and Reynolds on our staff have good connections at the Universities of Wisconsin and Minnesota, and volunteer workers on those campuses could be of particular help in connection with the Scandinavian and Middle Western German elements, we are taking advantage of a trip West by Bowman to look into possibilities at those two places.

The preparation of instructions for Bowman has led to some further definition of the function of this Branch. So we are taking the liberty of sending you a copy of these instructions in order to obtain the advantage of your comments and to ask at the same time your opinion respecting the wisdom of seeking to develop more widely the system of volunteer assistance. I may add that what we have had currently in mind was to hold any further extension within pretty strict limits out of obvious considerations of prudence.

- 2 -

Recently two officers of the Budget Bureau spent two hours with us inquiring about the practical operation of the volunteer system. They said that the Attorney General had recently dropped a hint that his Department might not care to continue to service the Government generally in respect of foreign-language-press scanning. Did we think it possible that this whole business might now be organized on a volunteer basis?

The answer was that it seemed out of the question for the Department of Justice to rely simply on volunteers for the gathering of prosecutorial data. Even with respect to our strictly political interest it had to be remarked that the press scanning now being done by a paid staff in the Special Defense Unit of the Attorney General's Office was indispensable as a foundation, so to speak. What we obtained from our volunteer workers, though of the very first value to us, had still to be considered as auxiliary. Conceivably, we might in time come to rely upon volunteer workers alone, but we would need to have a longer experience with them than we had yet had in order to know that their present excellent effort would be sustained.

At the same time, we went on to observe, the volunteer system presented two marked advantages. The first was economy. It was more than just a question of

- 3 -

saving some salaries; the services of trained intellectual workers were secured for the press-scanning such as could not possibly be employed in considerable numbers for work of this kind within the Civil Service framework. Of course, the volunteer service was not had for absolutely nothing. Administrative and clerical expenses at headquarters were measurably increased by the added flow of material; but one might surmise that additional cash outlays on this account would not run over ten per cent of what it would cost to have the work done -- and done not so well -- on a paid basis.

The second advantage of the volunteer system was to be found in the moral satisfaction accruing to the volunteers. Here were men and women who remained at their necessary peace-time tasks but still could be made to feel that by the donation of work done in their evening hours they were contributing in a direct and congenial manner to the national cause at a critical juncture. The good effect on civilian morale, though numerically very limited, was still something to be borne in mind.

The gentlemen from the Budget Bureau expressed interest and appreciation, and intimated that they would be back later on to talk further.

- 4 -

It would be much appreciated if you could find time to scrutinize the attached instructions to Bowman. They constitute in effect a basic statement regarding the work of this Branch, which of course is still in an early stage of development, and your comments and directives would be of the greatest assistance.

WCP

DeWitt C. Poole

C O P Y

From: D. C. Poole

March 26, 1942

To: Mr. F. F. Bowman, Jr.

During your trip to Wisconsin and Minnesota please make inquiries respecting scholarly volunteer workers (such as Professor Meritt and his associates at Princeton) who may be found at the University of Wisconsin or the University of Minnesota, or both of them, to help us in our study of foreign political activity among the German element in the United States, also the Scandinavian elements and also the Finnish.

As you know, our interest relates to the unfolding of foreign politics in the United States as manifested in the activities of individual leaders among the foreign-language groups, the reactions to the activities of these leaders among resident aliens of the same nationality and citizens of recent extraction; inter-relations among the various foreign-language groups and their leaders -- such, for example, as the Swedes and the Finns; and also reactions on the part of the foreign-language groups and their leaders to political events abroad and decisions and acts of the United States Government in the field of foreign politics.

In political study and appraisal of this kind,

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scrutiny of the foreign-language press is obviously of great importance; and it is extremely helpful to have the foreign-language newspapers and magazines read by university men of the type -- let us say again of Meritt at Princeton -- who combine working command of languages with a broad historical and general cultural background and a lively sense of the actual in the current movements of political life. It would be of great use if you could find volunteer helpers of this sort on the campuses you will visit, who would undertake to scan the German-language press, at least in part, and also that in Danish, Norwegian, Swedish and Finnish (to which Dutch might also be added) and send us regular reports.

These reports, as has just been indicated, should be much more than mere summary translations of the contents of papers and magazines from week to week. Rather they should be estimates and appreciations at brief intervals of political developments within each group and among the groups, always in relation to the foreign field, based mainly perhaps upon press extracts, but also upon some personal contact with leaders in the respective groups and the general body of resident aliens and citizens who make them up. Attention may also well be given to foreign-language radio broadcasts in case

-3-

any can be listened to with regularity.

In conveying the perspective helps the precise kinds of information which our general task requires us to have, the following outline may be of use:

I. Foreign political activities in the United States.

1. a. Personal data on recent refugees who may be accounted political leaders (Who's Who).
- b. Their organizations and the more informal groupings among them.
2. a. The established national group by groups (aliens long resident here and citizens of the first & later generations): their number, distribution, social-economic position, etc.; the leaders among them (Who's Who) - as distinguished from the refugee leaders.
- b. Their organizations.
3. Current political activities, with particular regard always to foreign political stimuli; public meetings. (In all cases where public meetings are of importance, advance information is desired as to date, place and purpose (ostensible and real); and a subsequent report or reports on the actual event. The latter should not be just a record of superficial aspects but a penetrating appraisal of the political significance of the event and its probable consequences.)

II. Repercussions within the nationality group or groups in the United States from political events abroad or policy decisions by the United States Government.

1. Political events abroad -- such, for example, as the Russian attack on Finland in 1938,

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the Finnish counter-attack of 1941, the starvation of Greece, the sinking of the S.S. STRUMA, and so on.

2. Policy decisions of the United States Government -- such, for example, as the United States warning to Finland in the autumn of 1941 not to press the counter-attack on Russia further; the possible declaration of war by the United States on Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria, etc.

The foregoing suggestive outline has been written down with one or another single foreign-nationality group in mind. However, inter-group relations and the more complex reactions connected therewith must also be kept in view and are certainly of no less interest to this Branch. So -- to illustrate -- it is an important part of our task to observe how the international politics of Central Europe are reflected among the corresponding nationality groups in the United States, not alone within each group, but also among the groups. What are the current relations between the Slovaks and the Hungarians; the Hungarians and the Rumanians; the Czechs and the Poles; the Bulgarians, Slovenes, Serbs and Croats? And so on. Similarly, in the Scandinavian region, what are the current relations between the Finns and the Swedes, the Swedes and the Norwegians? And so on.

The problem of inter-group relations leads to the question of the current political relationship of each foreign-nationality group with the general body of the American nation and so with the United States Government.

-6-

Problems of war-cooperation and loyalty then arise. In this shadowy zone the interest and competence of the Foreign Nationalities Branch comes not too sharply to an end. As you are well aware, we are not directly concerned with morale-building -- that is the task of O.P.F. and O.C.D. Also we are not policemen; we are not concerned with sedition, secret meetings, sabotage and betrayal. That is the province of F.B.I. Nor are we exerting ourselves to obtain ev. lence of such nefarious activities. If evidence of the kind comes perchance into our possession, of course we transmit it to the right quarter, as any other good citizen would do.

Our province, let it always be understood, is foreign politics -- foreign politics as they are unfolding within the United States. As in the time of the last World War, but now in an even more advanced degree, the United States has become a busy arena of foreign political activity. This interesting historical phenomenon derives its being and its intensity from two principal facts -- first, in no other large area of the world today is anything like free political life permitted; secondly, the United States has long been the haven of the oppressed and its body politic a veritable ethnic reproduction of the other politically important parts of the world. Therefore, to study from day to day and from moment to

-3-

moment the unfolding of foreign politics within the United States is a governmental function that is imperative and vital.

You should make this clear to those with whom you talk, and by so doing give them the assurance that any contribution which they may elect to make as volunteers to the work for which we are responsible will give support directly and at a crucial point to the national cause.

DCE/cc

FOREIGN NATIONALITIES
BRANCH

CGI

FRANCE

SECRET**SECRET**

H. G. H. C. R. R. R.

OFFICIAL ONLY

SECRET - AMPL - NOT SENT

APPENDIX A

10 Dec 43

OPERATION "ANTILE"

The following plans are to be prepared in order of priority shown below and submitted to G-3 (Plans), A.P.H.Q. as early as possible.

Reference Maps:

EUROPE

1:500,000 (Air)

Sheet: MAREUILLE, NICE

BREM, MULELAND, TORINO, VERONA.

A. Plan "WIPER"

Plan for liquidation of all enemy opposition on ILES D'AMEROS. All these islands to be dealt with about D-day.

B. Plan "DIPPER"

Plan to prevent all troop movements between area SAVARY - incl. CAVALAINE and 20 miles inland (about D-1).

C. Plan "FLOAT"

Plan to cover area SOUTH COAST OF FRANCE to hamper troop movements within the limit of exploitation, namely 200 miles.

D. Plan "TOPLINK"

Plan to assist in containing the greatest possible number of enemy troops in NORTH ITALY between now and D-Day.

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U. S. SECRET

SECRET

OPERATION "ANVIL"

SECRET - AMPL - AMPL - AMPL

SECRET

PLANT OFFICER PLANT OFFICER

Map: 0808 40408 Sheets: 348 SW. 348 SW.

OBJECT

The liquidation of enemy opposition on ILES D'HYDRE.

APPRECIATION

The fact that the civilian population has been evacuated from these islands precludes the use of OSS/OS agents in the pre D-day period. However, there are specific tasks which are outlined below which might be satisfactorily accomplished by detachments of S.A.S. (Note: It is not recommended that OSS/OS be used as, the islands having no civil population, their language qualifications are better reserved for use on specific targets on the mainland).

TASKS - in order of priority are as follows:

- (i) The severing of communications between all three islands and the mainland.
- (ii) The elimination of the gun positions at points 192891, 199865, 197868 on the ILE DE PORQUEROLLES, and at points 298858, 290856, 300870 on the ILE DE PORT GROS covering the entrance to the channel. Gun position at point 398871 on ILE DE L'EVANT also to be attacked.
- (iii) To assist in cutting the boom between ILE DE PORQUEROLLES and ILE DE PORT GROS.

These attacks to be put in simultaneously with the landing of RANGER battalions.

22 Dec 43

SECRET

U. S. SECRET

SECRETSECRET - AREA - WEST TROOPOPERATION "ANTHRO"APPENDIX A-2HEAVY ARTILLERY PLAN "ANTHRO"**OBJECT**

To prevent all troop movements between area SAVANT - fact, CAVALATHE and 10 miles inland (about D - 1).

APPRECIATION

Road and rail communications in this area are few, therefore any movement within that area can be controlled by cutting these communications at as many points as possible. It is not the intention to attempt demolitions on a large scale, but rather to effect as many small acts of sabotage as possible in order to keep these routes closed for a minimum period of 12 hours, bearing in mind the necessity for the subsequent use of these routes by our own troops.

It must be appreciated that road targets will necessarily be more difficult than rail, but the main efforts will be concentrated in the areas around the 10-mile boundary with the intention of precluding the introduction of enemy reinforcements into the area.

The forces necessary to accomplish the tasks are as follows:

- (i) JEDDURON teams, consisting of 2 officers and one W/T operator, whose work is to take command of existing groups in the periphery of the area to deal with modified targets.
- (ii) O.G.'s of O.S.S. or detachments of S.A.S.
- (iii) The "maquis" groups, under O.S.S./S.O.E. guidance who will engage in harassing tactics.

The tasks can be divided into four main headings:

- (a) Cutting of all rail communications within the area.
- (b) Attacking road targets.
- (c) Attacking airfields with the object of
 - i. Hampering the use of enemy fighter aircraft by attacking aircraft on the ground.
 - ii. Hindering the landing of enemy reinforcements by air.
- (d) Complete sabotage of all telephone and telegraph communications within the area.

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TOULON

Particular attention to be paid to the **PORT OF TOULON**. The intention is to place within the Port "counter-landing" parties, consisting of 1 French Naval officer and one W/T operator, working direct to this HQ, whose main task will be:

- (i) To disable Signals communications by attacks on telephone exchanges and port control, in order to hamper enemy attempts to immobilise the port.
- (ii) To prevent all demolitions within the dock area.
- (iii) To sabotage tugs and lighters to assist in the prevention of laying blockships.
- (iv) To prevent, by diversion, the destruction of all Power Stations.
- (v) To observe and warn any alteration in the position of buoys and landing marks.
- (vi) To act as pilots to invasion craft on D-day.

NOTE: This Naval force has been specially trained by S.O.E. and are under S.O.M. A.F.H.Q. control. The troops are an exceptionally good type and are particularly suited to the tasks in hand for the following reasons:

- (i) They have a knowledge of the **TOULON** dock area.
- (ii) They have the added advantage of being better able to recruit saboteurs from French Naval dockyard workers, having regard to the still present feeling of French Naval personnel towards the Allied Forces.

22 Dec 43

- 2 -

SECRET

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1942 - 1943 - 1944

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SECRET PLAN SECRET

A. OBJECT

To prepare a plan of the action to be taken by G.S.S./S.O.S. organizations to hamper enemy troop movements within the limits of exploitation of "ANTIL" plan, namely, NORTH coast of FRANCE to a depth of 200 miles.

B. INTRODUCTION

1. During the past three years LONDON has built up various types of resistance organizations in FRANCE supplying weapons, communications, organizers and arms.
2. LONDON's primary interest has naturally been in the former Occupied Zone, but considerable organization exists in the NORTH.
3. The SOUTHERN area has naturally suffered in the supply of arms and material.
 - (a) owing to distances from U.K. bases;
 - (b) non-availability of aircraft from W. AFRICA bases during the summer of 1943. (Available aircraft being fully employed on GOMERICA and ITALY);
 - (c) The mountainous nature of the terrain makes clandestine delivery practically impossible during certain winter months, although the areas form a natural refuge for many thousands of outlaws who are potential saboteurs and guerrillas.

C. FORCES AVAILABLE WITHIN "ANTIL" AREA

1. The forces available within S. FRANCE fall into two main categories:-
 - (a) Immediate action groups which are organized to deal with specific targets and will on D-day have the function of carrying out sabotage. They are to a small extent already equipped and engaged in this work.
 - (b) The large potential represented by sympathetic groups which are not active now but which come into action on D-day provided they are armed. It is difficult to provide details of numbers with any accuracy owing to the claims made by the various interested political movements.

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REF ID: A6 (0000)

B. Detail of Forces in ANVIL Area**(a) The Armee Secrete**

This is not in fact an army but its effectives are drawn from members of the organized Socialist resistance movements who are not outlawed.

They are in effect members of secret societies who lead normal lives for the most part and meet only in secret to carry out special tasks.

They will become an effective force only on D-day if supplied with arms and directed to specific types of activity.

In the area under consideration they are divided into five "regions" each with its own regional structure.

It is estimated that at the present their numbers amount to some 70,000 of which approximately 3,000 are armed.

(b) The Franc Tireurs and Partisans

Controlled by the Communist party, most of the day-to-day acts of terrorism and sabotage have been carried out by these groups. They do not form part of the "Armee Secrete" but are willing to co-operate on D-day, and have come to "live and let live" agreement with other organizations.

They are estimated to be well armed and disciplined and with high security; but although very numerous in FRANCE as a whole are largely centered in the industrial North; in the area under consideration they number at least 10,000 men mainly concentrated near LYONS and MARSEILLES.

(c) Armee de l'Armistice

The professional army retained by FRANCE under the terms of the armistice with GERMANY consisted of 100,000 men. Considerable amounts of material, arms and transport were "cached" during 1940-43 until it was disbanded on the occupation of the former Z.N.O. in November 1943. Though the Germans have seized a proportion of their stores, large supplies are estimated still to be available.

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GROUP - ACTIVE - SECRET

RECEIVED 1-1-1945

Considerable elements of this army remain clandestinely organized and certain categories of troops even remain camouflaged for non-armed duties with consequent retention of discipline.

The organized number still in existence is at least 20,000.

In view of its military origin this group owes allegiance to the C-in-C of the ~~French~~ forces but because of its association with the ~~Vichy~~ administration its relationship with other organizations has not always been easy.

It is however to be considered as an important factor on D-day owing to its mobility, discipline and high officer content, and steps have been taken to ensure co-operation.

(d) "MAQUIS" Groups

The "maquis" is a general term covering all those members of the different resistance organizations who are living as outlaws. A great number are refugees from the "relays" and are drawn from the 1939-45 classes which are legally subject to forced labour service in GERMANY; they probably number 100,000 but are sparsely armed.

Owing to their age the majority have little military experience though some groups have older men and even parts of military formations living with them and acting as instructors.

The groups vary in size but are seldom more than 100 strong, although frequently a large number of such groups is found in isolated farmsteads in one area.

A regional structure, parallel to that of the "Armee Secrete", has recently been formed though by the nature of their existence large numbers are as yet not under any control. The Communist party is particularly interested in the "maquis" as it is part of their policy to recruit and succour all those who are on the run.

These groups are continually being hunted by the GERMANS and where they are armed often become involved in open battle.

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SECRET**U. S. SECRET****SECRET - ARVIL - NOPT SECRET****APPENDIX 222 (Cont)**

They are found everywhere in the high ground but are notably concentrated on both sides of the MOONE VALLEY and in the ALPS bordering the ITALIAN frontier.

(a) **LONDON GROUPS**

These groups exist all over the area and are organized on a cellular basis being designed to attack a number of specific objectives.

The organizers are in the majority of cases PARTISAN officers fully briefed and sent out from LONDON.

Their objects are very precise and their discipline strict so that, although the numbers concerned are small, they can be relied upon to carry out to the letter any orders given.

Their specific objectives include industrial targets, airfields and a network of targets throughout the railway system.

Material for the execution of their tasks is generally available.

D. FORCES AVAILABLE FOR INFILTRATION

1. Pre D-day:

- (a) Clandestine agents; organizers, W/T operators, instructors, to join existing organizations.
- (b) Allied liaison missions for reconnaissance and information purposes in areas at present little organized.

2. D-day and Post D-day

- (a) Small teams of Allied officers with W/T link for contacting, instructing and directing existing groups to specified targets.
- (b) Operational groups and detachments of J.A.S. for attack on specific targets as a military operation.

E. PLAN

- 1. To continue the policy of discouraging the population of FRANCE from taking any action until instructed by the Supreme Allied Commander.

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U. S. SECRET

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SECRET - ANVIL - MOST SECRET

ATTACHED 5.6 (cont)

2. To build up the strength and control of those groups situated in the most favorable strategic areas:

(a) by the infiltration of organizers and W/T links

(b) by infiltrating by all possible means further stores of arms, explosives, food, clothing, medical supplies, etc., together with instructors.

3. To use on or after D-day specially trained uniformed Allied troops with, if possible, linguistic qualifications, for carrying out specific strategic tasks as a military operation.

4. The infiltration of teams of Allied officers to organize FRENCH groups to carry out specific strategic tasks.

5. To encourage, by propaganda, those portions of the population which, although sympathetic to the Allied cause cannot be organized and supplied, to act in accordance with the direction of the Supreme Allied Commander.

7. CONCLUSION

It will be seen from the foregoing that there are in ANVIL area considerable forces organized and available on D-day, a large numerical proportion of which can only become effective if properly armed and directed to specific action.

3 December 1943.

BIGOT - ANVIL - MOST SECRET

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SECRET

U. S. SECRET

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SECRET - AMPL - MORE SECRET

ATTACHED 5-2

OPERATION "ANTIL"BRIEF OUTLINE PLAN "TOPLINE"SUBJECT

To assist in containing the greatest possible number of enemy troops in NORTHERN ITALY between now and D-day.

PLAN

The plan is divided into three phases:

- (i) To prevent movement of enemy troops and continually harass lines of communication on the North - South routes running from A.P.N.C. area into that of 15th Army Group.

To be accomplished by C.G.'s of G.S.S. and detachments of S.A.S.

- (ii) To provide diversions during the period approximately D-28 to D-day, by organized resistance in the LOMBARDY Plains and particularly in the UDINE area.

To be undertaken by partisan groups under the direction of O.S.S./S.O.E.

- (iii) To sever the lines of communication on the FRANCO-ITALIAN frontier to prevent movement of enemy troops into FRANCE on or around D-day, attacks to continue until D-day + 10.

To be effected by JEDBURGH teams and partisans under the direction of O.S.S./S.O.E. and assisted by the Committee of Liberation.

It is appreciated that the success of operation "ANTIL" will largely depend on the ability to prevent the movement of all enemy troops from NORTHERN ITALY into FRANCE on or about D-day.

THEREFORE, every effort will be made in the intervening period to ensure that all targets are properly prepared before D-day and ready for execution at two days' notice.

These targets to be closely co-ordinated with those on the FRANCE side of the frontier.

22 Dec 43

NOTE: A detailed plan will be submitted in due course by Italian Headquarters of S.O.E./O.S.S.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES


INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Mrs. O'Donnell
FROM: Major Doering
SUBJECT: U. S. Relations with the French

DATE: 13 July 1943

Dr. Langer is making a very important study on the entire subject of our relations with the various French groups, particularly in connection with the African campaign. He would appreciate it if you would deliver to him all the material in your files bearing on this subject. If you have any question regarding the scope of the material to be given to Dr. Langer, I suggest that you discuss it with him.

CC to Dr. Langer


Jr.

Material to Langer
Subject: France Groups

- ✓✓✓ Eddy folders - 6, 7, 8.
- ✓ France - 7912
- ✓ Fighting French 10,968
- ✓ France - 10,991
- ✓ France - 6591
- ✓ France - 6554
- ✓ France - 6634
- ✓ France - 5989
- ✓ France 5874
- ✓ State Dept - 3874
- ✓ N.B.C 4486
- ✓ France - 3554
- ✓ Fighting French 9367
- ✓ Fighting French 9027
- ✓ Fighting French 8861
- ✓ France - 7030
- ✓ de Gaulle 8589
- ✓ de Gaulle Org 5998
- ✓ Fighting French 9223 A
- ✓ Free French 7839
- ✓ Free French Nat Comm 7732
- ✓ State Dept 6804
- ✓ No no. Some Considerations Situation - France

✓ France - 8250 - cumulative material

✓ France 11,280 (one specimen, on continuous)

~~Eddy folders 1, 4, 2, 3, 4, 5.~~

~~"My Plan for North Africa"~~

~~A. Murphy Report~~

all documents
relieved for
Mr. Langer
8/3/43

SECRET

22 October 1943

Lieut. Colonel J. J. P. Le Bel
 Chief of Staff
 French Military Mission
 1759 K Street, N. E.
 Washington, D. C.

Dear Colonel Le Bel:

I am in receipt of your letter of 25 September 1943 addressed to Colonel Huntington setting forth the arrangements concerning the detachment of French soldiers to OSS.

As regards the termination of assignment of these soldiers to OSS, I understand that it is not the intention of the French Command to withdraw these men on short notice, unless such action is actually agreeable, and that in any event your action would be governed by conditions existing at the time. I understand, further, that the men will be allowed to communicate with French Military authorities, providing, of course, that such communication does not in any way jeopardize the security of the mission on which they might be engaged, and that the agreement to notify the French Military Mission as to their destination and time of departure refers only to their general, rather than their exact destination.

I am most appreciative for your cooperation in this matter and trust that these arrangements have been concluded in a manner entirely satisfactory to you.

Very sincerely yours,

William J. Donovan
 Director

Copy: Copeland

SECRET

MISSION MILITAIRE FRANCAISE
BOX 2601-ORIS
WASHINGTON 9 D.C.
No. 2970/P

September 29, 1943

Colonel Huntington,
Office of Strategic Services,
E. O. Box 2601,
Washington 13, D.C.

Subject: Agreement between the
French Military Mission
and the Office of
Strategic Services.

Dear Colonel Huntington:

1. It is understood that the detachment of soldiers at the U. S. S. is temporary. They remain members of the French Armed Forces.
2. The French Command may decide at any moment that their assignment to the U. S. S. has come to an end and may recall them under short notice.
3. They will draw their pay from the French. The amount of their pay will be communicated to the U. S. S. and, for practical reasons, the French cannot pay them on account of their location, the American authorities will take charge of the payment. The refund will be made to the American authorities by the French Military Mission in Washington.
4. The expenses attached to a specific mission will not involve a refund from the French Military Mission.
5. They must be allowed to communicate freely with the French military authorities stationed at their location.
6. The French Military Mission will be informed when and where these volunteers are going to be sent overseas.
7. Those having their families in France will be allowed to assume another name than their own.
8. Their mission will remain a purely military mission. No "plain clothes" duty could be assigned to them, if not on a strictly voluntary basis.

A. J. F. Le Bel,
Lieut. Col., Chief of Staff,
French Military Mission.

7-10-66
13.5
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
SECRET

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Director, OSS
FROM: F. L. Meyer
SUBJECT: NANA Chain

DATE: September 4, 1953.

Attached you will find a translation of a report by
the head of the NANA chain, together with comments on it by SELLER.
I thought this would be of interest to you.

Shown to Col. Sands.

F. L. M.

Send to Gen Magruder.

SECRET

COPY

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R 971

August 20, 1943

MEM - Wash.

TO OICAR FROM SILKY:

The following report has just been given to me personally by the head of the NANA chain, with whom I conferred in San Sebastian when he came out of France for the purpose. For your information, NANA went into France for us on July 1. This is the result of his work up to August 12, when he came out. He is returning tomorrow August 21. I am sending his report on the organization along to you to give you some idea of how he has set things up.

In addition to the information below, he has given me complete details of all his contacts and letterboxes; these are being enciphered and will be kept for use if contact with NANA himself should be lost.

We are arranging to send him a skate tomorrow and hope that he will have it transported to the territory where it will be used and have it operating around the 1st of September.

I think you will be interested in the general remarks at the end of this report on intelligence work and on resistance groups in France. Further to this he has pointed out to me in conversation that the resistance groups are the only ones in France that are not armed and that Algiers is averse to providing them with arms. This is generally considered an error in France, because such groups will

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have no defense and can take no action against communists and the anti-Bolshevik League and other fascist organizations. Thus it is that the people on whom the Allies must depend most for assistance when invasion comes in helping in battle and in helping to keep order, are the only ones who do not have the means to do this, much less to defend themselves.

HANA is responsible for the very fine map of Marseille, which has already been forwarded to you.

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1.

BEAULIEU SUR MER

My agent in this town seems to be active and discreet. I have asked him to set up a service of information which will deal with the following two main subjects:

- Passage of troops at NICE
- Coastal fortifications from TOULON to the Italian border.

On this latter point I have asked him to concentrate particularly on the bay at JUAN LES PINS, as this is one of the most advantageous spots for a landing operation.

2.

At present he has two agents working for him. I have made him set up a letter-box at NICE so that his mail can be collected. This letter-box will be connected with the central letter-box at PAU.

3. Personal Relations

I was able to establish contact with two information organizations at PAU and TOULOUSE. They were working for the French S. R. (Service Renseignements), but their activity was on a reduced scale due to lack of funds. These organizations had been sounded out by I.S. but had refused to work for it. They agreed to work for the American S. R. (Service de Renseignements ?)

4.

I have placed this group under the direction of a man at PAU. This man is extremely active and of great value from the point of view of information. He has an entree to the railway employee's organization (Patrie) and to different administrative organizations, such as: Bridges and Highways,

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Police, etc. He has been working for quite a while with the different organizations of resistance in the area and with the S.T.O. (Forced Labor Service) dissidents, who refuse to leave for Germany. For this reason, many persons who wish to serve are constantly turning to him. These include former officers of the 2nd Bureau, demobilized officers, members of the police force dismissed through German pressure, etc.. All these are qualified persons, and as they can introduce us everywhere, they can be of great service to us.

5.

ORGANIZATIONS

I have set up four areas and placed them under this man's direction:

1st Area.....	Bordeaux, Pau, Spanish border.
2nd "	Pau, Perpignan, Spanish border.
3rd "	Perpignan to the Italian border (Mediterranean coast)
4th "	Nice, Geneva, Italian border, with Lyon and the Rhone Valley.

6.

At the head of these areas are three regional chiefs; the 1st and 2nd regions are placed under the direction of one chief.

7.

At present there are 28 regional agents, 3 regional chiefs and the chief mentioned in Paragraph 3, making a total of 32 agents. (The railway employees keep a check on the troop movements).

8.

Seven letter-boxes have been set up in these regions and an eighth box is being set up at NICE. Others will

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SECRET

be set up little by little according to need. All the letter-boxes are connected with a central letter-box at PAU where the man mentioned in Paragraph 3 keeps a check on the mail. All mail is passed on by railway men, mailmen or others.

9.

The mail is then carried to SAINT JEAN DE LUZ for transportation into Spain by way of SAN SEBASTIAN once a week.

10.

In case the letter-box at SAINT JEAN DE LUZ should fail, another one has been set up at BAYONNE. It is ready to function. We are setting up a letter-box at ERUN. French railway men will undertake to deliver it there. This will insure more rapid service.

11.

RESULTS OBTAINED

A first batch of mail was carried into Spain toward the latter part of July and a second delivery is expected to follow shortly.

12.

The first batch contained important information, such as the complete plan of the fortifications and different posts at MARSEILLE, the plan of MONT DE MARSAN etc. An officer of the Deuxieme Bureau is shortly to furnish us with the map of BORDEAUX and the coastal fortifications of BORDEAUX to HENDAYE. An Italian officer was sent into Italy. He has just returned to France and his report will soon arrive in Spain.

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13.

Agents have been sent to the coastal regions of BRZIERES, MARSEILLE to furnish us with plans of this region's fortifications. This is the most advantageous region for a landing from the Mediterranean. The request for information on the airfield at ISTRES has been transmitted.

14.

SUMMARY

At present three organizations are functioning; their documents must not be considered duplications as their sources are different. Their order of importance:

15.

1. Organization at PAU: At present, 32 agents.

16.

2. Organization at VICHY: At present 5 agents.

17.

3. Organization of BEAULIEU SUR MER: At present 3 agents.

18.

REMARKS

a) The working conditions of all these agents are naturally very difficult from a material as well as a morale angle, and it is indispensable to:

- Maintain the contact between them and you as possible.
- See that they get the necessary funds when they need them.

A radio transmitting and receiving set is indispensable, if only to maintain liaison and to transmit orders.

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b) Until August 2nd the Cote d'Azur was occupied by the Italians and it was possible to travel freely without being checked on. Since then the Germans have occupied NICE,

-5-

SECRET

JUAN-LHS-PINE and GARNIER. Without doubt, traveling will become more difficult.

19.

THE ORGANIZATIONS OF RESISTANCE AND THE DISSIDENTS OF THE S.T.O. (Forced Labor Service)

It is estimated that in France 3% of the population is pro-German, 45% will help us actively, and 50%, although hostile to the Germans, prefers to wait for the end of the war and does not wish to intervene now.

20.

Included in the 45% which are ready to help are:

- a. Those belonging to the S.N. (Information Service, 2nd Bureau)
- b. Others have formed "organizations of resistance", such as "PATRIE" (railway employees), "COMBAT" and "FRANC-TIREURS". They want weapons so that they will be able to take effective action when the time comes. All these organizations seem to be grouped under one leader whose headquarters are in France.
- c. The dissidents of the S.T.O. (Forced Labor Service) are young men of from 20 to 23 years old who refuse to leave for Germany. Some have already been grouped under the direction of the chief of the organizations of resistance. At present a great effort toward regrouping is being made.

21.

According to the information I have been able to gather, they are about 200,000 strong. 60,000 in the Pyrenees, 90,000 in the SAVOYAN ALPS, 30,000 in the MASSIF CENTRAL and 20,000 in CREUSE, DORDOGNE and CORREZE. These young men lack funds and weapons.

22.

It would be an advantage to have all these organiza-

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tions of resistance and the S.F.O. dissidents supplied with the necessary weapons to be used when the time for intervention comes. Algiers does not seem to agree with this, and some are afraid that these men cannot be disarmed after the war, but will use the weapons in some revolutionary movement. At any rate, the intervention of an armed force in France, coincidental with the liberation of the territory, seems indispensable, and in my opinion there will be no danger in furnishing these people with arms.

TR/AM

SECRET

SECRET

14 May 1946

The Honorable Herbert H. Lehman
 Director, Foreign Relief and
 Rehabilitation
 State Department
 Washington, D.C.

Dear Governor Lehman:

As a result of a conversation with your personal
 Donovan sent a cable to London asking for a report on the
 shipment of 4,000 children via France in last year for the
 known private.

Our representative in Rome has replied after
 discussion with Donald A. Lanza stating that the incidents
 in question took place in August, 1944, and February, 1945.
 The facts were presented to the Legislature in a general manner
 random upon which cable notes dated June 9 to the State
 Department was based. Our representative has summarized as
 the situation as follows:

"Unless our government is willing to give
 consideration to a broad program whereby, in
 reciprocity for temporary asylum here, we
 guarantee the issuance of visas under the law
 and the granting of transportation to the United
 States or elsewhere and possibly some assurance
 with respect to supplementary shipments of food
 in order to provide for the care of children
 here, I do not see that much can be done in re-
 gard to this type of situation."

If any further communication is received with
 respect to this matter we shall keep you informed.

Sincerely,

G. Edward Burton
 Acting Director

SECRET

Date: 7/19/43

To: Major O.G. Doering

Re: Memo July 8, 1943 from Whitney
H. Shepardson re two cables in
connection with 4000 children

Will you please check this?

G. Edward Buxton

SECRET

G. Edward Buxton
Assistant Director

126781

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10
Check with
Bureau JEB

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Colonel Burton

DATE: 8 July 1945

FROM: Whitney H. Shepardson

SUBJECT:

On June 21, 1945 General Donovan sent the following cable to our man in Bern:

" 4000 children ranging from the ages of 2 to 14 were being sent without adult escort via Paris in box cars destined for some unknown points, according to a wire, dated June 9, sent by Donald A. Loria of Y.M.C.A.

" Is it possible for you to investigate the circumstances of such activity? From your position can you suggest ways by which the children can be aided?

" Your recommendations and report are requested at the soonest possible date."

Our man in Bern replies (July 3, 1945, just received by me) as follows:

" Have discussed the matter with Loria. Unless our government is willing to give consideration to a broad program whereunder, in reciprocation for temporary asylum here, we guarantee the issuance of visas after the war and the granting of transportation to the United States or elsewhere and possibly some assurance with respect to supplementary shipments of food in order to provide for the care of children here, I do not see that much can be done in regard to this type of situation. A problem of this type hardly comes within the scope of my activities here and since similar conditions exist in virtually all the countries which are under

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

Colonel Duxton,
page 2.

German domination, its ramifications are broad. It is my understanding that no telegram was sent by Kuntze that there was presented to the Legation a general memorandum and that it was on the latter that telegram No. 5456 dated June 9 was transmitted to the Department. The incidents to which you refer relate to the month of August and February."

Since this matter originated with a discussion between Governor Lehman and General Donovan, you will doubtless wish to inform Governor Lehman of the present state of the matter. Perhaps you have already done so.

W.H.S.

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

France
x Children
x State Department

18, June 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Sheperdson
Card. Halliwell.

Regarding the attached cable concerning the French children. I talked with Gov. Lehman about this today and have told him I would wire Allan Dulles suggesting that he look into the matter and make recommendations as to what we should do on humanitarian and psychological warfare grounds.

I wish that both of you fellows would talk together to see if you approve the attached cable and if so forward it at once.

RJD

VCH
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased and
not be communicated
to anyone. (50)

Home
Dated June 9, 1943
Halla 7105 P.M.

Secretary of State
Washington

3465, June 9, 1 p.m. (SECTION ONE)

CONFIDENTIAL

D. Donald A. Lowrie, World Alliance YMCA
at Geneva reports as follows regarding refugee
children in Southern France.

"Since autumn 1942 nearly 1000 children between
the ages of 2 and 14 have been deported through
Paris to unrevealed destination loaded in windowless
box cars 60 to 1 car without a single adult escort,
without food, water hygienic provisions. French police
under German orders are now attempting census of
about 6,000 abandoned children remaining in France
(5000 Jewish and 1000 Spanish) who are being secreted
mostly in peasant homes by members of private wel-
fare organizations under the patronage of church
leaders both Protestant and Catholic. The work is
carried out only with extraordinary difficulty and
at great risk and condition of children generally is
wretched. Of these 6000 about half have been placed
in families in the Italian occupied zone but what
is to be done

-2-, 3485, June 9, 1 p.m. (SECTION ONE) from Bern

is to be done with remaining 3000 is becoming an acute problem. Their transportation and concealment is more and more dangerous and resort to their clandestine transportation into Switzerland or Spain is envisaged in spite of reluctance of authorities of those countries to receive and care for them and the vigilance of border police of all countries concerned".

My 340 January 15 reported rejection by Laval Government of State Department's humanitarian proposal to continue arrangements for regularized departure from France of 5000 children and my 929, February 11 indicated that Laval promised to consult with the German since then nothing has been heard.

HARRISON

WSB

LSH
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (GC)

Bern

Dated June 9, 1941

Rec'd April 1941

Secretary of State,
Washington,

1941, June 9, 1 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

It would seem of no avail to request Swiss
authorities to renew representations on the subject
since there has been no indication that either the German
or French authorities might be inclined to a favorable
response and developments have been anything but
promising.

If official sanction were given I suppose interested
welfare organizations would be in a position to
undertake the care and feeding of at least some of
these children if clandestine departures were effected
providing temporary asylum for them either in Spain
Portugal or Switzerland. It is not yet demonstrated
that any considerable proportion of them might succeed
in leaving France but should such prove to be the
case it is possible that we it found practicable to
give some assurance to either Spain or Switzerland
or both regarding the current provisioning of the
the children and their subsequent disposal

these

-2- 75465 June 9, 1964 (URGENT) from Bern

These governments are not willing to relax their
restrictions against clandestine entry of
these unfortunates.

Reported to Madrid.

(END OF MESSAGE)

MURKIN

WSD

AFRIKA-POST

WOCHEBLATT FÜR DEUTSCHE TRUPPEN IN TUNISIEN

DIE SCHLACHT IN TUNISIEN

In der letzten Zeit haben die deutschen Truppen in der Schlacht in Tunesien eine Reihe von Erfolgen erzielt. Die deutschen Truppen haben die italienischen Truppen in der Schlacht in Tunesien eine Reihe von Erfolgen erzielt. Die deutschen Truppen haben die italienischen Truppen in der Schlacht in Tunesien eine Reihe von Erfolgen erzielt.

Und schließlich, am 6. und 7. März, gilt es, die letzten Reste der italienischen Armee in Tunesien zu vernichten. Die deutschen Truppen haben die italienischen Truppen in der Schlacht in Tunesien eine Reihe von Erfolgen erzielt. Die deutschen Truppen haben die italienischen Truppen in der Schlacht in Tunesien eine Reihe von Erfolgen erzielt.

UND NUN -- RÜCKGEHT !

Die deutsche Armee hat in der Schlacht in Tunesien eine Reihe von Erfolgen erzielt. Die deutschen Truppen haben die italienischen Truppen in der Schlacht in Tunesien eine Reihe von Erfolgen erzielt. Die deutschen Truppen haben die italienischen Truppen in der Schlacht in Tunesien eine Reihe von Erfolgen erzielt.

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DIE R. A. F.

Die deutsche Luftwaffe hat in der Schlacht in Tunesien eine Reihe von Erfolgen erzielt. Die deutschen Truppen haben die italienischen Truppen in der Schlacht in Tunesien eine Reihe von Erfolgen erzielt. Die deutschen Truppen haben die italienischen Truppen in der Schlacht in Tunesien eine Reihe von Erfolgen erzielt.

IM FAHRE

Die deutsche Armee hat in der Schlacht in Tunesien eine Reihe von Erfolgen erzielt. Die deutschen Truppen haben die italienischen Truppen in der Schlacht in Tunesien eine Reihe von Erfolgen erzielt. Die deutschen Truppen haben die italienischen Truppen in der Schlacht in Tunesien eine Reihe von Erfolgen erzielt.

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IM LAZARETT

Die deutsche Armee hat in der Schlacht in Tunesien eine Reihe von Erfolgen erzielt. Die deutschen Truppen haben die italienischen Truppen in der Schlacht in Tunesien eine Reihe von Erfolgen erzielt. Die deutschen Truppen haben die italienischen Truppen in der Schlacht in Tunesien eine Reihe von Erfolgen erzielt.

WOCHENBLATT DER DEUTSCHEN TRUPPEN IN TUNIS

THE BATTLE IN TUNISIA

[illegible][illegible]

AND NOW - REVEAL

AND NOW THE KEY !

now Rjev. Tiflis, Stalingrad, Kurck, Rostov, Kharkov, and Caucasus territory (not including the losses of the entire bridgehead opposite Kerch) that is the exception of the small last three months in Russia is the end story of the fight. Who has not been to explain to the German army this keypoint which it is almost impossible to exaggerate, and whose neglect which was announced in the military more than 17 months ago, 3rd March, to German hands for in the first months of this town was successfully defended attacks. It was among the strongest the strongest defence and a edghead defences. The most famous of the famed comrades must have lost their lives there in bitter defensive actions. All in vain ! And now the road to Stalingrad is open to the Russians.

A Russian general said recently that the German generals in Russia had only made one strategic mistake but that this mistake is of supreme significance. The mistake was that the military leadership was given to Hitler personally. And Hitler wanted to conquer and hold every-thing at the same time. He wanted to conquer the Ukraine, Czechoslovakia, and the Donets Basin. He wanted to conquer the Caucasus to follow the advice of his generals. He was not prepared to follow the advice of his generals. He was not prepared of more important sectors. He set the German fighting forces a task beyond their powers. And like the famous fox in the fable who wanted to keep everything. In the Churchill expressed the same opinion three weeks ago in a speech in which he said that he seemed to recognise the bad of the master in the German strategy in Tunisia. Only Hitler could be expected to send still more troops to Africa, although every sensible strategist must see that no German troops will return from Africa.

THE PLAN

[illegible]

IN THE PACIFIC

THE PACIFIC

THE QUESTIONS WHICH WE ASK

THE QUESTIONS WHICH WE ASK

I was first the special Edmunds' business partner

A wife is the most important person in the world.

the Light Mountain Infantry Regiment 7th Air Division
A New Army Regiment 7th Air Division

the larger their real potential as German prospects here.

IN THE FIELD

IN THE FIELD HOSPITAL

IN THE FIELD HOSPITAL

A correspondent writes:
A couple of days ago I visited a British reception station
into which were being brought the wounded from the
front lines after the first hospital had attended to the
light cases. There the doctor led me into a long
passage about 100 yards long, with white sheets laid
out along each side. On each sheet lay a man, some-
times looking back towards his comrades. Doctors and nurses
about the place were busy attending — and the men
were silent, calm and peaceful. And the highly organized

They were all German-wounded prisoners of the fighting during the last days of February. I spoke with many of them and each expressed openly his deep gratitude and recognition of the treatment, both medical and human, which had been accorded to him. Some stated that, because of the excellent care they were receiving, they had lost all of their anxiety, and confessed that because they thought they would be flying home, they knew their anxiety was without foundation. They now are the prisoners they receive exactly the same medical treatment, care and nursing as the other English prisoners.

And it has been like that all the time, a young Berthine with Napoleon in his shoulder, side to me, as he fits comfortably and well hunched in bed. He doesn't tell me the circumstances in which he was captured.

French H. 227
* Chief of Staff
* Captain, The General

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: General Donovan, Director SI; Major Hutchinson DATE: April 27, 1948

FROM: Africa Section, SI

SUBJECT: French Air Lines in British West Africa

In accordance with the request of the British Empire Section of April 1, 1948 concerning material critical of our allies, the following report from Accra, dated April 12, 1948, is being sent only to you and to the other two whose names appear above:

"A conference was held on April 8th in Accra to settle the details under which the French Aero-Maritime commercial airlines could resume service between Dakar and Lagos. In spite of the fact that such a service would involve the security of the Accra Airport and possibly infringe upon existing agreements with Pan-American as far as Liberian traffic is concerned, the British neglected to invite any American representative other than the officer in charge of Traffic to the conference. U.S. Army Intelligence learned of the meeting only when a copy of the minutes was passed along to them on April 18th. British Intelligence Officers, including Colonel Dixon, head of British Security Control, were present, but, inasmuch as the security of the Accra Airport is the responsibility of the U.S. Army, explanations are in order. We have learned that A-2 will instigate a complaint against British G.R.Q. and will remind them, among other things, that existing contracts with Pan-American must be honored, and that no passage must be granted to individuals enroute to Dakar or Conakry from Rio de Oro, Portuguese Guinea, or other Portuguese territories in Africa without the consent of the Theatre Command."

R.B.

R. Boulton

Letter for Colonel Donovan
from Major D W King

This is in line with
General Belknap's request
to arm two or three
divisions at once and
have them relieve the
partly equipped divisions
on the Tamsui front
DCK

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Thompson 1964A
X Hughes letters
X Strickland, Robert
X Cable
X Political writing

MEMORANDUM

To: Colonel Wm. J. Donovan
From: Whitney H. Shepardson

The attached material has just been received from John C. Hughes, who sent it down for our information.

Fred Mayer has seen this.

WHS
W.H.S.

Attachments

SECRET

16642

MAR 3 1943
SECRET

March 2, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Whitney Sheperdson

FROM: Mr. John G. Hughes

Last evening Mr. Halpern sent me a memorandum, copy of which I attach herewith.

Probably you and Colonel Donovan are already aware of this but I suggest that you call it to his attention in case he has not heard of the same.

Mr. Halpern told me that when he was in Washington the day before yesterday he had seen a copy of this telegram.

J.G.H.

COPY

1st March, 1948

MOST SECRETMEMORANDUM

To: J. C. Hughes
From: A. J. Halpern

A telegram has been sent by the Foreign Office Representative (Mr. Mack) in North Africa to the Prime Minister in which he says that identical reports went from Mr. Murphy and General Eisenhower to the President, respectively to General Marshall. This telegram was communicated to the British Embassy.

The cable points out the growing disillusionment of the French troops in Africa which is due to the fact that the promised equipment has not arrived and that the troops have to fight under great disadvantage. This disillusionment combined with the reverses which we suffered in Tunisia have created a most unsatisfactory situation.

Apparently the political situation is not improving and Mack advises he and his American colleagues are of the opinion that more drastic steps are necessary in order to improve French morale. Such steps can be effected only in the direction of a political unity, and the creation of a united political organization for resisting (Overseas) France is imperative. Pressure must be exercised on Giraud and de Gaulle to agree on something on these lines.

0105 - 26-8-42

Once a friendly administration
has been established - - - leading to
enter into full collaboration with the
United Nations and their contribution to
liberation of France, - - - Government will
extend to Mad. all the economic and
financial benefits accorded to other
French territories which have joined
the United Nations - This will include
the early resumption of trade with
the United Nations & the guarantee by
His Majesty's Government of the
payment of salaries and pensions
to all civilian and military employees
in Mad. who continue to serve under
the new administration.

His Majesty's govt. have
no territorial designs on Mad,
Mad. remains French.

01558 - 20/4/42

Agreement C O S L F R 1 of 20th Aug

Following is list of conditions which you are requested to undertake to carry out in full circumstances as required.

- 1- The Civil, Naval, Military & Air force authorities in Mandate - will order the immediate cessation of hostilities to British & allied troops in Mandate & its dependencies.
- 2- The German Forces which surrender will be considered the losers of war.
(Note - this should not be included)
- 3- The Mandate authorities will immediately order all the administrative services in Mandate and its dependencies to continue their functions and to take such measures as the occupying authorities may require of them with a view to providing for all aspects for the maintenance of law and order throughout the territory.
- 4- - - - All buildings - - surrendered.
- 5- - - - all land - - jurisdiction - handed over.
- 6- - - All plans handed over - - -
- 7- - All bank equipment - - intact.
- 8- all archives - -
- 9- No ships to leave - - - without permission.
- 10- Foreign currency to be determined.

Many Frenchmen have asked the question why the RAF spared the famous Creusot works in their bombing operations. One of them quoted a member of the Schneider family which have controlled the armament industry at Creusot for generations as expressing amazement that the factories there remain untouched. That conversation occurred months ago at which time according to Schneider there was practically no anti-aircraft available at Creusot. The informant stated that while it is true that a considerable portion of the machinery had been removed from Creusot by the Germans and sent elsewhere, and the production of the factories was way below former capacity, they still produced an important quantity of cannon, machine guns and similar products. Creusot of course was the principal French gun factory. The informant said at the time that he could not understand all the fuss about ^{the} Renault Plant bombing which he thought a very satisfactory job, while Creusot continued the quiet production of armament which was more important to the Germans.

TO:

..... J. LONE, WILLIAM L. ROHMAN

June 30, 1942

The attached comes from Mr.
Rohman.

Wiley
FROM: JOHN C. WILEY

Private advices from France indicate today that recently there have been a number of serious food riots in Marseilles which have not been publicized. These riots are an outcome of operations on the "Black Market." There is great indignation in Marseilles over the distribution of food and the inability to get it except at extortionate rates beyond the means of the average citizen.

For example, a pair of shoes, listed at 800 francs in the official price list, cannot be obtained under 5,000 francs.

The entire grape supply is now going to Germany, the alcohol to be used obviously for industrial and war purposes. It is suggested that the Allies can make a very strong propaganda by short wave and other means against the seizure of the grape crop for the Germans on the ground that wine is an essential food and is required to sustain the falling energies of the French population which is now seriously suffering from malnutrition. This is an ideal subject for propaganda against the Germans, and the French people can be

-2-


called upon to resist the shipment of their grape crop.

Because of the decreasing physical strength of the French population, rentals for apartments in upper stories of residences have been cut in half. Apparently a good many Frenchmen have insufficient strength to climb stairs, and thus apartments in upper stories are going begging. This is true in both the occupied and unoccupied zones.

The French population, both anti-Vichy and pro-Vichy, is growing very restive. The precipitating cause is the constant talk of a second front. Obviously the anti-Vichy elements are anxious to participate in any mass attack upon the occupying enemy. The pro-Vichy elements are disturbed simply because they do not know where and when the blow will be struck.

R. R

RR:miw



James H. Keith 6731
** French Military Mission*

February 16, 1943

MEMORANDUM

From: Colonel Donovan
To: Mr. Wilmarth Lewis

In reference to our French Information Center, General Bethouart was in my office today. He wants to have the library available to the use of his mission. That seems fair, particularly in view of the fact that his mission is already installed in the building of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Also, he suggests that if there is any discrimination in favor of his group as against the de Gaullists, soreness would be created. It seems to me that we must fix up this library in such form that it could be available to both groups. Would you see if this could be done.

W.J.D.

Trench Instructions Order 6731

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: General William J. Donovan DATE: 18 June 1943

FROM: Office of The General Counsel

SUBJECT: Proposed Modification of OSS Contract with French Information Center Library

1. Since the CID has received several requests from the Army for the loan of French Information Center Library books and documents, it has been considered advisable to request modification of our original contract with the Center to permit us to make such loans.

2. The attached letter contains such a request and has been approved by Major Doering and Mr. Lewis (CID). Mr. Putzell has informed me that Mr. Villiet is agreeable in principle to the proposed modification of the contract.

3. The attached letter is therefore submitted for your approval and signature.

Sgt. P. F. Pugh
SGT. P. F. P.

Attachment

13 June 1945

Mr. Andre Vallist, Director
French Information Center Library
222 E. 49th Street
New York, New York

Re: OSS Contract No. 151

Dear Sir:

Reference is made to paragraph 8-a of the existing agreement, dated March 28, 1945, between your Corporation and the Office of Strategic Services (hereinafter referred to as OSS) which restricts use of the Library loaned to us under the agreement "to the location where it will be maintained", and does not permit "use of books and documents outside of this location".

In the course of performing our functions as an agency of the Joint United States Chiefs of Staff, we have received communications from other branches of the armed forces requesting the loan of several Library books and documents containing valuable information useful to such branches in their contribution to the war effort.

In view of the fact that such loans will materially aid prosecution of the war, we respectfully request that the contract now existing between your Corporation and OSS be amended to permit us to loan any of the Library's books and documents to responsible officers of the United States armed forces, upon proper receipt being given therefor, whenever we consider the request for such loan to be based upon a real need. It is expressly understood that such books and/or documents as may be loaned pursuant to the terms of this letter shall not be permitted to be taken outside of the continental United States. Should this

- 2 -

Proposed modification of paragraph 5-a met with your approval, we would appreciate your signing on behalf of the French Information Center, Inc., and returning to us, the enclosed copy of this letter.

Yours very truly,
Office of Strategic Services
By _____
Director

ACCEPTED in consideration of
one dollar (\$1.00) in hand
received and other good and
valuable consideration, re-
ceipt whereof is hereby
acknowledged:

French Information Center, Inc.

By _____

Title

PUGLIESE, PETERSON

Fr. Information Center 4781
70 Pine Street
New York, N.Y.

May 11, 1943

Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.
70 Pine Street
New York, New York

Gentlemen:

At the request of Mr. Andre Vuillet, Director of the French Information Center Library, 410 Fifth Avenue, New York City, we wish to inform you that the Office of Strategic Services, Washington, D. C., received on April 3-4, 1943, the books, vertical files, maps, posters, photographs and newspapers comprising the greater part of the French Information Center Library. We also received the following fixtures:

7 four-drawer and 6 three-drawer file cabinets, 9 library stacks, 1 sixty-drawer card catalogue, and 1 eight-drawer perpendicular file.

For the conditions under which the OSS received custody of said Library, we refer you to the contract signed by our office with the French Information Center, dated January 22, 1943.

No fire insurance covering the above property has been purchased by this office.

We also wish to advise you that under the supervision of a staff member of the French Information Center, an inventory is being made of all materials received by us under the above agreement. The inventory should be completed by May 15, 1943, although the preparation of a duplicate set of cards will require several additional weeks.

I trust that the above information will be satisfactory for your purposes.

Very truly yours,

WILLIAM J. DUNOVAN
DIRECTOR

By Direction:

PUGLIESE: PETERSON: N

Edwin J. Futsell, Jr.
Ensign, U.S.N.R.

French Inf. Center 67-1
Polk, Frank

Files

Edwin J. Putzell, Jr.

March 23, 1943

French Information Library Contract Closing

At 10 a.m. on Saturday, March 20, 1943, Messrs. Moran and Armand of OSS, New York, and the writer met with Andre Vulliet of French Information Center, Inc., Ralph M. Carson of Davis, Volk, Wardwell, Sunderland & Kiondi, counsel for the Center, and Mr. J. P. Gavron of Rockefeller Center, Inc., in the offices of French Information Center, Fourth Floor, 610 Fifth Avenue, New York City. The purpose of the meeting was the closing of the agreement for the use by OSS of the Library for the duration of the war, pursuant to the letter of Colonel Donovan addressed to French Information Center, Inc. and dated January 28, 1943.

Duplicate original executed copies of the Letter Agreement were exchanged by Messrs. Carson and Putzell. In addition, a check for \$18,000, the rental price of the Library, was handed by Mr. Putzell to Mr. Carson.

Mr. Carson then delivered to Mr. Gavron, representative of Rockefeller Center, Inc., a letter from French Information Center, Inc., stating that the use of the Library was being given to the Office of Strategic Services for a period of not less than sixty days after the signing of armistice between United States and Germany, as outlined in the aforementioned Letter Agreement. The letter also stated that OSS has the right to use the premises leased from Rockefeller Center and occupied by the French Information Center in La Maison Francaise, 610 Fifth Avenue. At that time, Mr. Gavron stated that he was also in receipt of a letter from Colonel Donovan to similar effect.

During the course of the exchanges of documents referred to above, certain of the details involved in the removal of the Library from New York to OSS, Washington, were discussed. These details included the typed inventory prepared by French Information Center, the method of handling the books in the course of transfer and the use of the Center's filing cabinets and library stacks by OSS.

- 11 -

Attached hereto are copies of the documents referred to above, together with a copy of the communication being sent this day to Mr. Vaillet of the French Information Center confirming his agreement to prepare certain papers in implementation of the transfer of the Library to OSS.

E.J.P., Jr.

French Information Center, Inc.,
c/o Frank L. Folk, Inc.,
Messrs. Davis Folk Hardwell Sunderland & Kienel,
15 Broad Street,
New York City.

January 22, 1947

Dear Sirs:

The Office of Strategic Services (hereinafter called OSS) wishes to acquire temporarily the Library, including all books, periodicals, newspaper clippings, photographs and other documents contained therein, known as the French Information Center Library, which you own and maintain at your office at 610 Fifth Avenue, New York City. All of this material relates to France and it is important that it should be available to the United States Government during the period of the present War. I understand that you are a French corporation and that none of your officers or directors are now in this country with the exception of Messrs. Andre Maurois and Frank L. Folk. In the circumstances, Mr. Folk, with the approval of Mr. Maurois, has undertaken to act for and on your behalf in this matter with the understanding that any agreement which he may so conclude is subject to confirmation and ratification by your proper officers and directors.

It is proposed that the Library shall be acquired by OSS upon the following terms and conditions.

1. The arrangement between us shall be from the date of this letter until sixty (60) days following formal notice given by either party to the other of its desire to terminate this arrangement, provided, however, that such notice shall not be given prior to the date of the signing of an Armistice between the United States and Germany.

In the event of termination by the United States Government of the activities of OSS or its successor or successors prior to the date of Armistice between the United States and Germany, you shall have the right to give formal notice of your desire to terminate this arrangement and obtain the return and installation of the Library in your offices in New York City.

2. During the period of this arrangement OSS will have possession of and the unconditional right to use and to make available on proper restrictions to other Government agencies the Library and all material contained therein. OSS will have also the right to use the quarters occupied by you at 610 Fifth Avenue, New York City, during the term of this arrangement, if it so desires; and you will take steps necessary to obtain the written consent of your landlord at said address to such use by OSS.
3. OSS shall have the right at its own expense to remove all or any part of the Library, including fixtures and equipment (but not office furniture, typewriters or supplies) to its offices at Washington, D.C., provided that upon the termination of this arrangement OSS shall as promptly as possible and at its own expense return the Library and any accessories thereto (as described in paragraph 3-b below) to New York City and reinstall the Library in your office there.
4. Upon the acceptance of this arrangement by you, you will furnish OSS with an inventory of all the Library books, pamphlets, periodicals, and other bound documents and volumes (but not clippings), fixtures and equipment which you turned over to OSS; and upon the termination of the arrangement, OSS will furnish you with a similar inventory.
5. In order that the Library may be maintained as a unit, to minimize loss of its material and to keep it up-to-date the OSS undertakes to use its best efforts
 - a. To permit the use of the Library only at the location where it will be maintained and not to permit the use of books and documents outside of this location; and
 - b. To keep up-to-date the Library files of newspaper and magazine clippings and other documentation relative to France.
6. You or your representative shall have the right periodically to visit the Library while in the possession of OSS in order to satisfy yourselves of its maintenance in accordance with the terms of this arrangement.

7. Upon acceptance of this arrangement by you and as a condition to the coming into effect hereof, you will pay you \$10,000 for the right to exclusive custody and use of the library and the material therein contained.

If the foregoing is in accordance with your understanding, will you kindly sign and return to me the enclosed copy of this letter.

Yours very truly,

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

By _____ Director

Accepted and confirmed:

FRENCH INFORMATION CENTER, INC.

By /s/ Frank L. Polk
Member of Board of Directors

March 16, 1948

Rockefeller Center Inc.
Rockefeller Center
New York, N. Y.

Attention of Mr. J. T. Gavron

Gentlemen:

We are presently occupying space in La Maison Francaise at 610 Fifth Avenue, New York, under a lease from you to the undersigned.

In accordance with the conference had with your Mr. J. T. Gavron this is to advise you that we are giving the Office of Strategic Services (a Federal agency) the right to exclusive possession and use of the French Information Center Library for a period commencing immediately and ending not less than sixty (60) days after the signing of an armistice between the United States of America and Germany.

In connection with the use of the Library we are permitting the Office of Strategic Services, if it so desires, to use the premises leased by you to the undersigned in La Maison Francaise so long as the undersigned remains a tenant and does not sublet the premises or assign its lease.

We understand that the Office of Strategic Services does not intend or desire to have the lease assigned to it or to become a sub-tenant of the undersigned. We will therefore continue as tenant under our lease and be obligated to you pursuant to the terms of the lease dated October 2nd, 1935, as amended and extended. All statements for rent and miscellaneous expenses and all notices will continue to be forwarded directly to the undersigned.

We are, however, desirous of subletting the premises or of assigning the lease. Accordingly we would appreciate your listing the premises as available for occupancy and giving us permission to proceed.

We would be indebted to you for advising us of your approval of the foregoing.

Very truly yours,

(signed) P.C. Cartier,
as Assistant Treasurer of the
French Information Center

March 20, 1943

Rockefeller Center, Inc.
Rockefeller Center
New York City

Gentlemen:

In accordance with our conversation with Mr. J. P. Gavron of your office, this is to notify you that the Office of Strategic Services is this day obtaining from French Information Center, Inc. the right to exclusive possession and use of the French Information Center Library for a period commencing immediately and ending not less than sixty days after the signing of an armistice between the United States of America and Germany.

While the French Information Center, Inc. is permitting OSS to use its quarters in La Maison Francaise at 610 Fifth Avenue, New York, N. Y., if OSS so desires, this office does not intend or desire to become an assignee or subtenant of the lease between you and the Center. The Center will continue as tenant and be obligated to you pursuant to the terms of its lease, dated October 2, 1935, as amended and extended. Accordingly, all bills for rent and miscellaneous expenditures will continue to be forwarded directly to the French Information Center, Inc., not to this office.

We are informed that the foregoing will be confirmed to you in a letter from the Center. This office would greatly appreciate being advised of your approval of this arrangement.

Very truly yours,

/s/ William J. Donovan

Director

March 22, 1943

Mr. Andre Vulliet
French Information Center, Inc.
Room 401
810 Fifth Avenue
New York City

Dear Mr. Vulliet:

This will serve to confirm the understanding arrived at in your office on Saturday last in connection with the transfer of the French Information Center Library to OSS, Washington, in accordance with the terms of the Letter Agreement between Colonel Donovan, Director of Strategic Services, and the late Mr. Polk on behalf of the Library, dated January 22, 1943.

On behalf of the Center, you will furnish us at your very early convenience:

- (a) A complete list of the periodicals and newspapers clipped by the Center for its Library as of March 18, 1943.
- (b) One set of title cards and one set of author cards for all books of the Library.
- (c) One copy of the documentation key covering the clippings files of the Library.
- (d) A list of the office fixtures and equipment which is being sent to OSS pursuant to the Agreement of January 22, 1943.
- (e) A list of the maps, posters and photographs owned by the Library and turned over to OSS pursuant to the Agreement.
- (f) A list of all books and documents loaned by the Library to Government Agencies, private individuals and firms and not yet returned to the Library. I further understand that you will write letters to each of the borrowers of such items informing them of the loan of the Library to OSS, and requesting that the items be returned directly to OSS. Copies of such letters are to be forwarded to us.

Mr. Andre Vassiliat

March 22, 1943

(a) Lists are to be prepared and forwarded by the Center requesting that all newspapers and periodicals subscribed to by the Center be forwarded hereafter directly to Central Information Division, OSS, Washington. You will notify us as soon as such letters have been sent out.

(b) You will furnish OSS with a list of those few books (such as children's books, etc.) which, it has been agreed, are not to be turned over to OSS, but with respect to which OSS has the right of use if necessary.

On its part, OSS will be pleased to furnish you with receipts for the several books, documents, fixtures, etc. lent to it by the Center pursuant to the aforementioned letter Agreement.

In view of the fact that we are most anxious to close out this matter as soon as possible, we will be indebted to you for expediting the foregoing at the earliest possible moment.

Very truly yours,

Edwin J. Putzell, Jr.

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C.

MEMORANDUM

FROM: C. W. Barnes per AEW

February 4, 1943

TO: Mr. Edwin Putzell

In connection with the voucher covering the \$18,000 payment to be made to the French Information Center Incorporated it is believed that it should be approved by the Director for the following reasons:

1. Since the payment will essentially constitute an "advance of funds" under the provisions of Executive Order No. 9001, it involves a related question of policy.
2. In accordance with paragraph 4 of Title 2 of Executive Order No. 9001 advance payments are to be made in accordance with regulations issued by the Director. In the absence of such regulations and in view of a Certifying Officer's liability the voucher should be approved by Colonel Donovan.
3. The approval of the voucher by the Director would constitute an affirmative indication of this agency's acceptance of the conditional terms set forth in paragraph one of the contract and the Director's acknowledgment that other conditions of the contract signed by him have been complied with.
4. It appears that a Certifying Officer of OSS other than the Director is not in a position to approve this voucher due to the particular questions of policy involved in the performance of the contract conditions.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Colonel Donovan

DATE: Feb. 9, 1943

FROM: The Secretariat

SUBJECT: Acquisition of French Information Library

1. On Sunday, February 7th, Mr. Frank L. Polk died. Because of his serious last illness, we were not able to iron out with him several details in connection with the rental of the French Information Library by OSS.

However, Mr. Polk did approve our draft of agreement, dated January 22, 1943, a copy of which is attached, and signed it on behalf of the French Information Center, Inc. The copy which he signed is in the hands of his law partner, Mr. Ralph Carson, and we believe that the matter can be closed with Mr. Carson.

2. The Secretariat has been informed by the Office of the Budget and Finance that it will be necessary for you to approve the voucher which must be submitted to the Treasury Department in order to make the \$18,000 payment to French Information Center, Inc. for its library.

3. In the opinion of Mr. Barnes' office, the payment of \$18,000 will constitute a so-called "advance of funds", under the provisions of Executive Order No. 9001. In the absence of regulations by you, as Director of Strategic Services, with respect to the manner in which such vouchers are to be certified and the manner in which such advance payments are to be made, it is deemed necessary to have the voucher for the \$18,000 approved by you, as set forth in Mr. Barnes' accompanying memorandum dated February 4, 1943.

4. If the attached copy of agreement and voucher meet with your approval, we would appreciate your signing those two documents in the spaces indicated by the pencil marks. We will then be in a position to approach Mr. Carson with a view toward closing negotiations and obtaining use of the Library.

E. J. P. Jr.

French Information Center Library
 & Correspondence

December 17, 1942

French Information Center, Inc.
 c/o Frank L. Polk, Esq.
 Messrs. Davis, Polk, Wardwell,
 Gardiner and Reed
 15 Broad Street
 New York City

Dear Sirs:

The Office of Strategic Services wishes to acquire temporarily the Library, including all books, periodicals, newspaper clippings, photographs and other documents contained therein, known as the French Information Center Library, which you own and maintain at your offices at 610 Fifth Avenue, New York City. All of this material relates to France and it is of the utmost importance that it should be available to the Government during the period of the present war. I understand that you are a French corporation and that none of your officers or directors are now in this country. In the circumstances, Mr. Frank L. Polk, whom you appointed one of the American trustees of the French Information Center Library, has undertaken to act for and on your behalf in this matter with the understanding that any agreement which he may so conclude is subject to ratification by your proper officers and directors.

It is proposed that the Library shall be acquired by OSS upon the following terms and conditions:

1. The arrangement between us shall be from the date of this letter until sixty (60) days following formal notice given by either party to the other of its desire to terminate this arrangement, provided, however, that such notice shall not be given prior to the date of the formal conclusion of peace between the United States and Germany.
2. During the period of this arrangement OSS will have possession of and the unconditional right to use and to make available to other Government agencies the Library and all material contained therein.

French Information Center, Inc.

- 3 -

December 17, 1943

3. OSS shall have the right at its own expense to remove any part or all of the Library to its offices at Washington, D. C., provided, that upon the termination of this arrangement OSS shall as promptly as possible and at its own expense return the Library and any accessions thereto (as described in paragraph 4-b below) to New York City and reinstall the Library in your offices there.
4. In order that the Library may be maintained as a unit, to minimize loss of its material and to keep it up-to-date the OSS undertakes to use its best efforts
 - a. to permit the use of the Library only at the location where it will be maintained and not to permit the use of books and documents outside of this location; and
 - b. to keep up-to-date the Library files of newspaper and magazine clippings and other documentation relative to France.
5. You will cause to be assigned to OSS or its nominee the lease with Rockefeller Center, Inc. covering the space presently occupied by the French Information Center at 610 Fifth Avenue, New York City, and OSS will assume the payment of the total balance of rent due and to become due thereunder not in excess of an aggregate of \$13,000.

If the foregoing is in accordance with your understanding, will you kindly sign and return to us the enclosed copy of this letter.

Yours very truly,

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

BY: _____

Director

Accepted and confirmed:

FRENCH INFORMATION CENTER, INC.

BY: _____

Trustee

Date: March 14, 1968

To: COLONEL DONOVAN

1. It is planned to have the closing on the French Information Library this Saturday morning at the offices of Davis, Holt, Randall, Sunderland & Kiesel. The Library is to be packed and delivered to OSS, Washington, on Wednesday of next week.

2. At the closing, it will be necessary for us to submit to Rockefeller Center, Inc. the attached letter, which is submitted for your approval and signature.


E.J. Jr.

Office of the Secretariat

(9139)

March 30, 1943

Rockefeller Center, Inc.
Rockefeller Center
New York City

Gentlemen:

In accordance with our conversation with Mr. J. P. Gavron of your office, this is to notify you that the Office of Strategic Services is this day obtaining from French Information Center, Inc. the right to exclusive possession and use of the French Information Center Library for a period commencing immediately and ending not less than sixty days after the signing of an armistice between the United States of America and Germany.

While the French Information Center, Inc. is permitting OSS to use its quarters in La Maison Francaise at 610 Fifth Avenue, New York, N. Y., if OSS so desires, this office does not intend or desire to become an assignee or subtenant of the lease between you and the Center. The Center will continue as tenant and be obligated to you pursuant to the terms of its lease, dated October 2, 1935, as amended and extended. Accordingly, all bills for rent and miscellaneous expenditures will continue to be forwarded directly to the French Information Center, Inc., not to this office.

We are informed that the foregoing will be confirmed to you in a letter from the Center. This office would greatly appreciate being advised of your approval of this arrangement.

Very truly yours,

Director

PUTZEL: JELSON

CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Colonel Donovan

DATE: December 19, 1942

FROM: Lt. Lee

SUBJECT: French Information Center Library

Mr. Putzell telephoned me yesterday afternoon to say that he had presented to Mr. Polk and discussed with him your letter offering to acquire the French Information Center Library for the duration of the war upon the terms set forth therein. This letter follows in general terms Mr. Polk's original letter to Mr. Lewis of November 20, 1942, proposing that OSS should acquire the Library.

Mr. Polk said that the letter was satisfactory, subject to two minor adjustments. In the first place, he would like the arrangement to continue for no longer than 90 to 120 days after the cessation of hostilities (rather than after the formal conclusion of peace). Secondly, he wishes to have the right to inspect the collection periodically to see that it is being maintained in proper shape. Mr. Putzell told him that both changes would be agreeable. It was then left that Mr. Putzell should work out the final phrasing of the letter with one of Mr. Polk's assistants who has been handling the matter directly. This man was out of the office yesterday and today but is expected to return on Monday. Mr. Putzell plans to close the matter with him in New York on Monday morning.

Mr. Putzell also said that yesterday morning, a representative of OWI called on Mr. Polk to protest the proposed arrangement with OSS and to induce him to transfer the Library instead to OWI. Mr. Putzell told me that Mr. Polk assured him that he had replied that he would abide by the proposal made in his letter to Mr. Lewis of November 20, as confirmed in your telephone talk with Mr. Polk yesterday. He repeated to Mr. Putzell that this was his intention.

I am asking Mr. Putzell to prepare a formal memorandum of his meeting with Mr. Polk.

D.C.L.
D.C.L.

cc: Mr. Wilmarth Lewis

October 18, 1942

Dear Frank,

On getting back from England I have found that there has been some discussion about transferring the Library of the French Information Center to this agency for the duration of the war. We already have smaller German and Japanese libraries, and the addition of this library would, I believe, concentrate in one place as remarkable and useful a collection of current foreign works as exists in this country. We have the space for this collection and a competent staff to administer it. We have, more important still, on our staff, scholars who would make the best use of the books wherever they are located. For their convenience, and to save their time, we of course hope that the Trustees of the Library will decide to lend it to us.

We are now, as you know, part of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and are contributing directly to military intelligence. That is to say, if these books came to us, they would be widely and immediately used for the benefit of the armed forces.

There are, I understand, certain conditions which go with the Library. I have had conflicting reports of what these are, but I can say for this Office that we shall be delighted to take the collection off your hands, to make it available to all properly qualified persons, to give it all reasonable protection, to dispose of it after the war as the Trustees desire, and to pay all expenses of moving the books here from New York, and, after the war, to whatever place is designated by the Trustees.

Yours sincerely,

Wilmath S. Lewis, Chief
Central Information Division

Frank L. Polk, Esq.
15 Broad Street
New York City

Dear Colonel: I have written the letter on a
small of a description of the library staff
working. Showing he had a reference
to the letter.

Wilmath S. Lewis

To: Colonel Donovan

April 27, 1942

For your information.

From the desk of
HUGH R. WILSON

COPY

REMARQUES SUR LA POSITION DE L'AVANT

Ce gouvernement nous semble suspendu de façon à ménager les transitions et à garder l'appui des milieux conservateurs qu'il avait trouvés ou acquis le Maréchal.

Sans doute les Allemands rappellent-ils à M. Laval que "l'homme du peuple, il doit prescrire à des réformes sociales" (N.Y. Times, 18 avril, Berlin View) et l'ordre nouveau, européen et français, est-il présenté comme "socialiste" (allocution du 20). Le choix, comme Secrétaire d'Etat au Travail, du vieux Lagardelle, jadis collaborateur de Georges Sorel au Mouvement Socialiste, plus récemment admirateur de Mussolini et de ses corporations, n'a par lui-même qu'une valeur symbolique assez réduite. Lagardelle n'a pas d'autorité personnelle dans le mouvement ouvrier. On doit cependant prévoir que la politique Puchot sera continuée. Les deux autres représentants de cette politique économique et sociale restent dans le Cabinet: Lefebvre à la Production Industrielle d'où dépend en fait le Travail et Barraud aux Relations Economiques Franco-Allemandes.

L'effort pour ménager les transitions et garder l'appui des milieux conservateurs apparaît dans l'absence d'hommes tels que Deat, Doriot, Spinasse... et la présence dans le Cabinet de Lucien Romier et de Joseph Barthelémy. Le premier a une réputation de libéralisme. Le second passait pour un élément "résistant". L'un et l'autre sont évidemment là pour conserver à Laval l'appui des milieux conservateurs, principalement

4000
catholiques, que le Maréchal avait ralliés, surtout après avoir ennuyé Laval.

Une importance particulière doit être attachée à la nomination à l'Agriculture, sous-secrétaire de ministre, de Jacques Leroy-Ladurie, leader de l'Union Nationale des Syndicats Agricoles, organisation puissante qui disait rassembler en 1939 plus d'un million de familles paysannes et contrôlée par des milieux catholiques de droite, proches de l'Aktion Française et liés, surtout dans l'Ouest, aux intérêts des grands propriétaires. Cette organisation a sa principale force en zone occupée, dans l'Ouest et le Nord, à un moindre degré dans l'Est et le Sud-Est où elle bénéficie de l'appui du clergé des campagnes. Un livre auquel ont collaboré deux de ses dirigeants, Salleron et Goussault, vient d'être préfacé par les Evêques de Lille et d'Arras, Edmond et Dutoit (France 1941 Paris Atlantia). On doit signaler cet effort vers la paysannerie conservatrice ou modérée, effort confirmé par l'attention de Laval.

Le ministre de l'Instruction Publique, Abel Bonnard, représente la vieille extrême-droite ralliée au Maréchal, l'Académie Française qui, depuis la défaite, se tourne vers la Nouvelle Revue Française de Drieu la Rochelle. Ministre également de la Jeunesse, il rencontrera le problème de l'unification des mouvements de jeunesse, question irritante avec l'Eglise.

- 3 -

1400

On doit insister sur le passage de l'attention de Laval qui évoque le danger de l'armée rouge sur le Rhin, à laquelle l'Angleterre livrerait la France. Un des chefs de la résistance ouvrière nous signalait déjà le 8 octobre 1941, que la propagande pro-nazie faisait "circuler le bruit suivant: comme les Anglais devront, s'ils gagnent, à la Russie de n'avoir pas été envahis en 1941, il faudra qu'ils donnent des pays au communisme, et pour avoir voulu éviter le nazisme, nous tomberons dans un mal pire." Ce sera l'argument type pour consacrer ou gagner au régime Laval l'appui des milieux de conservateurs, modérés ou qui simplement ont garde un souvenir mélo du Front Populaire.

21 Avril 1942

February 28, 1942

General George C. Marshall
Chief of Staff
War Department
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Marshall:

Thank you for your letter of the 12th on
the subject of radio programs intended to influence
the French Navy.

I appreciate your views and suggestions,
and the points you mentioned will be kept in mind.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

February 20, 1948.

Colonel William J. Donovan,
Coordinator of Information,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Colonel Donovan:

I have your letter of February 12, with the attached description of a propaganda project for a series of special radio programs intended to influence the French Navy. This project is acceptable to me.

The members of my staff who have studied the matter feel that there are two considerations which should be given some thought. One is the realistic attitude of the French officers, who are in a position to be influenced more by factual news than by argument. The other is the danger that German monitoring may lead to energetic counter measures if the program appears threatening.

I suggest that these two points be borne in mind when the program is executed.

Faithfully yours,


Chief of Staff.

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
INTEROFFICE MEMO

FROM: Wallace B. Phillips
TO: Colonel William J. Donovan
SUBJECT: Propaganda Campaign for the French Navy

DATE February 19, 1942

Commander Rihelddaffer called here this morning and presented the enclosed letter from Admiral Wilkinson.

Mr. Taylor then came in and a general discussion took place, the conclusion being that any Radio Campaign at this time directly addressed to the Officers and men of the French Fleet would fail in its purpose due to the fact that the use of radio to listen to foreign broadcasts is forbidden on French ships.

W.B.P.

enclosure

Approved for Release
and No.

Serial 0433016

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

FEB 19 1942

Dear Colonel Donovan:

Your letter of February 12, addressed to Admiral King, regarding special broadcasts for the French navy, has been forwarded to me for consideration and reply.

Your proposal and the detailed outline of the project have been given very careful examination, and I am outlining below the considered opinion of the several officers attached to ONI who are most closely concerned.

All the information which we have obtained on the French navy indicates that the older officers, roughly, senior lieutenant commanders and above, are pro-Darlan and anti-British. They are undoubtedly pro-Darlan because they consider that their own security as regards their position and possible pensions on retirement, as well as the actual physical safety of their families, depends upon collaboration with Germany. They are anti-British by reason of tradition and professional jealousy, and their antagonism has been intensified by British action since the fall of France, namely, Oran and Dakar.

The French officers of all grades can be considered as anti-DeGaulle, and so long as DeGaulle is supported by Britain as the leader of Free French forces, it is doubtful if any enthusiasm can be aroused.

The use of radio to listen to foreign news or propaganda broadcasts is forbidden on French ships, and it is doubtful if more than one or two broadcasts carrying propaganda could be made before it was identified and put on the proscribed list.

Insofar as regards Martinique, the Germans have already used the fact of supposed American propaganda in Martinique in order to bring pressure on the Vichy government. Any active propaganda directed at Martinique would almost certainly result in reprisals on the French, or in a demand that German representatives be permitted in Martinique to control the use of radio.

While the junior officers and probably the majority of ratings in the French Navy are anti-German and may be presumed to be pro-American, it is extremely doubtful if they would agree to cooperate with the British.


CONFIDENTIAL

Serial 0433016

CONFIDENTIAL

For these reasons I doubt very much the efficacy of any attempt to influence the French Navy by propaganda, and believe such attempts inadvisable.

Sincerely yours,



T. S. Wilkinson,
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Director of Naval Intelligence.

Colonel William J. Donovan,
Coordinator of Information,
Washington, D.C.

Copy to: Cominch.

CONFIDENTIAL

February 12, 1942

Admiral Ernest J. King
Navy Department
Washington, D. C.

Dear Admiral King:

Thank you for your letter of
February 7, regarding the special broadcasts
for the French Navy.

I enclose a draft of the pro-
posed project. We shall be glad to get in
touch with Commander Rihelddaffer.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

Encl.
Murphy:Foy

February 12, 1942

General George C. Marshall
Chief of Staff
War Department
Washington, D.C.

Dear General Marshall:

I have your letter of February 11 in reply to mine of February 4, relating to the proposed "Form of Broadcast" to influence the opinions of officers and sailors of the French Fleet. In compliance with your request, I am enclosing a draft of the entire project which I hope will answer your questions.

I enclose also a copy of the reply of Admiral King.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

Enclosures (2)

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

February 11, 1942.


Colonel William J. Donovan,
Coordinator of Information,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Colonel Donovan:

I have your letter of February 4, with the attached "Form of Broadcast", which proposes to influence the opinions of officers and sailors of the French fleet. The material submitted does not give a very definite idea of the exact objective to be attained, the conditions or events upon which the proposal is based, or whether it fits in with American or Allied naval strategy.

Without this information it would be difficult for the War Department to express an opinion on the "Form of Broadcast".

Faithfully yours,


Chief of Staff.

SECRET

COMMON FILE

UNITED STATES FLEET

HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMISSIONER OF COAST
NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D.C.

February 7, 1942.

Colonel William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
Washington, D.C.

Dear Colonel Donovan:

The proposal contained in your letter of February 4, 1942, regarding special broadcasts for the French Navy is acceptable to me.

As you probably are aware, most navies have monitor control of broadcast reception on each ship with the number of outlets extremely limited, so that care would have to be exercised in the nature of the programs, in order so have them passed by the monitor.

Should your representative wish to further discuss this matter, Lieutenant Commander Riheldaffer, U.S.N. (Ret.), in the Office of the Director of Naval Intelligence has been designated by the Director of Naval Intelligence for this purpose.

Sincerely yours,

E. J. King

February 4, 1948

Admiral Ernest J. King
Navy Department
Washington, D. C.

Dear Admiral King:

I am enclosing a proposal
for preparing the minds of officers and
sailors of the French Fleet. Would you
have your people look at it? And then it
seems to me that it would be desirable to
have a discussion with them.

Sincerely,

Encl.

Donovan:Foy

William J. Donovan

Sent 1, hand

Navy - material (2)

February 4, 1948

General George C. Marshall
War Department
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Marshall:

I am enclosing a proposal for preparing
the minds of officers and sailors of the French
Fleet. Would you have your people look at it?
And then it seems to me that it would be desir-
able to have a discussion with them.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

Encl.
Donovan:Foy

Sent by hand
Form of broad case in heavy folder

FORM OF BROADCAST

The form of the broadcasts to the French Navy will be conditioned by the channels and the nature of the specific target. Since it is especially vital for us to reach officers serving on board ship, the third of the channels mentioned above--collective listening in ward-rooms--is by far the most important. To utilize this channel it will be necessary to give the broadcasts such form and content that there is no danger of listening to them being forbidden. If the broadcasts are labeled or even obviously intended for French Naval Officers, there is serious danger that they will be banned at least at some stations.

(1) Immediately following a short program of music, there should be a special news commentary in French, which is to avoid anything of a subversive nature, but heavily slanting toward matters likely to interest naval listeners. For instance, comments on naval developments and naval warfare would be more frequent and carried in greater detail than in an ordinary commentary.

(2) Following the news commentary, there should be a short talk, in no case more than five minutes in length, which in most cases would be something quite innocuous and non-political--for instance, talks by or about movie stars who are popular in France--but which could be used on special occasions and infrequent intervals to carry a direct propaganda appeal in the form of a speech or statement.

- 2 -

Historical subjects - especially from French Colonial and naval history - are particularly indicated.

(3) The principal propaganda instrument would obviously be the news commentary. There is reason to hope that following as it does immediately upon the musical program, it will be listened to by the officers we wish to reach as they will always be able to say, if criticized for listening to American broadcasts, that they had only turned on the radio for the music and had forgotten to turn it off when the news started. Even so, great care must be taken not to betray the fact that we are addressing ourselves to Naval Officers and above all, not to use any criticisms or attacks on the Vichy regime.

February 11, 1945

Mr. Ray Atherton
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

Dear Ray:

Thank you very much for sending me the memorandum prepared by the young French geographer. This is interesting and useful material and I will get in touch with you if we want to talk with the author. I have made copies of the memorandum and am returning the original herewith.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

✓ Murphy:Foy

ADVERSE OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D. C.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

February 2, 1942.

Dear Bill:

I am sending you a memorandum concerning the contribution of unoccupied France to German war economy which was prepared by a young French geographer recently arrived in the United States. For obvious reasons he would prefer not to have his name made known, but he is willing to be interviewed further by any United States Government officer who is interested in what he has to say. If your organization wishes to take this up, I shall be very glad to be of such assistance in making the contact as you may desire.

Sincerely yours,

Wm. A. C. [Signature]

Colonel William J. Donovan,

Coordinator of Information,

Administration Building, 25th and E Streets, N.W.,

Washington, D.C.

May I have the memo returned to me!

[Signature]

1/24/42

Dear David:

Please look at this and let me
have any recommendation.

[Signature]
W.J.D.

J.B.
I think this should
be followed up
WJ 1/26/42.

For Mr. David Bruce

C.C. Turn over to David H. Livingston when he
arrives.
DB

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

SIDNEY HILLMAN,
GENERAL PRESIDENT (ON LEAVE)
JACOB M. POTOFKY,
GENERAL SECRETARY

GENERAL EXECUTIVE
BOARD

DOROTHY J. BELLARNA
MYRIAM BLUMBERG
JOSEPH CATALANOTTI
ABRAHAM CHATMAN
LOUIS HOLLANDER
JACK KROLL
LEO KREYER
SAMUEL LEVIN
ANNEUNG D. MARIMPIETRI
ABRAHAM MILLER
WILLIAM MISHKIN
FRANK ROSENBLUM
STEPHEN SKALA
CHARLEY WEINSTEIN
MURRAY WEINSTEIN

Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America

15 UNION SQUARE

NEW YORK, N. Y.

SECRET

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

Jan. 15, 1942

JAN 20 1942

The Advance

Mr. John Wiley
c/o Coordinator of Information
25th & "E" Streets, N.W.
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Wiley:

I am taking the liberty of enclosing herewith a number of confidential memoranda and documents dealing with the situation in both occupied and unoccupied France, as well as the French Colonies in Africa.

These have been entrusted to me by Professor Paul Vignaux of Notre Dame University, and since the memoranda involve the safety of a number of his co-workers in the underground movement abroad, I must ask you to treat them in absolute confidence.

As you will notice the enclosed consist of the following:

The home address of Professor Vignaux in South Bend, Ind. On the reverse side is the address of M. Joseph Botton at the Hotel Great Northern, New York City. M. Botton represented the Free French at the International Labor Conference held recently in New York as a workers' delegate. He enjoys the absolute confidence of Professor Vignaux.

The next memoranda relates to an important contact in Toulouse, France, in connection with the French Fleet. The reference "Jacqueline" is followed by the Greek letter "pi". This Greek letter is the identification mark for the contact in Toulouse.

The next memoranda deals with a contact in Algiers in connection with the French Fleet. The reference is from M. Joseph Botton.

The next memoranda deals with a contact in Lisbon. You will recognize it as the pseudonym of Emilio Lussu, the noted Italian soldier and democrat. His contacts in France and Italy are extraordinary. In no case must he be referred to as Lussu, but as Dupont instead.

-2-

There then follow confidential memoranda by Professor Vignaux dealing with the underground movement in France and other aspects of the labor situation which can be utilized against the Axis.

There then follow copies of a memorandum on the disposition of the French Fleet which was gathered from independent sources. There may be later information on this subject but I am advised that the enclosed is of very recent date.

Finally I should like to make this suggestion: if you find the enclosed material interesting and feel that Professor Vignaux can be useful to your agency, I wish you would call upon him. He is a genuine French patriot, devoted to the cause of freedom, has extraordinary underground connections in France and Africa, and has also extremely useful Catholic connections. Though a comparatively young man he was regarded one of the outstanding philosophers in France before his arrival in this country.

Please let me know whether any of the enclosed is of service to you.

Cordially and sincerely,

Richard Rohman
Richard Rohman
Publicity Director

P.S. Professor Vignaux in a letter to me speaks of the necessity of mobilizing democratic forces in France to prevent the accession of either communism or fascism. I know that he has contacts with the best democratic elements.

TOP SECRET

~~Handwritten~~~~37 E 64th St~~~~Manhattan~~1105 Taylor St.
South Bend, Ind.

To go to H. Casson 42 Gillespie Pkwy
from Jacqueline X
Toulouse

and ask him the address of Prove
(The friend we told you about and who will
then to the proper persons in the proper places)

10 rue

Sis du Par

Representant industriel de
matériel électrique associé
avec M^r Penclavel

mention

103 Bottom

~~Emilio~~ Dupont (Emilio Lema)
103 Rua Rodrigo da
Fonseca
Lisbon, Port.

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La Charte du Travail

vue par les syndicalistes français.

Les syndicalistes signataires du manifeste du 22 Septembre 1946 ont fondé un Comité d'Action. Depuis lors, cette organisation qui avait une forme à la fois pendante et très ferme a acquis, de façon constante, la conscience ouvrière.

A la date du 11 Novembre, ce Comité a donné un "exposé objectif" de la Charte du Travail qui venait d'être publiée.

De cet exposé détachons les trois points les plus importants, qui concernent :

1/ les syndicats

La Charte prévoit des syndicats "qui sont-ils ?

"En principe, les syndicats ouvriers ne sont pas professionnels; ils doivent se constituer et vivre dans le cadre local et professionnel qui leur est assigné. Ils sont obligatoires, c.à.d. en leur composition la masse de tous ceux qui ne s'intéressent pas à la vie syndicale; ils sont uniques, en ce sens qu'il ne pourra être constitué, pour une même catégorie de travailleurs, plus d'un syndicat par circonscription et par profession, industrie ou famille professionnelle.

"Autrement dit, l'adhésion à un syndicat ne sera plus le résultat d'un libre choix, ne sera plus une consécration, mais une simple formalité administrative, sanctionnée par une retenue opérée par le chef de l'entreprise sur le montant du salaire.

"Par contre, l'exclusion du syndicat pourra être prononcée pour des motifs d'ordre divers, y compris les "motifs d'ordre public" (article 1).

"Le rôle des syndicats sera essentiellement un rôle de liaison entre les travailleurs et les comités sociaux. Ils engageront les uns, c.à.d. se-ront chargés de représenter leurs volontés d'indépendance; ils présenteront des candidats aux autres, c.à.d. feront le tri nécessaire pour que la collaboration avec les éléments patronaux dans les comités sociaux ne fasse jamais de difficultés.

"Quant à la vie proprement dite des syndicats, elle est définie en termes clairs dans l'exposé des motifs de la loi.

"Ils (les syndicats) vivront et fonctionneront sous l'autorité des comités sociaux et en s'inspirant de leurs doctrines qui ne sauraient être elles-mêmes que celles du gouvernement."

Voilà du totalitarisme avoué.

Un point réserve:

"Un point, extrêmement important, n'a pas été précisé par la loi, mais le sera par décret. Il concerne la composition et le mode de désignation des Conseils d'Administration des syndicats. Sur ce point qui n'est pas acquis, nous exprimerons notre avis: si le conseil d'administration des syndicats est désigné librement par les adhérents, il peut avoir encore quelque autorité sur ces derniers; à la cas contraire, il vaudra mieux

les considérer comme des organismes purement administratifs, dont la composition est indifférente à la nature des activités.
 "Des maintenant, l'article 10 de la loi laisse à ceux le nombre de membres n'est limité qu'un seul membre pourra exercer dans le conseil de syndicat, ce qui exclut la possibilité de former des institutions de la vie professionnelle.
 Le patronat réactionnaire a toujours craint les fonctionnaires syndiqués, trop expérimentés et indépendants.

La Charte prévoit des Unions Régionales (Associations à vocation professionnelle) et des Fédérations Nationales:

"En ce qui concerne les Unions et Fédérations professionnelles, leur autorité dépendra en partie de celle des conseils d'administration qui les composeront; elle dépendra aussi de l'usage qui sera fait de la loi relative d'Etat au Travail de la loi d'attribution certains sièges, dans les conseils de ces unions et fédérations "à des personnes ayant toute action sociale sur le plan national et local en Algérie, dans plusieurs régions", littéralement, "de textes législatifs que des patrons ou directeurs d'entreprises pourront siéger dans les conseils des unions et fédérations ouvrières".

2/ Les Comités sociaux

Ce sont des organismes mixtes, composés par tiers des représentants des ouvriers et des employés, des cadres et des patrons.

"Ces comités sociaux sont constitués à tous les échelons.
 "A celui de l'entreprise, ils sont créés en accord avec le chef de l'établissement, ce qui veut dire par lui. Nul doute que le Comité ne devienne alors, au sens propre du terme, une famille professionnelle.
 "Aux échelons local, régional et national, les comités sociaux ont les pouvoirs les plus larges en matière professionnelle. Ils fixent les salaires et les conventions collectives; ils discutent les questions de formation professionnelle, d'embauchage et de licenciement, les mesures concernant l'hygiène et la sécurité du travail, en résumé, toutes les questions qui étaient autrefois de la compétence syndicale. Ils parent en outre les œuvres sociales de la profession.

Il apparaît que l'action des Comités sociaux et le patronat, par sa force propre et par son influence sur les cadres, aura un rôle prédominant, sera beaucoup plus importante que celle des syndicats. A moins que le seul personnage réellement important ne soit le représentant de l'Etat.

"Le contrôle de l'Etat, éventuellement en arbitrage, est assuré par la présence d'un Commissaire du Gouvernement au sein des comités sociaux nationaux. L'influence de ces Commissaires sera sans doute équivalente à celle des Commissaires du Gouvernement au sein des Comités d'organisation professionnelle."

3/ ~~TOP SECRET~~

On voit que la direction représentée par les communistes et les socialistes
fascistes auquel tendent les autres et les autres, et ~~les autres~~ les autres
tion s'est, éliminant tout un certain nombre d'éléments, les autres
le patronat de l'industrie, spécialement l'industrie textile. On voit
dernier l'importance.

"Les articles 39 et 39 de la loi prévoient la création d'associations professionnelles mixtes, c.à.d. patronales et ouvrières, lorsque les lois que nous citons l'accord de la loi des 20-21-22-23-24-25-26-27-28-29-30-31-32-33-34-35-36-37-38-39-40-41-42-43-44-45-46-47-48-49-50-51-52-53-54-55-56-57-58-59-60-61-62-63-64-65-66-67-68-69-70-71-72-73-74-75-76-77-78-79-80-81-82-83-84-85-86-87-88-89-90-91-92-93-94-95-96-97-98-99-100-101-102-103-104-105-106-107-108-109-110-111-112-113-114-115-116-117-118-119-120-121-122-123-124-125-126-127-128-129-130-131-132-133-134-135-136-137-138-139-140-141-142-143-144-145-146-147-148-149-150-151-152-153-154-155-156-157-158-159-160-161-162-163-164-165-166-167-168-169-170-171-172-173-174-175-176-177-178-179-180-181-182-183-184-185-186-187-188-189-190-191-192-193-194-195-196-197-198-199-200-201-202-203-204-205-206-207-208-209-210-211-212-213-214-215-216-217-218-219-220-221-222-223-224-225-226-227-228-229-230-231-232-233-234-235-236-237-238-239-240-241-242-243-244-245-246-247-248-249-250-251-252-253-254-255-256-257-258-259-260-261-262-263-264-265-266-267-268-269-270-271-272-273-274-275-276-277-278-279-280-281-282-283-284-285-286-287-288-289-290-291-292-293-294-295-296-297-298-299-300-301-302-303-304-305-306-307-308-309-310-311-312-313-314-315-316-317-318-319-320-321-322-323-324-325-326-327-328-329-330-331-332-333-334-335-336-337-338-339-340-341-342-343-344-345-346-347-348-349-350-351-352-353-354-355-356-357-358-359-360-361-362-363-364-365-366-367-368-369-370-371-372-373-374-375-376-377-378-379-380-381-382-383-384-385-386-387-388-389-390-391-392-393-394-395-396-397-398-399-400-401-402-403-404-405-406-407-408-409-410-411-412-413-414-415-416-417-418-419-420-421-422-423-424-425-426-427-428-429-430-431-432-433-434-435-436-437-438-439-440-441-442-443-444-445-446-447-448-449-450-451-452-453-454-455-456-457-458-459-460-461-462-463-464-465-466-467-468-469-470-471-472-473-474-475-476-477-478-479-480-481-482-483-484-485-486-487-488-489-490-491-492-493-494-495-496-497-498-499-500-501-502-503-504-505-506-507-508-509-510-511-512-513-514-515-516-517-518-519-520-521-522-523-524-525-526-527-528-529-530-531-532-533-534-535-536-537-538-539-540-541-542-543-544-545-546-547-548-549-550-551-552-553-554-555-556-557-558-559-560-561-562-563-564-565-566-567-568-569-570-571-572-573-574-575-576-577-578-579-580-581-582-583-584-585-586-587-588-589-590-591-592-593-594-595-596-597-598-599-600-601-602-603-604-605-606-607-608-609-610-611-612-613-614-615-616-617-618-619-620-621-622-623-624-625-626-627-628-629-630-631-632-633-634-635-636-637-638-639-640-641-642-643-644-645-646-647-648-649-650-651-652-653-654-655-656-657-658-659-660-661-662-663-664-665-666-667-668-669-670-671-672-673-674-675-676-677-678-679-680-681-682-683-684-685-686-687-688-689-690-691-692-693-694-695-696-697-698-699-700-701-702-703-704-705-706-707-708-709-710-711-712-713-714-715-716-717-718-719-720-721-722-723-724-725-726-727-728-729-730-731-732-733-734-735-736-737-738-739-740-741-742-743-744-745-746-747-748-749-750-751-752-753-754-755-756-757-758-759-760-761-762-763-764-765-766-767-768-769-770-771-772-773-774-775-776-777-778-779-780-781-782-783-784-785-786-787-788-789-790-791-792-793-794-795-796-797-798-799-800-801-802-803-804-805-806-807-808-809-810-811-812-813-814-815-816-817-818-819-820-821-822-823-824-825-826-827-828-829-830-831-832-833-834-835-836-837-838-839-840-841-842-843-844-845-846-847-848-849-850-851-852-853-854-855-856-857-858-859-860-861-862-863-864-865-866-867-868-869-870-871-872-873-874-875-876-877-878-879-880-881-882-883-884-885-886-887-888-889-890-891-892-893-894-895-896-897-898-899-900-901-902-903-904-905-906-907-908-909-910-911-912-913-914-915-916-917-918-919-920-921-922-923-924-925-926-927-928-929-930-931-932-933-934-935-936-937-938-939-940-941-942-943-944-945-946-947-948-949-950-951-952-953-954-955-956-957-958-959-960-961-962-963-964-965-966-967-968-969-970-971-972-973-974-975-976-977-978-979-980-981-982-983-984-985-986-987-988-989-990-991-992-993-994-995-996-997-998-999-1000-1001-1002-1003-1004-1005-1006-1007-1008-1009-1010-1011-1012-1013-1014-1015-1016-1017-1018-1019-1020-1021-1022-1023-1024-1025-1026-1027-1028-1029-1030-1031-1032-1033-1034-1035-1036-1037-1038-1039-104

Avec l'application de la Charte du Travail, le mouvement ouvrier deviendra tout entier un mouvement souterrain.

Devant la Charte du Travail

Nous avons dit comment dès la mise au point de la Charte du Travail, l'opposition du syndicalisme libre s'est manifestée par la déclaration de 25 fédérations C.G.T. le 5 juin, reprenant le 27 juin, par des syndicats catholiques.

Confirmant la position prise par leurs dirigeants, leurs militants de base ont, dès ce moment, envoyé à Vichy de multiples protestations contre ces projets. L'une d'elles a été signée, pour la seule zone libre, par 25 Unions Départementales (la quasi-unanimité) entièrement adhérentes à la C.G.T.

Pour le Syndicalisme libre et l'émancipation

Le document le plus complet sur cette phase de la résistance ouvrière est un travail du Comité d'Etudes Syndicales et Patronales, fondé à la suite du manifeste du 15 novembre 1940 et pour en propager l'esprit. Ce travail date du début de septembre. Il fixe pour l'histoire les points suivants :

"Dans certains milieux politiques ou patronaux, on estime couramment que les syndicalistes ouvriers qui ont été convoqués à Vichy, ont parlé au nom de la classe ouvrière française et, par conséquent, l'ont plus ou moins engagée dans leurs décisions. Il n'en est rien. Les syndicats convoqués à Vichy ont parlé en leur nom personnel. Il n'y a certainement pas un seul ouvrier qui se soit intéressé à leur action. Il s'est agit d'approches".

A notre connaissance, tous les ouvriers membres du Comité de l'Organisation Professionnelle étaient des amis et des obligés de Salin, à l'exception d'un délégué des syndicalistes chrétiens. Celui-ci, par une intervention énergique avait obtenu la désignation d'un "résistant". Tout au long des réunions du Comité, le délégué "chrétien" a protesté contre toutes les atteintes à la liberté syndicale.

La classe ouvrière peut être d'autant moins engagée qu'on ne peut la consulter. Pourquoi Vichy a-t-il dépeint le syndicalisme / par la

dissolution des Confederations ?

" Nous savons bien que la dissolution de la C.F.T. et de la C.G.T., une des
" plus lourdes fautes commises dans cet ordre, empêche le fonctionnement du
" syndicalisme sur les bases ~~syndicalistes~~ normales, mais ce n'est pas à la
" classe ouvrière de payer les erreurs de ceux qui ont un peu trop apprécié
" son opinion". Depuis le 15 Novembre 1940, la protestation continue contre la
dissolution des Confederations.

3/

Les hommes de Vichy qui ont dissous les Confederations veulent -
très logiquement - supprimer tous les organismes interprofessionnels, notamment
les Unions Départementales. Là se trouve le cœur de la bataille: le gouverne-
ment veut briser - les syndicalistes défendent - la solidarité ouvrière.

" Le syndicalisme français, déjà morcelé par la suppression incoordonnée de ses
" Centrales, se verrait ainsi divisé sur tous les plans, national, régional,
" local, en une poussière d'organisations sans liaison entre elles et par consé-
" quent sans moyen".

" C'est bien le résultat recherché par certains... Ces hommes que le front ne
nomme pas mais qui sont évidemment les grands industriels, soucieux et profi-
taires du régime de Vichy (Fachon, Lohidoux, Bonnard) se gardent de diviser le
patronat comme ils veulent diviser le monde du travail.

" Il n'a d'ailleurs jamais été question de supprimer, tant leur nécessité se fai-
" sait sentir, de nombreux organismes patronaux interprofessionnels: Chambres de
" Commerce, Comité Central de l'Organisation Professionnelle etc,..."

C'est pourquoi les syndicalistes maintiennent leur position:

" Nous croyons donc le maintien des Unions (Fédérations) interprofessionnelles
" indispensables, comme le demeure l'existence d'une ou plusieurs centrales syn-
" dicales ouvrières"

Malgré toutes ces pressions et les invites à un compromis, les syn-
dicalistes français ne reculent pas d'un pas. Ils contre-attaquent même Vichy
et ses agents qui accusent les Confederations et les Unions (Fédérations) inter-
professionnelles d'être des organismes politiques.

" Signalons, au passage, l'indépendance de position de ceux qui acceptent l'existence de l'Etat, c'est-à-dire de la politique dans le syndicalisme et ne prouvent en même temps toute importance du syndicalisme dans la politique "

4/ Sur le problème de la représentation sociale dans le travail et l'industrie, M. Vichy veut instituer dans des Comités Sociaux, les syndicalistes français ont une position très claire:

- " Nous sommes d'accord en principe sur l'existence des Comités Sociaux, mais à la condition formelle que les Comités Sociaux soient composés de représentants de syndicats libres.
- " Il importe de fixer de manière précise les limites des attributions de ces Comités Sociaux, le rôle de ces derniers étant extrêmement limité à l'examen des problèmes mixtes, c.a.d. intervenant à la fois les patrons et les ouvriers "
- " La participation des syndicats ouvriers aux organismes sociaux ne consiste pas sans une participation organisée, sur les bases bases, de ces mêmes syndicats aux organismes économiques "

Sur ces trois points, opposition au projet de Charte du Travail, élaboré par le Comité de l'Organisation Professionnelle

5/ L'étatisme, en honneur à Vichy comme à Berlin, risque de déconsidérer l'organisation professionnelle (c.a.d. une auto-administration paritaire de chaque branche d'activité économique) et la coopération du travail et de l'industrie conditions de l'économie dirigée, telle qu'elle est préconisée par la loi du 15 Novembre 1940, cette autre Charte que le syndicalisme français s'est librement donnée....

" La caractéristique essentielle du projet (de Vichy) est la désignation, en politique, par l'Etat des militants ouvriers qui auront à prendre la défense des intérêts professionnels de leurs mandataires, autrement dit le choix exercé par la puissance publique entre les différents courants d'opinion qui peuvent se manifester dans la classe ouvrière. Nous tenons à l'organisation professionnelle et nous ne "

"cette attitude qu'on soit en train de la déconstruire, peut-être définitivement, par
 "vous des ouvriers par les mêmes méthodes et de correspondre par un
 "comportement et aux besoins des travailleurs français. L'expérience démontre
 "des Comités d'Organisation Industrielle, celle que l'on avait en France
 "avec une Charte du Travail établie, surtout pour résoudre les problèmes sociaux
 "à l'avenir toutes les tentatives d'organisation diverses. On nous rappor-
 "terons peut-être un jour, dans des milieux plus divers, de ne plus pouvoir
 "parler sans difficulté de Comités d'Organisation, de Comités d'Action, voire
 "même de collaboration entre patrons et ouvriers."

Conclusion:

"Le syndicalisme libre et démocratique, dirigé par les ouvriers, conduisant
 "lui-même ses représentants dans les organismes de collaboration est la seule
 "formule correspondant à l'esprit français."

Sur cette attitude, militants de la C.G.T. et syndicalistes catho-
 liques sont d'accord malgré la divergence qui subsiste en ce qui concerne, sur la
 question de l'unité d'organisation:

- " Si les militants du syndicalisme chrétien refusent de renoncer au principe
 "du pluralisme syndical, les militants du syndicalisme ex-confédéré (C.F.T.)
 "l'acceptent pour la plupart comme un sacrifice nécessaire aux nécessités de l'or-
 "ganisation professionnelle. Mais les syndicalistes de toute tendance sont d'ac-
 "cord sur un point: c'est qu'il est impossible, en tout état de cause, d'accom-
 "plir l'unité syndicale dans un syndicalisme sous la tutelle de l'Etat. Ce serait
 "renoncer d'avance à toute possibilité d'expression à l'intérieur du syndicat;
 "ce serait, en conséquence, tuer la vie même du syndicat".

La majorité du Comité d'Etudes Démocratiques et Syndicales, venant
 de la C.G.T. cette attitude est digne de remarque:

- Belin n'a donc pas réussi à séduire ses anciens camarades en leur disant
 qu'il réalisait enfin l'unité syndicale (C.F.T. d'inspiration de l'Union de la
 l'unité dans un syndicalisme étatisé n'a rien à voir avec l'unité d'un syndica-
 lisme libre et démocratique;

- Les militants de la C.G.T. ont répondu au message que leur adressaient les

- 22 fois les syndicalistes catholiques, qui déclarent alors "exposer que les alliés tant en C.G.T. d'abord, conformément aux conclusions du manifeste du 15 Novembre 1940, fidèles aux principes du syndicalisme français, comportent entre autres :
- " liberté d'association syndicale (syndicats de base, unions interprofessionnelles, fédérations etc....
 - " libre choix du syndicat par les travailleurs
 - " libre désignation par les travailleurs de leurs représentants devant le patronat et les pouvoirs publics
 - " principes auxquels les syndicalistes chrétiens adhèrent, pour leur part, étant constamment attachés."

Le 5 octobre 1940, les dirigeants syndicalistes chrétiens ont exprimé cet attachement à :

- " la liberté syndicale et son corollaire le pluralisme, conditions indispensables d'une authentique représentation du monde du travail et de la confiance de celui-ci dans ses représentants" et déclare, en conséquence,
- " ne pouvoir, à quelque moment que ce soit, accepter de responsabilité dans une organisation qui ne compromettrait pas cette liberté"

Après la voix des hommes libres, entendons celle des maîtres de l'air, des agents du gouvernement de Vichy.

PROFESSEUR GUYE POLARIS.

En mois de Septembre 1940, quand la dissolution de la C.G.T. ont été décidées en principe (loi du 16 Août 1940), Molin, ancien secrétaire de la C.G.T. et ministre du Travail, crée un Comité Syndical de Coordination, destiné à remplacer l'ancienne Commission Administrative de la C.G.T. Cet organisme a la direction du ministère mais ne remplace l'ancienne Centrale, que le ministre veut déclarer inutile et dangereuse....

Cette manœuvre fut immédiatement dénoncée dans une lettre collective

de quelques Secrétaires d'Unions Départementales, qui ont en des premiers documents de la résistance du syndicalisme libre.

Balin a placé son secrétaire de la Fédération des Syndicats son chef de cabinet, Bertrand, ancien dirigeant de la Fédération des Syndicats de la C.G.T. un homme qui paraît avoir très bien compris la fonction politique d'un syndicalisme d'État, puisqu'il a déclaré que le contrôle permanent (la censure des lettres qui a été maintenant même développée après l'annexion) permet de connaître l'attitude réelle des militants. Cet esprit se retrouve dans le document que nous allons analyser.

Après avoir feint de l'ignorer pendant près d'un an, le Comité Syndical de Coordination dénoncé, dans une circulaire d'octobre, le Comité d'Etudes Syndicales et Economiques. Après avoir accusé les membres de vouloir garder l'anonymat, le Comité de Coordination ne manque pas de donner leurs noms ce qui, dans les conditions en vit la France, constitue une dénonciation, un appel à la répression. Dans une autre circulaire, Bertrand dit d'un militant qu'il vient d'attaquer: "Nous y verrons plus clair désormais. Il est bon de savoir en chacun sa classe..." Et après s'être vanté d'avoir lancé un appel en faveur des Comités de Propagande du Municipal, le même personnage ne craint pas d'ajouter: "Je pense que personne ne me le reproche"... Comme à Vichy, ce n'a pas le sens du ridicule, le même chef de cabinet de Balin par le des gens qui ne sont ni "au service, ni à la solde de personne". Lui qui, à chaque occasion, déclare que son ministre, Balin, "s'est montré comme le plus courageux au moment de la période la plus difficile". Il faut citer les propos de tels personnages officiels pour bien comprendre la Revolution Antiparlementaire et le succès qu'elle remporte auprès des militants ouvriers, infatigables, et qui gardent l'esprit libre et le sens du ridicule.

De ce succès, le Comité Syndical de Coordination a lui-même tiré la mesure en essayant de faire assumer par des dirigeants fédéraux et d'Unions Départementales son attaque contre le Comité d'Etudes.

avec tous les moyens de liaison (exceptionnel dans un pays libre en tous genres), de persuasion et de sélection dont disposent les chefs du mouvement, Bertrand et, en tout et pour tout, vingt. Les dirigeants fédéraux, appartenant à 12 fédérations, sont d'ailleurs de ce nombre Bertrand lui-même et 3 membres du Comité de l'Union nationale syndicale; parmi ces derniers, il y a le type rose de l'opportuniste, communiste, puis anarcho-syndicaliste, puis partisan d'un syndicalisme fasciste, un moment collaborateur du journal pro-nazi l'Action... et, pour tout le territoire, Secrétaires d'Unions Départementales. Ce dernier chiffre est éloquent: car beaucoup plus que les Fédérations, les Unions Départementales sont encore vivantes et traduisent les efforts de la classe ouvrière. Rappelons que la France compte plus de 50 départements dont chacun avait son U.D.

Tel est le succès obtenu par Belin après quinze mois de propagande officielle par son Comité de Coordination, les services du Ministère, son hebdomadaire Au Travail, toute la radio de Vichy et ses tonnes personnelles....

Selon une expression du Comité d'Union, seuls soutiennent le pseudo-syndicalisme d'Etat, ceux ~~qui~~ pour qui, l'émancipation des syndicats est "le seul espoir de jouer quelque rôle dans l'organisation professionnelle". A vain, les amis de Belin se déclarent-ils opposés à "la politique du pire" ^{apparemment ça} et s'efforcent de sauver tout ou partie du syndicalisme "si nous voulons survivre, il nous faut accepter, disent-ils, ce qui est la conséquence des erreurs et des fautes du régime nazi". Il n'est pas étonnant que cette politique ait rallié tous les défaitistes. Les ouvriers français sont au contraire avec ceux qui n'ont pas voulu renier la démocratie, ni se faire des amis de vaincus.

DISPOSITION OF THE FRENCH FLEET

BATTLESHIPS (3)

Jean Bart (35,000 tons; uncompleted); under Vichy control at Casablanca

Richelieu (35,000 tons, completed 1940); under Vichy control at Dakar; damaged by British July 8, 1940

Strasbourg (26,800 tons, 1935); at Toulon; hit by aerial torpedo while fleeing from Oran, July 8, 1940

Dunkerque (26,800 tons, 1937); repaired at Toulon after severe damage at Oran, July 8, 1940

Bretagne (22,189 tons, 1915); sunk at Oran

Provence (22,189 tons, 1915); under repair at Toulon after damage at Oran

Lorraine (22,189 tons, 1915); demilitarized at Alexandria

Paris (22,189 tons, 1914); taken over by British at southern English port; used as barracks for Polish Navy

Courbet (22,189 tons, 1913); at southern English port; used as anti-aircraft and radio training ship

AIRCRAFT CARRIER: Bearn (22,146 tons); under Vichy control at Martinique

SEAPLANE CARRIER: Commandant Teste (10,000 tons); under repair at Toulon after damage at Oran

HEAVY CRUISERS (7)

Algerie (10,000 tons); Colbert, Foch and Duplex (9,936 tons); at Toulon

Duquesne, Tourville (10,000 tons) and Suffren (9,936 tons); demilitarized at Alexandria

LIGHT CRUISERS (11)

Duguay-Trouin (7,249 tons); demilitarized at Alexandria
Jean de Vienns and La Galissonniere (7,600 tons); at Toulon
Gloire, Marseillaise, Montcalm and Georges Leygues (7,600 tons);
under Vichy control; at Dakar and Casablanca
Primauguet (7,249 tons); at Dakar or Casablanca
Lamotte-Picquet (7,249 tons); under Vichy control in Indo-China;
damaged in Battle of Koh-Charang Bay, Jan. 16, 1941
Jeanne d'Arc (6,496 tons); under Vichy control at Guadeloupe
Emile Bertin (6,886 tons); under Vichy control at Martinique

DESTROYERS

Nogador (2,884 tons); under repair after severe damage at Oze
Volta (2,884 tons); at Toulon
Le Triomphant (2,560 tons); at first under Vichy control, but has
joined Free French; assigned to Far East
L'Audacieux (2,560 tons); sunk by H.M.S. Australia at Dakar,
Sept. 24, 1940
Le Fantasque (2,560 tons); at Dakar; severely damaged, Sept. 23, 1940
Le Malin, Le Terrible, L'Indomptable (2,560 tons); under Vichy control;
Le Malin at Dakar
Aigle, Albatros, Surfaut, Vautour, Epervier, Milan, Cassard, Vanquelin,
Le Chevalier Paul, Kersaint and Tartu (2,441 tons); under
Vichy control. Le Chevalier Paul sunk off Beirut, June 15,
1941; others at Toulon
Lion, Guepard, Verdun, Vauban and Valmy (2,200 tons); under Vichy
control

Panthera, Lynx and Tigre (1,125 tons); under Vichy control
 Leopard (8,126 tons); with Free French
Le Hardi, Espe, Fleuret, Casque, Le Havre, Le Havre (1,775 tons);
 under Vichy control. Two more of this class, Le Havre
 and Le Filibuster, completed at La Seyne, unoccupied France,
 but understood not to have been armed
Le Fortune, Banque and Forbin (1,375 tons); demilitarized at
 Alexandria
L'Aleçon, Le Mars, La Palme, Bordelais, Boulogne, Brutus, Prudent
 and Prudent (1,375 tons); under Vichy control, some at Cas-
 ablanca. (Prudent reported lost)
Orage, Simoun, Tempête, Tramontane, Typhon, Trombe and Torade (1,319
 tons); under Vichy control. (Orage reported lost)
Mistral (1,319 tons); with Free French

Note: of the forty five completed destroyers listed as under Vichy con-
 trol, almost forty were at Toulon in September, 1940. Three are re-
 ported to have been lost.

TORPEDO-BOATS (12, all 610 tons)

La Melpomene, La Flore, L'Incomprise, La Cordelière, Branlebas and
Bouclier; joined Free French. (Branlebas lost)
La Bomone, L'Iphigénie, La Pourtauvante, La Bayonnaise, Bombard and
Baliste; under Vichy control

SUBMARINES (Approx. 75)

Surcouf (2,880 tons); Protee (1,379 tons); Marval (974 tons);
La Creole (893 tons); Eubie (669 tons); Minerve, Juno
 (597 tons); Orion, and Online (558 tons); with Free French.

(Harval lost).

Note: The remaining French submarine (numbering sixty six, as far as can be ascertained, stayed under tight control. Five have been lost.

CONFIDENTIAL

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

INTEROFFICE MEMO

FROM: Wallace B. Phillips
TO: Colonel William J. Donovan
SUBJECT: Propaganda Campaign for the French Navy

File
2-22
Propaganda
DATE January 22, 1942

*3 copies
distributed 7/18/42*

I enclose a summary, in quadruplicate, of a project which has been approved in the Planning Committee covering a Propaganda Campaign for the French Navy.

It is requested that you transmit this Project to the proper Naval Authorities in order that approval or modification may be secured from the Navy Department.

It is important that the Propaganda Plan is placed in operation at a very early date and, therefore, prompt action by the Navy Department will be appreciated.

W.B.P.

enclosures

GENERAL CAMPAIGN FOR NORTH AFRICA AND THE MEDITERRANEAN A SERIES OF SPECIAL RADIO PROGRAMS INTENDED TO INFLUENCE THE FRENCH NAVY.

I. Objectives:

1. The primary objective is to prepare the minds of officers and sailors of the French Fleet so that in the event of a German attempt to take over the Fleet they will:
 - (a) desert with their ships to our side;
 - (b) if it is not possible to rally the whole Fleet, certain units will desert;
 - (c) in the worst case, should the French Fleet ever come into contact with American Forces, their fighting morale will be low and the resistance opposed to us nominal.
2. In so doing, to avoid weakening or embarrassing in any way the present Vichy regime and to avoid compromising our present policy toward France which is based upon conditional support of the Vichy regime.

II. Specific Target:

Propaganda intended to influence the French Navy should be directed primarily at career officers actually serving in ships. It does not seem likely that the seamen in the French Fleet can be persuaded to do anything except carry out orders received from their superiors. At some French Naval Stations there is evidence that officers between the ages of 30-40 years, ranging in grade from Jr. Lieutenant to Lieutenant-Commanders, constitute a group particularly susceptible to American propaganda, but this does not appear to be true everywhere. In any case, it is the officers actually serving on board ship who are most important from the point of view of attaining the objectives listed above.

Channels:

Material transmitted by shortwave from this country will reach French Naval Officers throughout the world through three channels:

- (1) radio operators on ships will pick up some American programs and spread them around by word of mouth.
- (2) officers of French Naval Intelligence will be listening to American broadcasts as part of their professional duties and will similarly discuss them in private conversations.
- (3) There will be a very substantial amount of collective listening in officers' ward-rooms particularly on board ship. The radio sets provided for the officers' wardroom are exceptionally powerful ones and adapted to shortwave reception. There is greater likelihood of shortwave programs from this country being heard in French ports like Toulon than there is of the same programs being heard by the civilian population in France.

In Martinique and North Africa American programs are heard clearly and are widely listened to.

IV. Form of Broadcast:

The form of the broadcasts to the French Navy will be conditioned by the channels and the nature of the specific target. Since it is especially vital for us to reach officers serving on board ship, the third of the channels mentioned above--collective listening in ward-rooms--is by far the most important. To utilize this channel it will be necessary to give the broadcasts such form and content that there is no danger of listening to them being forbidden. If the broadcasts are labeled or even obviously intended for French Naval Officers, there is serious danger that they will be banned at least at some stations.

(1) ~~Following the musical program of music, there~~ should be a special news commentary in French, which is to avoid anything of a subversive nature, but heavily slanting toward matters likely to interest naval listeners. For instance, comments on naval developments and naval warfare would be more frequent and carried in greater detail than in an ordinary commentary.

(2) Following the news commentary, there should be a short talk, in no case more than five minutes in length, which in most cases would be something quite innocuous and non-political--for instance, talks by or about movie stars who are popular in France--but which could be used on special occasions and infrequent intervals to carry a direct propaganda appeal in the form of a speech or statement. Historical subjects - especially from French Colonial and naval history - are particularly indicated.

(3) The principal propaganda instrument would obviously be the news commentary. There is reason to hope that following as it does immediately upon the musical program, it will be listened to by the officers we wish to reach as they will always be able to say, if criticized for listening to American broadcasts, that they had only turned on the radio for the music and had forgotten to turn it off when the news started. Even so, great care must be taken not to betray the fact that we are addressing ourselves to Naval Officers and above all, not to use any criticisms or attacks on the Vichy regime.

It is desired to ask the approval of the Navy Department with a view to the prompt inauguration of a detailed Radio program which, due to its length, has been omitted from this memorandum.

If in principle the project is approved it is suggested that a representative of the Navy Department be assigned to cooperate closely with the Radio Division of the Office of the Coordinator of Information.

IT IS PROPOSED TO INCORPORATE IMMEDIATELY AS PART OF THE GENERAL CAMPAIGN FOR NORTH AFRICA AND THE MEDITERRANEAN A SERIES OF SPECIAL RADIO PROGRAMS INTENDED TO INFLUENCE THE FRENCH NAVY.

I. Objectives:

1. The primary objective is to prepare the minds of officers and sailors of the French Fleet so that in case of a German attempt to take over the Fleet they will:

- (a) desert with their ships to our side;
- (b) if it is not possible to rally the whole fleet, certain units will desert;
- (c) in the worst case, should the French Fleet ever come into contact with American forces, their fighting morale will be low and the resistance opposed to us purely nominal

2. Same as above with special reference to Martinique.

3. To discourage the Germans from attempting to seize the French Fleet by building up a spirit of resistance.

4. In so doing, to avoid weakening or embarrassing in any way the present Vichy regime and to avoid compromising our present policy toward France which is based upon conditional support of the Vichy regime.

II. Specific Target:

Propaganda intended to influence the French Navy should be directed primarily at career officers actually serving on ships. It does not seem likely that the seamen on French Fleet can be persuaded to do anything except carry out orders they receive from their superiors. At some French Naval Stations there is evidence that officers between the ages of 30-40

years, ranging in grade from Jr. Lieutenant to Lieutenant Commanders, constitute a group particularly susceptible to American propaganda, but this does not appear to be true everywhere. In any case, it is the officers actually serving on board ship who are most important from the point of view of attaining the objectives listed above.

III. Channels:

Material transmitted by shortwave from this country will reach French Naval Officers throughout the world through three channels:

- (1) radio operators on ships will pick up some American programs and spread them around by word of mouth.
- (2) officers of French Naval Intelligence will be listening to American broadcasts as part of their professional duties and will similarly discuss them in private conversations.
- (3) There will be a very substantial amount of collective listening in officers' ward-rooms particularly on board ship. The radio sets provided for the officers' ward-rooms are exceptionally powerful ones and adapted to shortwave reception. There is greater likelihood of shortwave programs from this country being heard in French ports like Toulon than there is of the same programs being heard by the civilian population in France.

In Martinique and North Africa, American programs are heard clearly and are widely listened to.

IV. Form of Broadcast:

The form of the broadcasts to the French Navy will be conditioned by the channels and the nature of the specific target. Since it is especially vital for us to reach officers serving on board ship, the third of the channels mentioned above, collective listening in ward-rooms, is by far the most important. To utilize this channel, it will be necessary to give

French Naval Officers, there is serious danger that they will be lanned at least at some stations.

(1) Immediately following a short program of music, there should be a special news commentary in French, which is to avoid anything of a subversive nature, but heavily slanting toward matters likely to interest naval listeners. For instance, comments on naval developments and naval warfare would be more frequent and carried in greater detail than in an ordinary commentary.

(2) Following the news commentary, there should be a short talk, in no case more than five minutes in length, which in most cases would be something quite innocuous and non-political, for instance, talks by or about movie stars who are popular in France, but which could be used on special occasions and infrequent intervals to carry a direct propaganda appeal in the form of a speech or statement. Historical subjects, especially from French Colonial and Naval history, are particularly indicated.

(3) The principal propaganda instrument would obviously be the news commentary. There is reason to hope that following as it does immediately upon the musical program, it will be listened to by officers we wish to reach as they will always be able to say, if criticized for listening to American broadcasts, that they had only turned on the radio for the music and had forgotten to turn it off when the news started. Even so, great care must be taken not to betray the

NAVY Regime.

The orientation of the program toward Naval Officers will be achieved in two ways:

(1) This particular program will be used at the hours when officers on board ship habitually listen to the radio in their ward-rooms.

(2) By the slanting of the news towards subjects of particular interest or preoccupation to naval listeners.

V. Propaganda Content of Talks:

The contents of the talks will be determined by specific psychological objectives.

1. The first of these must be simply to capture the interest of the listeners. This will be assured if the technical quality of the program is adequate.

2. The second special objective is to build up feelings of friendship for the United States, and confidence in our strength and in our good will toward France. This objective will be achieved partly by friendly messages in the talks which follow the news commentary, but chiefly in the way in which the news itself is presented by the commentator. He will constantly try to find a pretext in the day's developments for introducing the following themes:

(a) the strength of our Navy and Air Force, and facts about American arms production.

(b) our determination to respect the integrity of the French Empire, i.e., to see to it that all French territory temporarily occupied by any of the Allies

territory in a position comparable to the French Colonial Empire - for example, the Azores. In discussing the problem of the Azores, the commentator might call attention to the little-known fact that they were used as a naval base by us during the last war, then turned back to the Portuguese. Using this as a peg, cite a number of other historical instances of a similar character.

(c) the traditional friendship between France and America and particularly French and American armed forces. In the news commentaries, whenever the name of an American officer who served in France in the last war is mentioned in the news, his record in France should be recalled in considerable detail. In the short talks at the end of the program, reminiscences of stays in France along the lines suggested might achieve the same purpose.

(d) in handling all news about Britain, the commentator should present such news in the manner that clearly implies that while we are Allies of Great Britain, working together for a common victory, we maintain all our independence, and, in fact, do not share all the British prejudices toward France. If the British agree to it, it would be highly desirable from time to time to take up some of the wilder attacks on France in irresponsible British papers and refute them, pleading the case of France. Though this phase of the campaign must be handled very cautiously,

in commentaries to explain the position of Britain and counteract Axis propaganda which presents Britain to the French people as the mortal enemy of France.

3. One of the most essential objectives, of course, is to strengthen the anti-German feeling, which is already fairly strong, among the class of officers at which we are aiming. In addition to current material from Europe and utilization of the historical theme, it will be desirable to give the anti-German theme a special naval slant. This might be done by elaboration upon the following basic idea: that Hitler is essentially a land warrior who has no understanding of the role of sea power and no feeling for ships as such. He has ruthlessly sacrificed his own ships in a manner which must seem shocking to any naval man, and now he has been trying to prod the Italian Navy to come out of its bases to certain destruction, simply to slow down the British land offensive in Libya. If he gets control of the French Navy, he will not use it for real naval warfare against the Allies, but will sacrifice it to strengthen the position of his land armies.

4. The most delicate and at the same time the most essential objective of all is to develop in the minds of French Naval Officers the fear that Hitler does, in fact, intend to seize the French Navy and to implant in them a suspicion that Darlan would not only create diplomatic difficulties with Vichy, but might defeat their own purpose.

to imply that we feel completely confident in the courage, honor, and patriotism of the French Naval Officers. What is really important here is not so much to warn our listeners that Hitler will try to get the French Navy, but to put them on guard against a specific form such an attempt might take. The commentator might, for instance, make reference to a report in Allied Naval circles that Hitler was planning to get hold of the Fleet pretending to Vichy that an Anglo-American expedition against Dakar was imminent. The commentator would brand this as a lie and point out that the avowed purpose was to be able to offer German aid in resisting Anglo-Saxon aggression - aid, for instance, in the form of German submarines to cooperate with units of the French Fleet at Dakar.

In case the threat to the Fleet becomes imminent, we should obtain from ONI details of the exact process by which the Germans were likely to carry it out in stages and warn our listeners to take steps before it is too late.

Great care should be taken in the commentaries not to cry "Wolf" when there is no wolf, and if the wolf really does appear, we should warn our listeners gradually so as not to shock them into incredulity before their minds are prepared. In case of a seemingly certain threat to the French Fleet or Colonies, the news commentaries would steadily take on a tone of mounting alarm and urgency until it reached the point - after several days or weeks, depending upon the speed

ary. ~~we should inspire confidence and desertion, if necessary.~~

5. If, on the contrary, we continue to remain relatively satisfied about the attitude of Vichy, we should carefully avoid any such appeals and attempt to give the impression that Washington and Vichy are in accord and that we ask nothing further from French Naval Officers than that they maintain their present neutral attitude.

a. Even if no such thing is contemplated for the time being, we should inspire reports from time to time that if the situation continues to evolve satisfactorily, shipments of American food to France and of supplies to North Africa may be resumed. Then use these reports as pretexts for recalling the extent of American economic aid to France and particularly to North Africa in the past, before Weygand's resignation.

b. We should inspire and quote in the news commentaries editorials, articles, or statements regarding homage to the great services rendered the Allied cause by the French people in meeting and delaying the first onslaught of the Nazi hordes. Even if we are beginning to get critical once more of the Vichy regime, we should follow this line in order to overcome the complicated sentiment of inferiority which has developed in the minds of French Naval and Army Officers, and attempt to bolster rather than to weaken their self-confidence and feeling of worth.

One of the most powerful of these assets is the French Fleet which would seriously complicate the task of the Allies if it were turned against us, but would mean the speedy end of Hitler if it were turned against him. In our commentaries we should make it clear that we would be very glad to see the French win concessions from their conquerors by clever diplomacy based upon the fact that they still have a strong fleet.

VI. Implementation:

1. The first task is to find a skillful American commentator capable of understanding our objectives and of handling day-to-day news in such a way as to attain them. Whether he speaks French is unimportant as the script can be translated and read by any French speaker, while a very considerable journalistic skill will be needed in preparing the script.
2. When a suitable commentator has been found, a special sub-committee should be set up to keep in close touch with him, offering almost daily guidance. The Army, the Navy, and State Departments should be asked to supply representatives for this sub-committee.
3. The sub-committee should take up the somewhat complicated problem of scheduling with the Radio Division. It must be borne in mind that three different areas must be aimed at: metropolitan France and North Africa, West Africa, and Martinique. The programs would, therefore, have to run at different hours in terms of American time and be put on different beams.

these program procedures from London.

January 12, 1942

~~SECRET~~**SECRET**

IT IS PROPOSED TO INAUGURATE IMMEDIATELY AS PART OF THE GENERAL CAMPAIGN FOR NORTH AFRICA AND THE MEDITERRANEAN A SERIES OF SPECIAL RADIO PROGRAMS INTENDED TO INFLUENCE THE FRENCH NAVY.

I. Objectives:

1. The primary objective is to prepare the minds of officers and sailors of the French Fleet so that in case of a German attempt to take over the Fleet they will:
 - (a) desert with their ships to our side;
 - (b) if it is not possible to rally the whole fleet, certain units will desert;
 - (c) in the worst case, should the French Fleet ever come into contact with American forces, their fighting morale will be low and the resistance opposed to us purely nominal.
2. Same as above with special reference to Martinique.
3. To discourage the Germans from attempting to seize the French Fleet by building up a spirit of resistance.
4. In so doing, to avoid weakening or embarrassing in any way the present Vichy regime and to avoid compromising our present policy toward France which is based upon conditional support of the Vichy regime.

II. Specific Targets

Propaganda intended to influence the French Navy should be directed primarily at career officers actually serving on ships. It does not seem likely that the seamen on French Fleet can be persuaded to do anything except carry out orders they receive from their superiors. At some French Naval Stations there is evidence that officers between the ages of 30-40 years, ranging in grade from Jr. Lieutenant to Lieutenant-Commander, constitute a group particularly susceptible to American propaganda, but this does not appear to be true everywhere. In any case, it is the officers actually serving on board ship who are most important from the point of view of attaining the objectives listed above.

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XIX Channels:

Material transmitted by Americans from this country will reach French Naval Officers throughout the world through three channels:

- (1) radio operators on ships will pick up some American programs and spread them around by word of mouth.
- (2) officers of naval intelligence will be listening to American broadcasts as part of their professional duties and will selectively discuss them in private conversations.
- (3) There will be a very substantial amount of collective listening in officers' ward-rooms, particularly on board ship. The radio sets provided for the officers' wardrooms are exceptionally powerful ones and adapted to shorewave reception. There is greater likelihood of shorewave programs from this country being heard in French ports like Toulon than there is of the same programs being heard by the civilian population in France.

In Martinique and North Africa American programs are heard clearly and are widely listened to.

The best listening hours to reach French Naval Officers are after lunch and after dinner. The lunch period in the French Navy is from 11:00 or 11:30 to 1:30 or 2:00. The best after dinner period is from 7:00 to 9:00 P.M. The times here referred to are at the point of destination in terms of U.S.T. they would vary according to whether the program was beamed at France itself, at West Africa, or at Martinique. Because of the time difference it is obvious that the same program will have to be given at three different hours in order to reach all the strategic areas in which we are interested.

IV. Form of Broadcast:

The form of the broadcasts to the French Navy will be conditioned by the channels and the nature of the specific target. Since it is especially vital for us to reach officers serving on board ship, the third of the channels mentioned above--collective listening in ward-rooms--is by far the most important. To utilize this channel it will be necessary to give the broadcasts such form and content that there is no danger of listening to them being forbidden. If the broadcasts are labeled or even obviously intended for French Naval Officers, there is serious

- 3 -

danger that they will be burned at least at some stations.

To avoid this danger and at the same time reach our target with the necessary message, we should construct a special one-half hour program as follows:

(1) Ten to fifteen minutes of the time should be devoted to light music. The purpose of the music will be to provide an excuse for listening to the program as a whole. Both in order to make the excuse as convincing as possible and to make sure that the program will be tuned in on, a special effort must be made to provide the kind of musical entertainment most appreciated by officers of the French Navy, especially at Colonial stations, and to use musical recordings of the very highest caliber. Tango music is said to be particularly appreciated by the French Naval Officers and should be used lavishly provided the tunes are good and rendered by the best available ensembles. A certain amount of good American swing and of Americanized Latin-American music, such as rumbas and congas could also be used, and occasionally French jives and popular tunes from operas.

(2) Immediately following the music, there should be a special news commentary in French, which is to avoid anything of a subversive nature, but heavily slanting toward matters likely to interest naval listeners. For instance, comments on naval developments and naval warfare would be more frequent and carried in greater detail than in an ordinary commentary.

(3) Following the news commentary, there should be a short talk, in no case more than five minutes in length, which in most cases would be something quite innocuous and non-political—for instance, talks by or about movie stars who are popular in France—but which could be used on special occasions and infrequent intervals to carry a direct propaganda appeal in the form of a speech or statement. Historical subjects—especially from French Colonial and naval history—are particularly indicated.

The principal propaganda instrument would obviously be the news commentary. There is reason to hope that following as it does immediately upon the musical program, it will be listened to by the officers we wish to reach as they will always be able to say, if they are criticized for listening to American broadcasts, that they had only turned on the radio for the music and had forgotten to turn it off when the news started. Even so, great care must be taken not to betray the fact that we are addressing ourselves to Naval Officers and above all, not to use any criticisms or attacks on the Vichy regime.

The orientation of the program toward Naval Officers will be achieved in two ways:

- 4 -

(1) this particular program will be used at the hours when officers on board ship habitually listen to the radio in their wardrooms.

(2) by the slanting of the news towards subjects of particular interest or preoccupation to naval listeners.

V. Propaganda Content of Talks

The contents of the talks will be determined by specific psychological objectives.

1. The first of these must be simply to capture the interest of the listeners. This will be assured if the technical quality of the program is adequate.

2. The second special objective is to build up feelings of friendship for the U. S. and confidence in our strength and in our good will toward France. This objective will be achieved partly by friendly messages in the talks which follow the news commentary, but chiefly in the way in which the news itself is presented by the commentator. He will constantly try to find a pretext in the day's developments for introducing the following themes:

(a) the strength of our Navy and Air Force, and facts about American arms production.

(b) our determination to respect the integrity of the French Empire, i.e., to see to it that all French territory temporarily occupied by any of the Allies or ourselves shall be restored to French sovereignty without conditions at the end of the war. This point must be heavily stressed. The theme can frequently be injected into commentaries by allusions to some territory in a position comparable to the French Colonial Empire—for example, the Azores. In discussing the problem of the Azores, the commentator might call attention to the little known fact that they were used by us as a naval base during the last war, then turned back to the Portuguese. Using this as a peg, cite a number of other historical instances of a similar character.

(c) the traditional friendship between France and America and particularly French and American armed forces. In the news commentaries, whenever the name of an American officer who served in France in the last war is mentioned in the news, his record in France should be recalled in considerable detail. In the short talks at the end of the program, reminiscences of stays in France along the lines suggested by Mr. Potter might achieve the same purpose.

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(d) In handling all news about Britain, the commentator should present such news in the manner that clearly implies that while we are Allies of Great Britain, working together for a common victory, we maintain all our independence. We do not share all the British prejudices toward France. In fact, the British agree to it, it would be highly desirable from time to time to take up some of the wilder attacks on France in respectable British papers and refute them, pleading the case of France. Though this phase of the campaign must be handled very carefully, it is of great importance and subtle means must be found by the commentator for suggesting, without saying so, that we are protecting France from any sinister British designs. Consequently, commentaries should be made in commentaries to explain the position of Britain and Government and propaganda which presents Britain to the French people as the mortal enemy of France.

3. One of the most essential objectives, of course, is to strengthen the anti-German feeling, which is already fairly strong, among the class of officers at which we are aiming. In addition to current material from Europe and utilization of the historical theme, it will be desirable to give the anti-German theme a special naval slant. This might be done by characterizing upon the following basis ideas that Hitler is essentially a land warrior who has no understanding of the role of sea power and no feeling for ships as such. He has ruthlessly sacrificed his own ships in a manner which must seem shocking to any naval man, and now he has been trying to prod the Italian Navy to come out of its base to certain destruction, simply to slow down the British land offensive in Libya. If he gets control of the French Navy, he will use it for real naval warfare against the Allies, but will sacrifice it to strengthen the position of his land armies.

4. The most delicate and at the same time the most essential objective of all is to develop in the minds of French Naval Officers the fear that Hitler does, in fact, intend to seize the French Navy, and to implant in them a suspicion that Hitler would not only create diplomatic difficulties with Vichy, but might defeat their own purpose.

It is equally important not to give the impression that we lack confidence in the officers of the French Fleet. On the contrary, whenever we refer to German designs on the French Fleet we must do so in a manner to imply that we feel completely confident in the courage, honor, and patriotism of the French Naval Officers. What is really important here is not so much to warn our listeners that Hitler will try to get the French Navy, but to put them on guard against a specific form such an attempt might take. The commentator might, for instance, make reference to a report in Allied Naval circles that Hitler was planning to get hold of the Fleet pretending to Vichy that an Anglo-American expedition against Dakar was

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was imminent. The commentator would brand this as a lie and point out that the obvious purpose was to be able to offer German aid in resisting Anglo-American aggression--aid, for instance, in the form of German submarines to cooperate with units of the French Fleet at Dakar.

In case the threat to the Fleet becomes imminent, we should obtain from ONI details of the exact process by which the Germans were likely to carry it out in stages and warn our listeners to take steps before it is too late.

Great care should be taken in the commentaries not to say "Wolf" when there is no wolf, and if the wolf really does appear, we should warn our listeners gradually so as not to shock them into incredulity before their minds are prepared. In case of a seemingly certain threat to the French Fleet or Colonies, the news commentaries would steadily take on a tone of mounting alarm and urgency until it reached the point--after several days or weeks, depending upon the speed of events--when the listeners would no longer be shocked to hear the commentator drop all pretenses of journalistic objectivity, and come out with direct appeals for disobedience and desertion, if necessary.

5. If on the contrary we continue to remain relatively satisfied about the attitude of Vichy, we should carefully avoid any such appeals and attempt to give the impression that Washington and Vichy are in accord and that we ask nothing further from French Naval Officers than that they maintain their present neutral attitude.

(a) Even if no such thing is contemplated for the time being, we should inspire reports from time to time that if the situation continues to evolve satisfactorily, shipments of American food to France and of supplies to North Africa may be resumed. Then use these reports as pretexts for recalling the extent of American economic aid to France and particularly to North Africa in the past, before Heydrich's resignation.

(b) We should inspire and quote in the news commentaries editorials, articles, or statements rendering homage to the great services rendered the Allied cause by the French people in meeting and delaying the first onslaught of the Nazi hordes. Even if we are beginning to get critical once more of the Vichy regime, we should follow this line in order to overcome the complicated sentiment of inferiority which has developed in the minds of French Naval and Army Officers, and attempt to bolster rather than to weaken their self-confidence and feeling of worth.

(c) Similarly, we should attempt to restore the confidence of the French in their own powers of resistance by frequently

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pointing out that they still hold very powerful cards that they can play against the Germans. One of the most powerful of these cards is the French Fleet which would seriously complicate the task of the Allies if it were turned against us, but would seem the specially and of Hitler if it were turned against him. In our commentaries, we should make it clear that we would be very glad to see the French via concessions from their consequent by clever diplomacy based upon the fact that they still have a strong fleet.

VI. Implementation:

- (1) The first task is to find a skillful American commentator capable of understanding our objectives and of handling day to day news in such a way as to attain them. Whether he speaks French is unimportant as the script can be translated and read by any French speaker, while a very considerable journalistic skill will be needed in preparing the script.
- (2) When a suitable commentator has been found, a special sub-committee should be set up to keep in close touch with him, offering almost daily guidance. The Navy and State Departments should be asked to supply representatives for this sub-committee. The other members should be Mr. Taylor and a representative from the News Division and one from the Radio Division. The sub-committee should be authorized to employ as consultant, Mr. Paul Emilio Victor, a reserve officer in the French Navy, who is now in this country and would probably be willing to assist us for a financial consideration.
- (3) The sub-committee should take up the somewhat complicated problem of scheduling with the Radio Division. It must be borne in mind that three different areas must be aimed at; metropolitan France and North Africa, West Africa, and Martinique. The programs would, therefore, have to run at different hours in terms of American time and be put on different beams.
- (4) In view of the strong anti-British feeling existing in the French Navy, it would not seem advisable, at least at the beginning, to have any of these programs be broadcast from London.
- (5) As this project can hardly be carried out effectively without the cooperation of ONI and of the State Department, it should be discussed with them before putting it into execution, and any revisions necessary to secure their cooperation should be made.

SECRET

January 12, 1943

SECRET

IT IS PROPOSED TO INAUGURATE IMMEDIATELY AS PART OF THE GENERAL CAMPAIGN FOR NORTH AFRICA AND THE MEDITERRANEAN A SERIES OF SPECIAL RADIO PROGRAMS INTENDED TO INFLUENCE THE FRENCH NAVY.

I. Objectives:

1. The primary objective is to prepare the minds of officers and sailors of the French Fleet so that in case of a German attempt to take over the Fleet they will:
 - (a) desert with their ships to our side;
 - (b) if it is not possible to rally the whole fleet, certain units will desert;
 - (c) in the worst case, should the French Fleet ever come into contact with American forces, their fighting morale will be low and the resistance opposed to us purely nominal.
2. Same as above with special refs. now to Martinique.
3. To discourage the Germans from attempting to seize the French Fleet by building up a spirit of resistance.
4. In so doing, to avoid weakening or embarrassing in any way the present Vichy regime and to avoid compromising our present policy toward France which is based upon conditional support of the Vichy regime.

II. Specific Target:

Propaganda intended to influence the French Navy should be directed primarily at career officers actually serving on ships. It does not seem likely that the seamen on French Fleet can be persuaded to do anything except carry out orders they receive from their superiors. At some French Naval Stations there is evidence that officers between the ages of 30-40 years, ranging in grade from Jr. Lieutenant to Lieutenant-Commanders, constitute a group particularly susceptible to American propaganda, but this does not appear to be true everywhere. In any case, it is the officers actually serving on board ship who are most important from the point of view of attaining the objectives listed above.

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III Channels:

Material transmitted by shortwave from this country will reach French Naval Officers throughout the world through three channels:

- (1) radio operators on ships will pick up these American programs and spread them around by word of mouth.
- (2) officers of naval intelligence will be listening to American broadcasts as part of their professional duties and will constantly discuss them in private conversations.
- (3) There will be a very substantial amount of collective listening in officers' ward-rooms particularly on board ship. The radio sets provided for the officers' wardrooms are exceptionally powerful ones and adapted to shortwave reception. There is greater likelihood of shortwave programs from this country being heard in French ports like Saigon than there is of the same programs being heard by the civilian population in France.

In Martinique and North Africa American programs are heard clearly and are widely listened to.

The best listening hours to reach French Naval Officers are after lunch and after dinner. The lunch period in the French Navy is from 11:00 or 11:30 to 2:30 or 2:00. The best after dinner period is from 7:00 to 9:00 P.M. The times here referred to are at the point of destination; in terms of R.S.T. they would vary according to whether the program was beamed at France itself, at West Africa, or at Martinique. Because of the time difference it is obvious that the same program will have to be given at three different hours in order to reach all the strategic areas in which we are interested.

IV. Form of Broadcast:

The form of the broadcasts to the French Navy will be conditioned by the channels and the nature of the specific target. Since it is especially vital for us to reach officers serving on board ship, the third of the channels mentioned above--collective listening in ward-rooms--is by far the most important. To utilize this channel it will be necessary to give the broadcasts such form and content that there is no danger of listening to them being forbidden. If the broadcasts are labeled or even obviously intended for French Naval Officers, there is serious

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danger that they will be harmed at least at some stations.

To avoid this danger and at the same time reach our target with the necessary message, we should construct a special one-half hour program as follows:

(1) Ten to fifteen minutes of the time should be devoted to light music. The purpose of the music will be to provide an excuse for listening to the program as a whole. Both in order to make the excuse as convincing as possible and to make sure that the program will be tuned in by a special effort must be made to provide the kind of musical entertainment most appreciated by officers of the French Navy, especially at Colonial stations, and to use musical recordings of the very highest calibre. Jazz music is said to be particularly appreciated by the French Naval Officers and should be used lavishly provided the tunes are good and rendered by the best available orchestras. A certain amount of good American swing and of Americanized Latin-American music, such as rhumbas and congas could also be used, and occasionally French jazz and popular tunes from operas.

(2) Immediately following the music, there should be a special news commentary in French, which is to avoid anything of a subversive nature, but heavily slanting toward matters likely to interest naval listeners. For instance, comments on naval developments and naval warfare would be more frequent and carried in greater detail than in an ordinary commentary.

(3) Following the news commentary, there should be a short talk, in no case more than five minutes in length, which in most cases would be something quite innocuous and non-political, for instance, talks by or about movie stars who are popular in France—but which could be used on special occasions and infrequent intervals to carry a direct propaganda appeal in the form of a speech or statement. Historical subjects—especially French Colonial and naval history—are particularly indicated.

The principal propaganda instrument would obviously be the news commentary. There is reason to hope that following as it does immediately upon the musical program, it will be listened to by the officers we wish to reach as they will always be able to say, if they are criticized for listening to American broadcasts, that they had only turned on the radio for the music and had forgotten to turn it off when the news started. Even so, great care must be taken not to betray the fact that we are addressing ourselves to Naval Officers and above all, not to use any criticisms or attacks on the Vichy regime.

The orientation of the program toward Naval officers will be achieved in two ways:

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(1) this particular program will be used at the hours when officers on board ship habitually listen to the radio in their wardrooms,

(2) by the slanting of the news towards subjects of particular interest or preoccupation to naval listeners.

V. Propaganda Content of Talks:

The contents of the talks will be determined by specific psychological objectives.

1. The first of these must be simply to capture the interest of the listeners. This will be assured if the technical quality of the program is adequate.

2. The second special objective is to build up feelings of friendship for the U. S. and confidence in our strength and in our good will toward France. This objective will be achieved partly by friendly messages in the talks which follow the news commentary, but chiefly in the way in which the news itself is presented by the commentator. He will constantly try to find a pretext in the day's developments for introducing the following themes:

(a) the strength of our Navy and Air Force, and facts about American arms production.

(b) our determination to respect the integrity of the French Empire, i.e., to see to it that all French territory temporarily occupied by any of the Allies or ourselves shall be restored to French sovereignty without conditions at the end of the war. This point must be heavily stressed. The theme can frequently be injected into commentaries by allusions to some territory in a position comparable to the French Colonial Empire—for example, the Azores. In discussing the problem of the Azores, the commentator might call attention to the little known fact that they were used by us as a naval base during the last war, then turned back to the Portuguese. Including this as a peg, cite a number of other historical instances of a similar character.

(c) the traditional friendship between France and America and particularly French and American armed forces. In the news commentaries, whenever the name of an American officer who served in France in the last war is mentioned in the news, his record in France should be recalled in considerable detail. In the short talks at the end of the program, reminiscences of stays in France along the lines suggested by Mr. Feltus might achieve the same purpose.

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(d) In handling all news about Britain, the commentator should present such news in the manner that clearly implies that while we are Allies of Great Britain, working together for a common victory, we maintain all our independence; only in that, do not share all the British prejudices toward France. If the British agree to it, it would be highly desirable from time to time to take up some of the wider attitudes on France in responsible British papers and refute them, pleading the case of France. Though this phase of the campaign must be handled very carefully, it is of great importance and subtle means must be found by the commentator for suggesting, without saying so, that we are protecting France from any sinister British designs. Conversely, commentarial attempts should be made in commentaries to explain the position of Britain and counteract Axis propaganda which presents Britain to the French people as the mortal enemy of France.

3. One of the most essential objectives, of course, is to strengthen the anti-German feeling, which is already fairly strong, among the class of officers at which we are aiming. In addition to current material from Europe and utilization of the historical theme, it will be desirable to give the anti-German theme a special naval slant. This might be done by elaboration upon the following basic idea: that Hitler is essentially a land warrior who has no understanding of the role of sea power and no feeling for ships as such. He has ruthlessly sacrificed his own ships in a manner which must seem shocking to any naval man, and now he has been trying to prod the Italian Navy to come out of its bases to certain destruction, simply to slow down the British land offensive in Libya. If he gets control of the French Navy, he will use it for real naval warfare against the Allies, but will sacrifice it to strengthen the position of his land armies.

4. The most delicate and at the same time the most essential objective of all is to develop in the minds of French Naval Officers the fear that Hitler does, in fact, intend to seize the French Navy, and to implant in them a suspicion that Barlan would not only create diplomatic difficulties with Vichy, but might defeat their own purpose.

It is equally important not to give the impression that we lack confidence in the officers of the French Fleet. On the contrary, whenever we refer to German designs on the French Fleet we must do so in a manner to imply that we feel completely confident in the courage, honor, and patriotism of the French Naval Officers. What is really important here is not so much to warn our listeners that Hitler will try to get the French Navy, but to put them on guard against a specific form such an attempt might take. The commentator might, for instance, make reference to a report in Allied Naval circles that Hitler was planning to get hold of the Fleet pretending that Hitler was planning an Anglo-American expedition against Dakar was

was imminent. The commentator would brand this as a lie and point out that the obvious purpose was to be able to offer German aid in resisting Anglo-American aggression--well, for instance, in the form of German submarines to cooperate with units of the French Fleet at Dakar.

In case the threat to the Fleet becomes imminent, we should obtain from ONI details of the exact process by which the Germans were likely to carry it out in stages and warn our listeners to take steps before it is too late.

Great care should be taken in the commentaries not to "cry wolf" when there is no wolf, and if the wolf really does appear, we should warn our listeners gradually so as not to shock them into incredulity before their minds are prepared. In case of a seemingly certain threat to the French Fleet or Colonies, the news commentaries would steadily take on a tone of mounting alarm and urgency until it reached the point--after several days or weeks, depending upon the speed of events--when the listeners could no longer be shocked to hear the commentator drop all pretense of journalistic objectivity, and come out with direct appeals for disobedience and desertion, if necessary.

5. If on the contrary we continue to remain relatively satisfied about the attitude of Vichy, we should carefully avoid any such appeals and attempt to give the impression that Washington and Vichy are in accord and that we ask nothing further from French Naval Officers than that they maintain their present neutral attitude.

(a) Even if no such thing is contemplated for the time being, we should inspire reports from time to time that if the situation continues to evolve satisfactorily, shipments of American food to France and of supplies to North Africa may be resumed. Then use these reports as pretexts for recalling the extent of American economic aid to France and particularly to North Africa in the past, before Weyland's resignation.

(b) We should inspire and quote in the news commentaries editorials, articles, or statements rendering homage to the great services rendered the Allied cause by the French people in meeting and delaying the first onslaught of the Nazi hordes. Even if we are beginning to get critical once more of the Vichy regime, we should follow this line in order to overcome the complicated sentiment of inferiority which has developed in the minds of French Naval and Army Officers, and attempt to bolster rather than to weaken their self-confidence and feeling of worth.

(c) Similarly, we should attempt to restore the confidence of the French in their own powers of resistance by frequently

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pointing out that they still hold very powerful cards that they can play against the Germans. One of the most powerful of these cards is the French fleet which would seriously complicate the task of the Allies if it were turned against us, but would mean the speedy end of Hitler if it were turned against him. In our commentaries, we should make it clear that we would be very glad to see the French win concessions from their enemies by clever diplomacy based upon the fact that they still have a strong fleet.

VI. Implementations

- (1) The first task is to find a skillful American commentator capable of understanding our objectives and of handling day to day news in such a way as to attain them. Whether he speaks French is unimportant as the script can be translated and read by any French speaker, while a very considerable journalistic skill will be needed in preparing the script.
- (2) When a suitable commentator has been found, a special sub-committee should be set up to keep in close touch with him, offering almost daily guidance. The Navy and State Departments should be asked to supply representatives for this sub-committee. The other members should be Mr. Taylor and a representative from the News Division and one from the Radio Division. The sub-committee should be authorized to employ as consultant, Mr. Paul Raile Victor, a reserve officer in the French Navy, who is now in this country and would probably be willing to assist us for a financial consideration.
- (3) The sub-committee should take up the somewhat complicated problem of scheduling with the Radio Division. It must be borne in mind that three different areas must be aimed at: Metropolitan France and North Africa, West Africa, and Martinique. The programs would, therefore, have to run at different hours in terms of American time and be put on different beams.
- (4) In view of the strong anti-British feeling existing in the French Navy, it would not seem advisable, at least at the beginning, to have any of these programs be broadcast from London.
- (5) As this project can hardly be carried out effectively without the cooperation of ONI and of the State Department, it should be discussed with them before putting it into execution and any revisions necessary to secure their cooperation should be made.

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

INTEROFFICE MEMO

DATE Jan. 15, 1942

FROM: James Warburg

TO: Colonel Donovan

SUBJECT: Propaganda Campaign for the French Navy

With reference to Mr. Taylor's memorandum on this subject which you have seen, it is suggested that instead of sending the broadcasts from American shortwave stations, the program be carried out through U. S. naval vessels. One such vessel would be located at Gibraltar and the other at either Bathurst or Freetown. The vessel at Gibraltar could reach the French navy which is located in French Mediterranean ports or North African ports, and the vessel at Bathurst or Freetown could reach French vessels at Dakar.

The advantages of this suggestion would be:

1. The available time on the American shortwave stations is limited. In order to introduce this special program it would be necessary to throw off the air some of the existing programs which are important. Even if the objections of the stations could be overcome, there would be some doubt as to whether the sacrifice of the existing program would be warranted, in view of the phenomenal reception by the French naval vessels of a shortwave program.
2. By the proposed method, reception could be assured without taking any of the limited time available for shortwave broadcasts.
3. If programs were sent from American naval vessels as suggested, it would have a far greater appeal to the officers and men of the French navy. The substance of the program would of course have to be modified somewhat and the program could be developed much more specifically for the Navy. Since it would not be heard all over the world as a shortwave program would be.
4. It would not be necessary to immobilize important naval units for this task since even a tug could be equipped with the necessary apparatus. It is true that the location of the two vessels would probably become

Jan. 15, 1942

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known, but since the two vessels would not be important, I do not see what harm this would do. The mere fact that American naval vessels were in European and African waters would have a psychological effect on the French navy.

From a mechanical point of view, what is suggested is transmission by Morse Code to the two naval vessels, which would then broadcast by voice to the French navy. Programs could be prepared here, but each vessel would have to be equipped with a good French speaker. Since the apparatus required would not be of high power, it should not be difficult to obtain it.

It may be objected that the French Navy would not be permitted to listen to broadcasts emanating from the American navy. I think this objection could be met by having the broadcasts safely innocuous at the beginning so that there will be no reasonable objection. Furthermore, while the French navy might be forbidden to listen, this would merely mean that while they could not sit around and listen in the ward-rooms, the wireless operators would hear every word of the broadcasts and their substance would get around by word of mouth, which might be even more effective.

January 2, 1944

PROJECT

IT IS PROPOSED TO INAUGURATE IMMEDIATELY AS PART OF THE GENERAL CAMPAIGN FOR NORTH AFRICA AND THE MEDITERRANEAN A SERIES OF SPECIAL PHOTO PROGRAMS INTENDED TO INFLUENCE THE FRENCH NAVY.

I. Objectives:

1. The primary objective is to prepare the minds of officers and sailors of the French Fleet so that in case of a German attempt to take over the Fleet they will:
 - (a) desert with their ships to our side;
 - (b) if it is not possible to rally the whole Fleet, certain units will desert;
 - (c) in the worst case, should the French Fleet ever come into contact with American forces, their fighting morale will be low and the resistance opposed to us purely nominal.
2. Same as above with special reference to Martinique.
3. To discourage the Germans from attempting to seize the French Fleet by building up a spirit of resistance.
4. In so doing, to avoid weakening or embarrassing in any way the present Vichy regime and to avoid compromising our present policy toward France which is based upon conditional support of the Vichy regime.

II. Specific Target

Propaganda intended to influence the French Navy should be directed primarily at career officers between the ages of 30 to 40, ranging in grade from Jr. Lieutenants to Lieutenant-commanders, though it goes without saying that the propaganda should also include a more general appeal to other Navy categories and, in fact, to the French people in general.

There are two reasons for selecting the special group named above.

- (a) the group is a very important one as it includes commanders of submarines and important executive officers of various types of surface craft.
- (b) this group is more receptive to American propaganda, less anti-British, and less dependable from the Vichy point of view than any other category. The higher officers nearly all owe their present positions to Admiral Darlan; their fate is bound with his and they can be expected to carry out any orders they receive from him. The Ensigns are more reactionary in their political views and more definitely loyal from the Vichy point of view whereas the petty officers and sailors will carry out any orders they receive from their superiors.

III. Means of Action

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Material transmitted by shortwave from this country will reach French Naval Officers throughout the world through three channels:

1. radio operators on ships will pick up some American programs and spread them around by word of mouth.
2. officers of naval intelligence will be listening to American broadcasts as part of their professional duties and will similarly discuss them in private conversations.
3. there will be a very substantial amount of collective listening in officers' mess-rooms particularly on board ships. The radio sets provided for the officers' mess-rooms are exceptionally powerful ones and adapted to shortwave reception. There is greater likelihood of shortwave programs from this country being heard in French ports like Toulon than there is of the same programs being heard by the civilian population in France.

In Martinique and North Africa American programs are heard clearly and are widely listened to.

The best listening hours to reach French Naval Officers are after lunch and after dinner. The lunch period in the French Navy is from 11:30 to 1:30 or 2:00. The best after dinner period is from 7:00 to 9:00 PM. The times here referred to are at the point of destination in terms of 1:30 PM. They would vary according to whether the program was beamed at France itself, at West Africa, or at Martinique. Because of the time difference it is obvious that the same program will have to be given at three different hours in order to reach all the strategic areas in which we are interested.

IV. Form of Broadcast

The broadcast should have a special character suited to the taste and viewpoint of French Naval Officers but not expressly labeled for them. Two subjects suitable for propaganda purposes and certain to interest French Naval Officers suggest themselves as being particularly appropriate for the special programs proposed:

1. professionally competent commentaries on naval affairs.
2. talks on history with a strong naval and colonial angle. The interest in this topic is not so obvious but it happens that history is an intellectual hobby of a great many French Naval Officers and plays a special role in their intellectual formation.

In order to avoid monotony and the impression of propagandizing, it might be well to alternate talks on these two topics on the programs, giving naval commentaries four times a week and historical talks three times. One or the other of these subjects should be put on regularly every day at the same hour, but this feature should have no name at all or else some very neutral and general one, not betraying the fact that it is aimed primarily at Naval Officers. To make sure that it reaches its target we count on the

hour at which it is broadcast and the [illegible] interest of the [illegible] in these subjects.

V. Propaganda Content of Talks

The contents of the talks will be determined by specific psychological objectives.

1. The first of these must be simply to capture the interest of the listeners. This will be assured if the technical quality of the program is adequate.

2. The second special objective is to build up feelings of friendship for the U. S. and confidence both in our strength and in our judgment toward France. For this purpose the following themes will constantly be brought out:

(a) the strength of our Navy and Air Force (this can be handled particularly well in the Naval commentaries).

(b) our determination to respect the integrity of the French Empire; that is, to see to it that all French territory temporarily occupied by any of the Allies or ourselves shall be restored to French sovereignty without conditions at the end of the war. This point must be heavily stressed. From time to time a whole program will be devoted to an elaboration of this theme. Whenever possible some allusion to the theme must be worked somehow into the Naval commentaries or historical talks.

(c) the traditional friendship between the French and American Navies. This is an ideal theme for handling in the historical talks.

3. One of the most essential objectives, of course, is to strengthen the anti-German feeling, which is already fairly strong, among the class of officers at which we are aiming. In addition to current material from Europe and utilization of the historical theme, it will be desirable to give the anti-German theme a special naval slant. This might be done by elaborations upon the following basic idea: that Hitler is essentially a land warrior who has no understanding of the role of sea power and no feeling for ships as such. He has ruthlessly sacrificed his own ships in a manner which must seem shocking to any naval man, and now he has been trying to prod the Italian Navy to come out of its basins to certain destruction, simply to slow down the British land offensive in Libya. If he gets control of the French Navy, he will not use it for real naval warfare against the Allies, but will sacrifice it to strengthen the position of his land armies.

4. The most delicate and at the same time the most essential objective of all is to develop in the minds of French Naval Officers the fear that Hitler does, in fact, intend to seize the French Navy, and to implant in them a suspicion that Darlan and the other political admirals whom they already dislike, will not be able to resist him. This must be handled very carefully. Any direct attempt to discredit Darlan would not only create diplomatic differences with Vichy, but might defeat their own purpose. The

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unpopularity of Darlan with his own men should constantly be kept in mind, but not referred to. It will be necessary to find a number of indirect and devious devices for suggesting that Darlan may be preparing to sell out the French Navy and for insinuating that in such a case the real duty of French Officers will be to disobey orders and come over to our side. As an example of one such device, we might in our talk reply to accusations of the British radio, taking the defense of French Officers and even of Darlan. Thus we might point out that in our opinion the British radio is unfair to Darlan because we do not think that any French Naval Officer, anyone who has a soldierly rather than a political code of ethics would do such a thing. If, however, he would sell out, we are convinced that the officers of the French Fleet, being patriots and men of honor, would refuse to obey orders and would come over to us, because they knew that America would never betray their trust. At most we might suggest that the one thing which worries some people here is that perhaps the French Naval Officers would wait until too late to make up their minds.

Many other devices of a similar nature can be invented if we put enough thought into it. For this purpose it is all to the good if we seem slightly critical of our British allies as it builds up our own independence.

VI. Implementation

1. The first task is to find an appropriate French speaker. The ideal will be an American Naval Officer speaking perfect French and ready to follow our directives, but it may be difficult to find such a man. An intelligent reserve naval officer, M. Paul Guille Victor, who has served in Martinique since the Armistice says in principle that he would be willing to do these programs for us. It is proposed that the Radio Division be authorized to make Mr. Victor an adequate financial offer for his assistance.

In view of his connections with the Vichy Embassy in Washington and his political attitudes generally, it would be advisable for the FBI to maintain Mr. Victor under constant surveillance during the period he is to work for us, but subject to this check there does not seem to be any serious risk in employing him.

As alternate speakers or occasional contributors to this special program, Atoine de St. Exupery and Andre Maurois are suggested. If they are unwilling to make this contribution to the American cause, pressure should be put upon them.

2. The Radio Division should be asked to schedule two-10 or 15 minute periods in French daily for the special Navy Programs. Actually, this means six daily periods; namely, one period between 11:30 and 2:00 Martinique time; another period between 7:00 to 9:00 P.M. Martinique time; two periods at the same hour in French time; two periods at the same hour in West African time if this is different from French.

It would not seem advisable, at least at the beginning, to have these programs rebroadcast from London.

3. Responsibility for coordinating the efforts of the News and Radio Divisions in preparing material for these programs and in interpreting directives to the speaker should be entrusted to Taylor, at least until a

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regional coordinator for France has been appointed.

4. If this project is approved by the COT, the State Department and Navy should be informed, offered opportunity to send copy if they so desire, and give them a chance to formulate any suggestions that may occur to them. Their approval to the form of the project need not and should not be solicited as it falls clearly within the mandate of the COT.

5. The first program should be broadcast not later than January 10th.

WAR DEPARTMENT
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
WASHINGTON

September 9, 1942

Colonel W. J. Donovan

Dear Colonel:

General Strong authorizes me to release to you a copy of a paper prepared by a French diplomat in Algiers, subject: Violations Successives Appreheues A la Convention d'Amsterdam, with the proviso that this paper not be shown or given to the British until so authorized by General Eisenhower, to whom you have requested kindly to show the paper. General Strong is telegraphing General Eisenhower to that effect at once.

With kindest wishes for happy landing and pleasant voyage, I remain

W. A. Wilson
W. A. Wilson
Lt. Colonel, G.S.C.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

MOST
SECRET

Photo copy sent to C. I. D



L'Armistice a été demandé et obtenu sur un malentendu.

Dans la proclamation qu'il a adressée au peuple français, le 16 Juin 1940, au moment où comme Président du Conseil, il prenait le pouvoir, le Maréchal Pétain déclarait : "J'ai tenu de l'universaire s'il était prêt à discuter avec nous, sans l'honneur, les conditions d'une paix durable".

Toutefois, cette même proclamation déclarait à l'armée : "J'ai le regret de vous dire qu'il est impossible de continuer la guerre". Ces termes qui, la radio de lendemain corrigé en : "Je vais essayer de faire cesser le combat", semblaient indiquer que nous n'entendions plus discuter, mais étions prêts à accepter le "statu quo", et, en l'attendant, à laisser l'ennemi s'emparer sans lutte de tous les gages qu'il pourrait désirer. C'est bien ainsi, malgré quelques renouveau ultérieurs (annonces et préparatifs d'un départ éventuel en Afrique, lutte acharnée de l'armée des Alpes) que nos ennemis, nos alliés et une partie de nos forces militaires ont compris la position prise. Si l'on n'avait pas considéré, avant même la signature de l'acte de Rethenon, que la guerre était définitivement finie, des instructions telles que celles qui furent données au Ministre de la Marine, à Rochefort, aux troupes qui se trouvaient devant Poitiers, aux 3.000 officiers regroupés au Camp de la Courtine, au Commandant du dépôt d'armes de St-Etienne, etc... Instructions comportant défense de ne servir de ses armes, défense de se retirer et ordre de se rendre à l'ennemi sans combat, seraient absolument inexplicables.

La position, pleine de contradictions, prise à Bordeaux par le Gouvernement et le Haut Commandement (l'un et l'autre alors pratiquement confondus) offre de très grandes analogies avec l'attitude désordonnée des Bolcheviki en 1918, à la veille de Brest-Litovsk. Dans les deux cas :

- 1°) On demande la paix.
- 2°) On accuse ses alliés en déclarant qu'ils vous ont mis dans l'impossibilité d'agir autrement, mais en ajoutant en même temps qu'on ne les trahira pas.
- 3°) On cesse en fait le combat sans attendre de connaître les propositions de l'adversaire et on précipite même la désorganisation de l'armée.
- 4°) On annonce cependant que la paix sera discutée et que rien de contraire à l'honneur ne sera accepté.

Dans les deux cas, toutefois, on spéculait plus ou moins consciemment, sur l'intérêt qu'aura l'adversaire de vous voir vous retirer d'une lutte qui n'est pas finie et sur le fait que la

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l'organisation même de l'Etat vaincu, lui donne avantage à y affirmer celles des autorités qui veulent traiter. En 1918, LITVINOV, l'un des tractations que continue TROTSKY avec les missions militaires alliées et de l'existence, dans diverses parties de la Russie, de généraux dissidents qui se déclarent fidèles à l'Entente. En 1940, l'Etat-Major français compte sur l'incertitude dans laquelle se trouvent les allemands touchant les intentions de l'Empire ainsi que celles d'une flotte intacte, et d'une armée de l'air en train de se reconstituer, l'une et l'autre hors du territoire métropolitain.

En 1940 comme en 1918, cette spéculation paraît se révéler juste avec cependant, comme conséquence immédiate et fatale dans les deux cas, une rupture avec les anciens alliés obligés de prendre contre le vaincu des mesures de sauvegarde.

Et c'est sur ce point surtout que le malentendu s'aggrave tandis qu'à Rethondes les plénipotentiaires français croient obtenir le moyen de sortir "bouteusement mais avec honneur" de la lutte.

De la déclaration par laquelle les accueille le Chancelier HITLER, ils retiennent que celui-ci "ne veut pas imiter le Maréchal FOCH et n'imposera pas à un ennemi qui s'est vaillamment battu, des conditions humiliantes pour lui". En revanche, il s'agit de demander quelles conséquences pourront être tirées de cette phrase : "L'Allemagne est obligée de continuer à se battre. Elle entend sortir le plus tôt possible victorieusement d'une guerre qui lui a été imposée. Ce souci a présidé à la rédaction des clauses de l'Armistice".

De ce côté on a donc l'impression que l'honneur est sauf et que l'on va être neutre; les conditions pour que l'honneur soit sauf ont été définies par les plénipotentiaires français. Elles sont au nombre de trois : 1/ N'apporter aucune aide à l'Allemagne contre ses anciens alliés. 2/ Que le Gouvernement français demeure un Gouvernement indépendant et souverain. 3/ Qu'il n'y ait pas d'occupation italienne étendue. Ces conditions paraissent suffisamment remplies puisque l'Allemagne accepte de ne réclamer ni navire de guerre ni avions français et que, "sous réserve de l'exercice des droits de la puissance occupante" elle laisse à la charge et aux soins de l'Etat français, l'administration des territoires occupés.

Du côté allemand en revanche, on a l'impression que l'on a réglé quelque chose de provisoire qui ne préjuge en rien de ce que sera la paix et qui a seulement pour but de mettre immédiatement entre les mains de l'Axe le maximum de moyens et de sûretés pour la poursuite victorieuse de la lutte.

De ce malentendu vont découler toutes les divergences de vue dans l'application de l'Armistice, toutes les violations de sa lettre comme de son esprit, tel que le concevaient les français.

La première violation de l'Armistice (avant Wessbaden)

La première déqualification que l'interprétation de l'Armistice apportera aux Français sera causée par la question des prisonniers de guerre et des "troupes combattantes". On y attachera, il est vrai sur le moment peu d'importance, car l'on continuera à s'imaginer que la paix étant imminente, il vaut presque mieux laisser pendant quelque temps une partie de l'armée à la charge de l'Allemagne dans des camps plutôt que d'avoir à secourir, dans des conditions exceptionnellement difficiles, la démobilisation d'effectifs considérables.

La Convention de Rethondes stipule que les hostilités cesseront dès sa mise en vigueur et que toutes les troupes françaises se trouvant encore au nord de la ligne de démarcation devront être retirées au Sud de cette ligne, ce point étant bien clair que des chefs locaux allemands laissent passer et laisser en retraite vers le sud des troupes qui, à la veille de l'Armistice, combattaient encore en Normandie ou dans la région de la Loire. Mais les centaines de mille hommes qui résistaient encore dans l'Est et qui tenaient toujours tous les principaux ouvrages de la Ligne Maginot sont déclarés par la Commission de Wiesbaden prisonniers de guerre. Invoquant la Convention, les troupes se refusent à rendre leurs ouvrages si on ne les laisse s'exercer avec leurs armes. Pendant quelques jours, elles essayent de faire prévaloir une thèse que le Général Huntziger sera d'ailleurs chargé de défendre mais qu'il abandonnera dès le lendemain de son arrivée à Wiesbaden. Le 1er et le 2 Juillet, trois colonels du Grand Quartier Général français seront, à la demande des allemands, envoyés dans les différents secteurs de l'est pour expliquer aux chefs de corps que, sous peine d'être considérés comme rebelles, ils doivent, non seulement abandonner leurs fortifications intactes, mais se rendre sans conditions. Le 4 Juillet une mission analogue sera remplie auprès de la garnison du Fort de l'Escluse dans le Jura qui n'avait pas été atteint par les allemands au moment de la signature de l'Armistice. Les allemands subordonnent à la mise en captivité de cette garnison (environ 300 hommes) qui n'était même pas encerclée, l'évacuation de Lyon qu'ils ne quitteront d'ailleurs qu'après avoir vidé de tous ses approvisionnements militaires et civils.

Sur d'autres terrains, dans ces tout premiers jours, la portée de la Convention d'Armistice est aussi singulièrement étendue par des décisions prises à Wiesbaden.

Notons seulement trois d'entre ces décisions qui montrent combien était illusoire l'espoir caressé par le Gouvernement français de s'être assuré à Rethondes le passage de l'état de belligérance à l'état de stricte neutralité.

la disposition de tous les renseignements les concernant, mais les stations météorologiques françaises qu'elles soient en territoire libre ou dans l'Empire, il est, en même temps, entendu que les avions civils et militaires allemands pourront sans restriction surveiller tous les territoires français et que, s'ils n'y sont, les autorités françaises donneront leurs équipages toutes facilités pour réparer les appareils et repartir. Alors qu'en Méditerranée et en Afrique du Nord, nos services de défense antiaérienne vont tirer sur les avions anglais qui s'approchent de nos côtes et que nous internerons les équipages britanniques abattus, les pilotes allemands et italiens pourront se servir de nos côtes comme d'un refuge. En Tunisie, ils en profiteront largement.

2°) L'article 13 de la Convention d'Armistice stipulait que, dans les territoires qui n'avaient pas été conquis par les allemands mais que l'Armistice allait leur permettre d'occuper (c'est à dire la région de Bordeaux et la Guyenne), le Gouvernement français devait remettre intacts tous les moyens de transport et de transmission et si certains venaient à être endommagés, entre la signature de l'Armistice et le moment de leur remise aux allemands, en assurant la réparation.

Un document que M. BERTHELOT qui fut depuis lors Ministre des Communications, accepta de signer le 1er Juillet, document que nos Services appelèrent, à tort d'ailleurs, l'annexe à la Convention d'Armistice, modifia complètement la portée de l'article 13. C'est sur l'ensemble des territoires occupés et quelque soit le moment et la destruction ou est intervenue que le Gouvernement français s'engage à entreprendre lui-même sous le contrôle des autorités occupées, la remise en état des moyens de transports et de transmission.

M. BERTHELOT, alors que la démobilisation nous fait redouter le chômage, y voit l'avantage d'assurer du travail à nos ouvriers. Mais cette nouvelle interprétation de l'article 13, enchaîne de la charge très lourde qu'elle impose à notre budget et à notre économie bientôt hors d'état de fournir pour nos besoins essentiels les quantités de matériels nécessaires, crée une collaboration franco-allemande pour des travaux de guerre. C'est en effet des lignes présentant un intérêt stratégique que les allemands nous imposent la réparation tout d'abord. Et, dès Juillet 1940, l'on assiste à ce spectacle paradoxal d'équipes françaises ayant la responsabilité de la refaçon d'un réseau ferré ou télégraphique, dans une région où il n'y a plus de vie française car les allemands y interdisent le retour des populations civiles et où tout, en revanche, est orienté et utilisé pour les opérations de la guerre anglo-allemande.

3°) La Convention d'Armistice stipule que, sauf une petite flotte coloniale dont l'usage nous est laissé (1), la flotte

- (1) Wiesbaden en fixera l'effectif à 3 vieux croiseurs, 2 contre torpilleurs, 4 torpilleurs et 4 sous-marins.

françaises devra être écartée dans les ports français. L'Allemagne ne la réclamera pas. Le 30 Juin, on précise que ces ports français doivent être ceux du littoral méditerranéen ou atlantique de la métropole et le Gouvernement français est invité à faire rentrer immédiatement ses escadres qui sont entrées. On ajoute que la clause de "non réclamation" ne s'applique pas aux mines qui étaient en achèvement dans nos arsenaux et à certaines unités de petit tonnage dont le Reich prétend avoir besoin. Enfin on déclare "de bonne prise" tous les bâtiments de commerce français qui se trouvaient à Royan, Bordeaux et Bayonne bien que ces ports aient été occupés seulement après la signature de l'Armistice.

Toutes ces décisions prises à Wiesbaden en vue de tirer de l'application de la Convention d'Armistice, une extension de potentiel de guerre allemand, même en violant la lettre de cette Convention, sont antérieures aux événements de Mers-el-Kébir.

II - Les événements de Mers-el-Kébir à Wiesbaden.

Dans la soirée du 4 Juillet, le Général HUNTZIGER est invité à aller immédiatement mettre au courant le Président de la Commission d'Armistice de l'ultimatum que vient de recevoir des anglais l'Amiral GENSOUL alors qu'il s'apprêtait à se conformer aux ordres qui lui avaient été transmis, dictés de Wiesbaden, de rallier Toulon.

Le Général HUNTZIGER communique en même temps au Général Von STILPHACHEL le texte des instructions que l'Amiral DARLAN a aussitôt adressées à l'Amiral GENSOUL : "Il devra accomplir sa mission, même s'il doit faire usage de ses armes."

Le Général Von STILPHACHEL déclare qu'il va porter immédiatement à la connaissance du Führer "cette communication excessivement intéressante". Vers la fin de la nuit il envoie son officier de liaison au Général HUNTZIGER. Le Führer approuve les instructions données à l'Amiral GENSOUL et, pour faciliter la tâche que va assumer la flotte française "accepte de suspendre provisoirement et en partie" l'exécution des clauses de désarmement naval.

Tandis que le canon tonne à Mers-el-Kébir, le malentendu se poursuit. La position du Gouvernement français peut se résumer ainsi : "nous avons signé l'Armistice. Fidèles à notre signature nous l'écarterons, même si nos anciens alliés s'y opposent". Celle des allemands au contraire, ne s'attache pas à cet aspect juridique du problème. Elle s'exprime très franchement et cyniquement ainsi : "Si votre marine ou votre aviation ont envie de se battre contre les anglais, nous leur laisserons les armes nécessaires pour de telles entreprises. Mais nous ne ferons pas plus pour vous : ce n'est d'ailleurs que provisoirement que nous vous laissons ces armes."

5
A Vichy, néanmoins, l'on a conçu d'innocentes espoirs. Les offres accordées au désarmement de notre marine sont étendus à certaines formations d'aviation, après que nous eussions fait le geste d'aller bombarder Gibraltar. On parle déjà d'accords d'état-major avec le vainqueur, d'avantages politiques que l'Allemagne prévoit. Les félicitations adressées par le Führer "à une marine qui s'est montrée digne de ne pas mourir".

La déception sera d'autant plus violente lorsque trois jours après ces félicitations, le Führer fera connaître qu'en contre-partie de la bienveillance dont la Commission d'Armistice veut se faire preuve vis-à-vis de la marine française, l'Allemagne s'attend à ce que la France mette immédiatement à sa disposition ses aérodromes du Maroc et, pour assurer la sécurité et le ravitaillement des unités qui y seront envoyées, lui donne le libre usage et le contrôle de la voie ferrée Tunis-Casablanca.

Dans les milieux restreints qui connaîtront cette demande, le tollé sera immense. Le Maréchal trouve alors l'argument qui écartera pour un temps, les insistances allemandes sur ce point : "Si, dit-il dans une lettre personnelle au Führer, je vous accorde ce que vous me demandez et qui va très au delà des clauses de l'Armistice, je ne serai pas en mesure de réunir l'Afrique du Nord dans la voie de la dissidence".

- III -

L'Occupation et ses effets

La Convention d'Armistice prévoyait l'occupation d'une très importante partie du territoire français. Une ligne de démarcation marquait la limite de cette occupation et départageait ainsi la France en deux zones. Le Gouvernement français (la Convention le précisait dans son article 2) conservait l'administration de l'une et de l'autre mais dans l'une, celle située au nord de la ligne, l'Allemagne recevait les "droits de la puissance occupante", droits qui ont été définis et strictement délimités par les Conventions de La Haye.

C'était à des fins uniquement militaires que, d'après les déclarations du Maréchal KEITEL, à Reims, répondait le traité de la ligne de démarcation et aussi l'article 17 de la Convention, en vertu duquel l'Allemagne pourrait empêcher la fuite des "valeurs économiques" de la zone occupée. Cet article ajoutait en effet que sa disposition ne devrait pas nuire au ravitaillement de la zone libre qui conserverait la possibilité de puiser en zone occupée ce qui correspondrait à ses besoins. Ainsi, au point de vue économique l'unité du territoire français paraissait maintenue, comme elle l'était au point de vue politique par une Convention dont plusieurs clauses visaient, par ailleurs, au retour rapide des réfugiés, à

à la remise en place des chartes administratives, à la reprise de la vie et des courants d'activité normale sur l'ensemble du territoire.

Aussi bien, en ce qui concerne le rôle de la ligne de démarcation, que le caractère donné à l'occupation, la lecture et l'esprit de la Convention d'Armistice n'ont cessé d'être violés.

De la ligne de démarcation et de l'occupation, l'Allemagne s'est servie comme d'instruments politiques, y voyant à la fois le moyen de pressions sur le Gouvernement français et la possibilité de préparer un état de fait accompli avant la négociation de la paix.

1°) - Au lieu d'une, trois lignes de démarcation ont été établies et la zone occupée soumise à trois statuts différents. L'Alsace Lorraine étant entièrement mise à l'administration française et peu à peu considérée comme purement et simplement annexée au Reich, et une zone interdite comprenant une division de départements étant créée sans que l'autorité allemande ait jamais accepté de préciser nettement ses intentions vis à vis de cette zone.

2°) - Le régime appliqué en Alsace Lorraine a soulevé en septembre 1940 une protestation du Gouvernement français, protestation à laquelle les allemands, privés de tout élément de droit pour justifier leur action, n'ont jamais répondu. Loins d'en tenir compte, ils ont cherché à accélérer leur mise-mise sur ses trois départements et ont procédé en Novembre 1940 à l'expulsion massive de 180.000 lorrains dans des conditions absolument contraires au droit des gens. Alors que la Convention de la Haye ordonne à la puissance occupante de "respecter les personnes et les biens" et déclare que "sauf le cas de réquisitions contre indemnité, la propriété privée doit être considérée comme sacrée", les français d'Alsace et de Lorraine ont été expulsés sans avoir le droit de rien emporter, leurs biens, meubles et immeubles, ont été purement et simplement confisqués, vendus à l'encan ou donnés à des allemands que le Reich a implantés dans le pays. Le Général DOYEN, Président de la Délégation française à Wiesbaden, a élevé le 18 Novembre une protestation solennelle contre ces mesures barbares. La Commission d'Armistice lui a renvoyé sa protestation en déclarant qu'elle était "nulle et non avenue à ses yeux, car le Gouvernement allemand se refusait à la reconnaître".

Porte de l'état de fait qu'elle avait créé, l'Allemagne à la suite de pressions successives, est arrivée à imposer au Gouvernement français le renvoi en Alsace Lorraine de tous les soldats allemands lorrains, la libération des prisonniers de droit commun allemands lorrains se trouvant en zone libre ou dans les colonies françaises etc...

3°) - Les allemands essaieront d'expliquer la création tout à fait inattendue pour nous d'une zone "interdite" en invoquant tout d'abord la nécessité de mettre de l'ordre dans le retour des réfugiés. Puis, quand après quelques semaines, les réfugiés seront rentrés dans les autres régions de la zone occupée et que ce

prétexte ne vaudra plus, ils alléguèrent, pour la violation d'un statut spécial à cette zone, des raisons d'ordre militaire;

Personne ne peut en être dupe : la France Combe comprise dans la zone interdite n'est exposée à aucune opération de guerre tandis que le Bretagne et la Normandie qui n'y sont pas comprises, sont, au même titre que les côtes de Flandres, zones d'opérations militaires.

En réalité, comme le fera ressortir un rapport du Général NOYEN, la zone interdite couvre les ambitions territoriales de l'Allemagne pour le cas où une victoire totale lui permettrait de réaliser un programme que les dirigeants nazis n'ont jamais dissimulé et que les journaux nazis avaient presque ouvertement au lendemain de l'Armistice (1).

Contrairement aux stipulations de la Convention d'Armistice, les allemands ont :

a) créé une barrière infranchissable entre la zone interdite et le reste du territoire occupé (des femmes ont été tuées au cours de l'hiver 1941 en essayant de franchir cette barrière).

b) entravé la réinstallation des cadres administratifs en zone interdite. Seuls les fonctionnaires qui étaient demeurés sur place ont pu, en général, y exercer des fonctions. En nombre insuffisant, ils ne peuvent assurer à eux seuls une administration normale du pays.

c) empêché le retour des réfugiés, surtout celui des paysans (les internés français en Suisse, originaires de la zone interdite n'ont pas, après leur libération, été autorisés à rentrer chez eux).

d) dépouillé des fermiers français et fait exploiter par la Société allemande Ostland plusieurs centaines de fermes soi-disant abandonnées (parce que l'on empêchait le retour de leurs propriétaires) ou que l'on prétendait d'un rendement insuffisant (alors qu'il s'agissait généralement des fermes les mieux traitées qui avaient échappé à la convoitise allemande). En Juillet 1941, plus d'un dixième du territoire de la Meuse et un sixième de celui des Ardennes étaient déjà entre les mains d'exploitations agricoles allemandes.

e) procédé à des réquisitions forcées de main-d'œuvre, soit pour l'envoyer en Allemagne, soit pour l'employer à des travaux militaires sur les côtes, soit pour faire travailler sur leurs

(1) En juillet 1940, on voit même apparaître dans certaines revues allemandes des revendications sur la Bourgogne. D'autre part, une carte publiée en 1938 par le journal d'extrême gauche "Ce Soir" et que personne ne prit alors au sérieux, reproduit exactement, sous le titre : "zone réservée à l'influence allemande" la ligne de démarcation telle qu'elle devait être tracée deux ans plus tard;

ordres des exploitants allemands, les adresses propriétaires loca-
ciers français.

45) - Les "droits de logement" ont été sans cesse exagérés non seulement en Alsace Lorraine et en zone interdite, mais dans toute la zone occupée. Les conventions de la Haye prescrivent formellement les dépenses qui s'y rattachent et les municipalités (Encore plus naturellement leur exécution). Il faut remonter à l'épisode des Bourgeois de Calais au 15^e siècle qui furent évil- leurs grâces sur l'intervention de la Reine d'Angleterre, pour re- trouver dans l'histoire de l'occupant la racine et la pratique des otages.

Pour la coupure d'un fil téléphonique des communes se sont vu infliger des amendes dont le montant équivalait à la confiscation de toutes les ressources des habitants. Quant aux otages, il en a été constitué plusieurs milliers, il en a été fusillé plusieurs centaines.

Les Conventions de la Haye interdisent d'exploiter les habitants du territoire occupé à des travaux de guerre et de les placer dans des endroits ex posés. Or, sur toutes les côtes, malgré les protes- tations incessantes de notre délégué à Wiesbaden, des français ont été réquisitionnés pour garder, sous leur responsabilité, des garri- ges militaires, pour construire ou entretenir des champs d'aviation. L'autorité occupante a fait fermer des chantiers de travaux publics dans le Loiret et en Indre-et-Loire pour en enrôler de force tous les ouvriers en Bretagne travailler dans les rangs de l'organisation Todt. Ces ouvriers étaient cantonnés la nuit dans les ouvrages sus- ceptibles d'être bombardés. C'est ainsi que 200 d'entre eux ont été tués, dans le courant de l'hiver 1941, dans l'arsenal de Lorient, que d'autres étaient maintenues en Normandie, pour y créer une ali- mentation factice, sur des champs d'aviation-pièges où ne se trouvaient que des avions en bois et vers lesquels les allemands voulaient faire dériver les bombardements britanniques.

Les Conventions de la Haye prescrivent le respect de la proprié- té privée. Si, sauf en Alsace Lorraine, le domaine public, les mu- sées notamment n'ont pas subi de trop graves atteintes, on peut dire au contraire que le pillage a été la règle dans toutes les proprié- tés privées occupées; En dehors du pillage individuel, une atteinte très grave a été portée à la fortune française par le fait que le Gouvernement allemand a agi comme s'il se considérait propriétaire légal de tous les biens juifs situés en territoire occupé. Les col- lections appartenant à des juifs français ont été envoyées en Alle- magne. Le salon de M. ABETZ est décoré aujourd'hui de tapisseries prélevées chez les ROTSHILD. Sous couvert de collaboration avec la France dans une épuration juive, l'Allemagne a effectué, sans aucun titre, un prélèvement de plusieurs milliards sur le patrimoine fran- çais et sur les richesses qui alimentaient le fisc français.

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5*) - L'article 17 donnait à l'Allemagne, sous les réserves indiquées ci-dessus, un contrôle du passage des "valeurs documentées" à la ligne de démarcation.

Dès le 10 juillet 1940, M. HENRI, qui venait de prendre la présidence de la délégation économique d'armistice, indiquant à la légation française stupéfaite, qu'il interprétait donner et ses "valeurs documentées" une interprétation telle que les deux parties de la France se trouveraient pratiquement complètement séparées l'une de l'autre.

Et, dans un habile chantage, il suggérait : "vous n'avez qu'un moyen de vous en tirer, c'est que la France, dans sa pleine souveraineté, accepte que les douaniers, les policiers et les contrôleurs financiers allemands, puissent surveiller les frontières extérieures de la zone libre. Dans ces conditions, la ligne de démarcation pourra n'être plus qu'une ligne fictive qui n'apportera aucune gêne à la vie française".

Pour appuyer ce chantage, les autorités occupantes rendaient peu à peu complètement hermétique, sous prétexte du passage des personnes qu'à celui des marchandises et du courrier, une ligne de démarcation qui était en fait, depuis quelques semaines, devenue une ligne réelle.

En même temps, un Ministre, M. PIENNI, qui avait pu se rendre à Paris, en était revenu. Déjà affolé par les nouvelles d'une presse que les allemands avaient prise dans la capitale, le Gouvernement du Maréchal, hanté par l'idée directrice de maintenir l'unité de la Nation et de l'Empire (en l'occurrence, il s'agissait seulement de la Nation, car le projet HENRI allait créer une ligne de démarcation nouvelle entre la zone libre et l'Empire), accepta d'entrer dans les vues de M. HENRI et de négocier avec lui les conditions d'un assouplissement de la ligne de démarcation moyennant l'octroi à l'Allemagne de garanties nouvelles.

Le Général HUNTZIGER, ne put, comme il le souhaitait, mener cette négociation avant son départ de Wiesbaden. Au début d'octobre, son successeur, le Général DORR, entreprenait les résultats définitifs à Vichy, en recommandant de les rejeter.

En échange de "facilités" à tout moment révoquables, accordées pour le passage des marchandises et des valeurs, à la ligne de démarcation, (il ne s'agissait plus de la suppression virtuelle de cette ligne comme l'avait laissé espérer M. HENRI), la France devait accepter l'installation au Ministère de l'Economie Nationale d'un Contrôleur aux Changes et d'un Contrôleur au Commerce Extérieur. Elle perdait la liberté de ses négociations commerciales et sur ses frontières des Pyrénées, de la Méditerranée et de la Suisse, ses douaniers seraient soumis au contrôle d'inspecteurs allemands. De plus, la police allemande contrôlerait les

entrées et les sorties des personnes étrangères en permanence au nord de la frontière, sur les frontières du territoire français libre. L'installation d'un contrôle postal allemand strict également prévu à Marseille et à Toulouse.

Sur la proposition de M. BAUCOURT, le Conseil des Ministres rejeta ces propositions. Mais quelques mois après, sur de nouvelles pressions allemandes, elles furent, à l'exception du contrôle polémique des personnes et du contrôle postal, que M. BAUCOURT ne réclamait plus, acceptées par l'Amiral LAMOTTE à Paris.

6°) - A Rathondes, toutes facilités avaient été promises au Gouvernement français pour le cas où il désirerait se réinstaller à Paris ou s'en rapprocher. Le Maréchal LAFITTE avait même déclaré que "l'on pourrait envisager de faire passer la ligne de démarcation derrière Orléans, si le Gouvernement désirait se fixer dans cette ville".

Le Gouvernement français n'essaya pas de tirer parti de cette suggestion mais vint tout de suite une réinstallation à Paris. C'est tant Bordeaux où entraient les allemands, il était venu s'arrêter à Vichy, à la limite nord de la zone libre, à 30 kilomètres à peine de la ligne de démarcation, comme à une étape sur la voie d'un retour considéré alors comme imminent. Dès le début de juillet, le Général HUNZIGER fut chargé d'invoquer la clause de l'Armistice qui permettait le retour du Gouvernement à Paris et de négocier les conditions de ce retour. Les allemands ne se dérobèrent pas tout d'abord ; on parla de donner à certaines parties du 7^e arrondissement de Paris, puis Versailles, un statut correspondant à peu près à celui de la Cité du Vatican en Italie. Promis de rentrer, les ministres faisaient rentrer leurs ministères sans attendre la garantie qu'ils pourraient travailler en toute indépendance.

Les événements subséquents ont prouvé qu'un gouvernement qui désirait conserver son indépendance ne pouvait que rendre sa tâche plus difficile en s'installant en zone occupée. Mais au lendemain de l'Armistice, le Gouvernement du Maréchal croyait y avoir intérêt. Le refus qu'à deux reprises lui ont opposé les allemands en Août et en Décembre 1940, lui a peut-être, malgré lui, rendu service ; il n'en constitue pas moins une violation de la Convention d'Armistice.

Le fait d'avoir laissé, dans l'espoir de ce retour gouvernemental, la majeure partie des administrations se réinstaller à Paris, va d'ailleurs offrir aux allemands une nouvelle occasion de se servir de l'occupation comme d'un moyen de pression politique. Chaque fois que la situation politique sera tendue, les autorités occupantes, en fermant la ligne de démarcation au passage des fonctionnaires, couperont le contact entre les bureaux de Paris et les cabinets ministériels à Vichy ; ce qui n'aura pas seulement pour résultat de gêner l'action gouvernementale en zone occupée, mais de paralyser l'administration de toute la France puisque c'est pour toute la France que travaillent les Services rentrés dans la

capitales. Pour n'avoir pas voulu s'organiser en prévision d'une Armistie de longue durée (parce qu'il croyait la capitulation britannique imminente), le Gouvernement français s'est, en effet, placé lui-même dans la situation paradoxale de gouverner le Pays de Vichy mais de l'administrer de Paris. C'est à Paris notamment que sont continués tous les paiements de l'Etat.

7°) - Bien que la Convention d'Armistice ait laissé au Gouvernement français la responsabilité de l'administration territoriale occupée, les autorités allemandes firent très vite la prétention de ne laisser promulguer sur ces territoires aucune loi nouvelle qui n'aurait pas été soumise préalablement à leur visa.

La promulgation des lois s'effectuant, en France, par leur publication au Journal Officiel, les allemands décidèrent de ne laisser pénétrer ce Journal en zone occupée que si tout son contenu leur était communiqué au moins huit jours avant son impression et que si le Gouvernement français acceptait par avance de retirer de l'impression tout ce qui soulèverait des objections de la part des autorités occupantes.

Tenant à tout prix à maintenir pour tout le territoire français un seul journal officiel et une seule législation, le Gouvernement français s'est donc vu obligé de le soumettre à la censure allemande. Toute insertion au Journal Officiel avant à être désormais approuvée par les allemands, ceux-ci se trouvent maintenant en mesure, s'ils le veulent, de s'opposer à n'importe quelle nomination de fonctionnaire même en zone libre ou dans l'Empire.

Malgré cette concession d'une portée immense, le Gouvernement français n'a pu obtenir que le Journal Officiel pénétre en Alsace-Lorraine ni qu'il soit automatiquement applicable en zone interdite. Dans cette dernière, les autorités allemandes locales continuent à faire un tri parmi les textes publiés au Journal Officiel (et dans déjà approuvés par les autorités allemandes de Paris).

8°) - L'intervention des autorités occupantes s'est exercée dans de très nombreux domaines où la Convention d'Armistice ne leur donnait aucun droit de regard. C'est ainsi, par exemple, que la région française de Wiesbaden a dû protester à maintes reprises, et sans aucun succès d'ailleurs, contre les ingérences absolument injustifiées dans l'exercice de la justice pénale française. Des fonctionnaires se sont opposés à la poursuite et à l'arrestation de criminels de droit commun qui étaient pour elle des indicateurs ; elles en ont fait libérer d'autres. Il est piquant de rappeler que c'est surtout en faveur des communistes que s'exerça, au cours de l'été 1940, cet interventionnisme allemand dans nos affaires judiciaires. A Bordeaux entre autres, en Août 1940, des gendarmes, qui, obéissant à des ordres du ministère de l'Intérieur, avaient transféré dans un camp de la zone libre des communistes détenus en Gironde, furent, à titre de sanction, incarcérés par les allemands. Le Gouvernement ne put obtenir leur libération qu'après avoir libéré lui-même les communistes protégés par le Reich.

condamnations pénales dépassant une année de prison ne seraient exécutées qu'après avoir été ratifiées par la Commandature.

Nous verrons d'autre part, aux chapitres concernant les prélèvements financiers et les prélèvements économiques, maintes exemples d'ordonnances prises par l'autorité occupante dans les questions qui n'ont aucun rapport avec la "sécurité des troupes d'occupation" qui domine dans lequel - et encore dans les limites permises par le de des gens - l'autorité occupante avait le droit d'établir une réglementation.

Comment concilier de telles ingérences avec la Convention d'Armistice qui laissait au Gouvernement français le soin d'administrer le territoire français et d'y assurer la maintenance de l'ordre ?

En réalité, l'occupation qui devait respecter le souveraineté du Gouvernement français sur tout le territoire français, a servi à exercer sans traité de paix, certaines parties du territoire, à préparer une main-mise sur d'autres et à vassaliser le Gouvernement français non seulement dans la mesure des besoins militaires allemands et dans les limites de la zone occupée, mais dans l'exercice de toutes ses prérogatives et partout où s'étendait son autorité.

Si l'occupation allemande est la seule à laquelle on pense, c'est certainement parce qu'elle s'étendait aux 2/3 de notre territoire métropolitain, un relevé des violations de la Convention d'Armistice ne se fait pas complet si l'on omettait de parler de l'occupation italienne.

La Convention d'Armistice franco-italienne stipule que les troupes italiennes "s'arrêteront sur les positions qu'elles ont atteintes". En fait, comme les troupes italiennes ne se trouvaient que dans les hautes vallées de montagne, sans avoir coupé aucun pont, le Gouvernement français, dans la fixation du tracé de la ligne de démarcation, se montra particulièrement libéral, laissant y inclure des routes que les Italiens n'avaient jamais atteintes mais sans possession desquelles il leur eût été impossible de maintenir des unités dans la plupart des échancrures de notre frontière par lesquelles s'était marqué leur offensive. De même le Gouvernement français ne discuta pas l'inclusion de Menton dans la zone occupée, que le matin même de l'armistice, une contre-attaque française et italienne les troupes italiennes qui y avaient pénétré, les faisant se soumettre ou les rejetant dans Vintimille.

Même étendue de la sorte, la zone d'occupation italienne ne présentait que 800 km² peuplés avant la guerre par 28.000 habitants. Mais les Italiens s'y sont comportés exactement de la même manière que les allemands dans nos départements d'Alsace Lorraine, c'est-à-dire qu'ils y ont agi comme si ces territoires avaient été purement et

Un véritable cordon a été publié le 10 juillet 1940 applicable aux territoires. Tous les fonctionnaires français ont été expulsés ou ont vu interdire d'y rentrer. La poste italienne s'y est installée et que des juges de paix italiens et les douanes italiennes ont été transportés à la ligne de démarcation. Les écoles françaises ont été fermées. Les rues à l'entour de l'occupation et l'italien est la langue officielle dans des bandes du Dauphiné et de Savoie. On ne peut le comprendre.

Avant la zone d'occupation italienne, la Convention d'Armistice de Rome a créé une zone "démilitarisée" large de 10 à 100 km. Sans prétexte de contrôler la démilitarisation de cette zone, les Italiens ont prétendu y exercer de véritables fonctions de police, y interdire tout rassemblement, la présence d'habitants, etc...

IV -

Les "FRANS d'OCCUPATION" et les PARLEMENTS ALLEMANDS

A la fin de Juillet 1940, M. HENKEN, Président de la Délégation Economique Allemande, aborde la question des frais d'occupation. C'est fut la Commission Economique qui eut à connaître cette question et la Commission Militaire est significatif (1) : il indique qu'il s'agit plus de poursuivre un objectif économique que d'obtenir le remboursement de dépenses militaires.

Telle sera en effet la vérité. En spécifiant que la France paie l'entretien des troupes d'occupation, la Convention d'Armistice établit, sans attendre la conclusion de la paix, un compte de paiements entre l'Etat français et le Reich. Détournant ce compte de l'objet auquel il avait été prévu, les allemands vont fort habilement s'en servir comme moyen d'aspirer peu à peu toute la richesse de la France et placer de manière durable notre pays sous la domination économique allemande.

- (1) A partir du 10 Juillet, la Commission d'Armistice de Wiesbaden fut scindée en deux commissions absolument indépendantes (elles siègent en deux endroits différents). La Commission d'Armistice proprement dite, présidée par le Général von STULPNAGEL, puis le Général VOGL, Commission Economique, présidée par M. HENKEN.

5. Comme dans d'autres domaines, la période d'armistice doit servir à permettre la ordation du fait accompli avant les discussions auxquelles donnera lieu le traité de paix.

La courte période d'opérations militaires est loin d'avoir laissé en France les ravages que l'affolement du moment laissait supposer. Ni au point de vue humain, ni au point de vue matériel, les destructions n'ont été très importantes. En Juin 1940 tout était complètement désorganisé, mais si une paix véritable était alors intervenue, tout aurait pu être remis, très vite et à moines peu de frais, en état. La France demeurait, en puissance, un pays riche et une force économique redoutable. Les allemands le savaient parfaitement. C'est à occuper cette richesse et à se servir à leur profit de cette force qu'a tendu toute la politique menée à Vichy par M. LACROIX et à Paris par le Docteur MICHEL.

1°) - Le premier acte de notre politique, à l'instar de ce qui a soulevé la question des frais d'occupation, consistera dans la fixation d'un taux de change artificiel entre le franc et le mark. Ils fixent à 20 francs le taux d'échange du mark, dont la valeur conventionnelle n'a jamais dépassé une quinzaine de francs, alors que le mark-billet n'en valait lui-même que 9, les allemands commettent une véritable escroquerie. Dévaluant eux-mêmes, sans aucun droit, le monnaie française, ils s'assurent la possibilité d'effectuer des achats en France à prix réduit. Le Gouvernement français proteste contre cette prime donnée aux acheteurs allemands et dont les effets sont d'autant plus graves qu'il s'efforce, en accord d'ailleurs avec l'autorité occupante, d'empêcher la hausse du coût de la vie et celle des salaires français. M. MICHEL répond d'abord que la question demeure réservée et laisse espérer une révision du taux de change si le montant des frais d'occupation est accepté. Quand ce montant sera accepté il déclarera que le taux de 20 contre un ne peut plus être modifié.

Au cours d'entretiens à Paris, au début de l'hiver 1941, l'Amiral DARLAN acceptera de renoncer à notre réclamation et de considérer la question du taux de change comme définitivement réglée.

2°) - Du montant réclamé pour les frais d'occupation les allemands défalquent immédiatement la principale dépense à effectuer en francs par leur armée, c'est-à-dire le logement des troupes. Le Gouvernement français remboursera lui-même, comme il l'entendra aux intéressés les billets de logement délivrés par l'autorité militaire. Il devra d'autre part, payer les travaux que l'autorité allemande entreprendra pour le logement de ses troupes et dont les notes lui seront directement transmises. On s'apercevra très vite que certaines de ces notes n'auront qu'un rapport très éloigné avec les dépenses de logement. On fera rembourser au Gouvernement français la construction de cinémas pour la troupe, l'aménagement de maisons de tolérance, l'achat de meubles ou de tableaux coûteux pour la décoration de casernes d'officiers, etc...

3°) - Les dépenses de logement qui sont en fait les strictes dépenses d'occupation ne trouvant défraiées, le Gouvernement français éprouve une véritable stupeur à se voir réclamer en plus, sous le prétexte de frais d'occupation, pas moins factuellement 400 millions de francs par jour. Le tiers de la somme réclamée.

Pour se rendre compte de ce que représente cette somme, il convient de rappeler :

a) Que les avances consenties par l'Etat français à chacune des Etats de la Petite Entente en 1934 en échange de leur alliance militaire étaient de 400 millions. Les commissions financières du parlement critiquèrent ces avances trouvées par elles trop coûteuses.

b) Que les restrictions des ventes des agriculteurs belges sur le marché français en 1935, restrictions qui furent le prétexte officiel et d'ailleurs véritable de la dénonciation de l'alliance militaire franco-belge, étaient évaluées par les deux pays à une perte de 400 millions par an pour la Belgique. Le Gouvernement français se refusa à compenser cette perte. Le Gouvernement de l'époque présidé par M. LAVAL préféra renoncer à la prolongation de la ligne Maginot en Belgique plutôt que de procéder dans ce pays à des achats supplémentaires d'un montant égal à ce qu'il donnerait plus tard chaque jour à l'Allemagne.

c) Qu'en 1938, prêts à renverser sa politique et à revenir à une alliance étroite avec la France, la Yougoslavie nous demanda de lui garantir sur le marché français la vente annuelle de 400 millions de francs de produits yougoslaves. Après de laborieuses négociations, nous acceptâmes seulement de nous engager pour 60 millions de francs.

d) Qu'à la veille de la guerre, le budget annuel français s'équilibrait aux environs de 50 milliards (soit une dépense journalière de 137 millions) c'est à dire que toutes les dépenses de l'Etat français n'atteignaient que le tiers de la somme réclamée par l'Allemagne pour ses frais d'occupation.

e) Que de Septembre 1939 à Mai 1940, alors que nous étions en guerre, les dépenses militaires journalières de la France n'atteignirent jamais 400 millions de francs, ce qui permet de dire que chaque jour d'armistice a coûté plus cher au contribuable que les jours de guerre.

Le Gouvernement français fit remarquer qu'en reprenant les taux proposés par lui lors de l'occupation française de la Rhénanie, la somme réclamée, convertie en franc-or, correspondait à l'entretien complet d'une armée de 20 millions d'hommes. Or, l'Allemagne n'avait pas en France plus de 4 millions d'hommes. D'autre part, il convenait de faire une distinction entre "troupes d'occupation" et "troupes d'opérations", la Convention d'Armistice ne nous obligeant pas à payer les troupes qui ne se trouvaient en France que pour les besoins de la lutte contre l'Angleterre.

Néanmoins, sous la menace allemande, se voyant dépourvus de vraies promesses de reconnaissance la question de tenir compte dans d'autres domaines de notre acceptation, le Gouvernement français s'inclina et un compte alimenté par des versements de 400 millions par jour fut ouvert à la Banque de France au Gouvernement du Reich (et non pas à l'armée d'occupation). En juin 1941, le Gouvernement français avait déjà versé 146 milliards à ce compte.

4°) - A cette époque, liant la question aux accords qui étaient négociés à Paris à propos des bases en Syrie, le Gouvernement français accepta le principe d'une réduction des frais d'occupation. Dans les conversations qui suivirent, M. REINHARDT consentit à faire tomber le versement journalier à 300 millions, à condition qu'un tiers de cette somme fut versé en devises étrangères, en or ou en valeurs mobilières. Cette exigence absolument incompréhensible et les "frais d'occupation" avaient seulement dû servir à leur objet véritable, c'est-à-dire, l'entretien des troupes allemandes en France.

Ces bases nouvelles qui ont été représentées comme une concession pour la France, sont en réalité beaucoup plus onéreuses pour la France que le régime antérieur puisque ce n'est plus seulement des francs papiers mais une partie de la substance même de sa richesse que la France doit, chaque jour, remettre directement au Reich.

5°) - Les ressources financières perpétuellement renouvelées qui lui assurait son compte à la Banque de France ont permis au Gouvernement du Reich, après avoir fourni à ses soldats stationnés en France, d'abondants moyens de paiements en France, de conserver encore une masse de manœuvre considérable (puisque le compte représente trois fois le budget français d'avant guerre) pour toutes les dépenses qu'il veut effectuer en France à l'insu du Gouvernement français.

Car pour les dépenses "avouables", le Reich dispose d'un autre moyen tout aussi commode car tout aussi peu coûteux pour lui, l'accord de clearing dont nous parlerons plus loin. C'est ainsi qu'il peut régler la plupart des commandes, militaires ou autres, qu'il a passées en France, sans entamer cette masse de manœuvre.

Quel usage est donc réservé à celle-ci ? Elle sert presque exclusivement à des fins politiques, étant utilisée pour créer en France et dans l'Empire l'état de fait accompli que désire l'Allemagne avant la négociation du traité de paix.

A cet effet, elle est employée, tout d'abord, à l'achat de consciences pour des œuvres de propagande ou de délation, ensuite à des dépenses qui paraissent d'un intérêt plus durable et qui tendent tout simplement à exproprier les français des affaires françaises. L'Allemagne a, dès Juillet 1940, notifié sa volonté de procéder au rachat des affaires françaises en Europe Orientale (par exemple les Mines de Bor) mais elle a procédé aussi en sous main, par des achats

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on bourse ou à l'immobilier, à l'es-appearence à des affaires françaises travaillant en France ou dans l'Empire. Ainsi, sans un cycle international, l'Etat Français verse chaque jour à l'Allemagne des sommes que celle-ci utilise pour s'approprier les affaires françaises de tout au moins en prendre la direction ou le contrôle.

6°) - A peine l'Armistice conclu, M. HERIOT a proposé à la France un accord commercial, accord reprenant, en les élargissant, tous les incovenients du premier accord franco-allemand de clearing (accord de 1934) grâce auquel l'Allemagne avait réussi à constituer, en temps de paix, au détriment de la France, plus d'un milliard d'arrérés de paiements.

En effet, cet accord qui comporte l'institution d'un clearing pur et simple (sur la base du mark valant 20 francs), sans clause de révision ni garantie d'équilibre, va jusqu'à stipuler que le Gouvernement français fera les avances nécessaires à la mise en train et au fonctionnement du clearing.

En signant en Septembre 1940 cet accord, qu'il fut hors d'état de faire mettre au point et qui est bien le type des accords passés entre vainqueur et vaincu, le Gouvernement français espérait, il est vrai, recevoir d'Allemagne des fournitures importantes, du charbon notamment. Son espoir a été déçu. Le courant très important de ventes qui s'est établi aussitôt dans le sens France-Allemagne, n'a été compensé dans l'autre sens que par un courant insignifiant. Le déséquilibre du clearing, dont le Gouvernement français avait fait les avances, atteignait déjà dans le courant de l'hiver dernier, 12 milliards de francs.

Ainsi, sans même que l'apport du compte "fraie d'occupation" lui soit nécessaire, le Reich pourrait, sans sortir une marchandise ni un mark du Reich, vider le marché français de tout ce qu'il produit, par le simple jeu de l'accord commercial franco-allemand.

7° Avant l'entrée des allemands à Paris, la Banque de France avait pu évacuer vers les Etats-Unis, vers les Antilles et vers l'Afrique Occidentale Française, tout son dépôt d'or et aussi ceux que lui avaient confiés les Banques de Belgique et de Pologne.

La Commission Economique d'Armistice, sans pouvoir d'ailleurs invoquer aucune clause de la Convention de Rethondes, réclame la restitution de l'or belge et de l'or polonais.

Pour l'or belge, la situation se présentait de la manière suivante : deux établissements groupant chacun une partie de son ancien personnel, se réclamaient de la Banque de Belgique, l'un fonctionnant à Londres auprès du Gouvernement PIERLOT, l'autre demeuré au siège social, à Bruxelles, et travaillant sous le contrôle de l'occupant.

Pour l'honneur de la Belgique, même à l'établissement de Bruxelles au nom duquel K. M. N. prétendait parler, les allemands ne purent trouver aucun fonctionnaire belge qui accepte de signer la demande de retour de l'or né, quand il fut remis, au déchargé. Cet acte de décharge fut finalement signé par le Chef-lieu de l'Allemagne à la Banque de Belgique qui donna l'ordre d'envoyer l'or, non pas à Bruxelles, mais à Berlin.

Devant le caractère contestable d'une telle décharge, la Banque de France désolée qu'elle ne livrerait le dépôt, sans que ni le Gouvernement allemand ni le Gouvernement français la protégeât contre tout recours ultérieur. Sur la pression allemande, le Gouvernement français accepta de prendre cette garantie à sa charge. Le prélèvement de l'or belge, sans l'accord d'aucun banquier de Belgique, aboutit donc en fin de compte à un transfert des avoirs de plusieurs milliards sur le trésor et le contrôle français. On s'en est d'ailleurs aperçu tout de suite puisque la Banque de Belgique de Londres, intervenant auprès des tribunaux américains, a fait bloquer aux Etats-Unis des avoirs français équivalant à la valeur de l'or belge remis par la France à l'Allemagne (notamment les paquebots français réfugiés dans les ports américains).

En ce qui concerne l'or polonais, le Gouvernement français fit remarquer que le sort de ce dépôt ne pouvait être traité dans le simple cadre des rapports franco-allemands, sans exposer la France à des réclamations de la part de la Pologne qui, au même titre que l'Allemagne, se considérait héritière de la Pologne et il convenait donc d'attendre le règlement général de la paix pour aborder cette question. Cette position était très forte et les allemands ne trouvèrent d'abord rien à y répondre. Toutefois, elle perdit toute sa valeur le jour où le Gouvernement français prit lui-même l'initiative de rompre ses relations avec la Pologne. Les allemands revinrent à la charge et obtinrent dans le courant de l'été 1941, l'intégralité de l'or polonais. Le Gouvernement polonais de Londres a naturellement violemment protesté contre cette cession et pris aux Etats-Unis contre les dépôts français les mêmes mesures de sauvegarde que le Gouvernement belge.

Quant aux convoitises allemandes sur l'or appartenant à la Banque de France, elles se cachent à peine. Sous prétexte que la "remise en place" des biens publics et privés découle de la Convention d'Armistice (I), les allemands n'ont cessé de réclamer que tout le possible soit fait de côté français pour rapatrier cet or dans les caves de la Banque de France, à Paris.

- (I) En réalité, c'est seulement la remise en place des personnes, c'est à dire le retour des réfugiés que stipulait la Convention d'Armistice. Ce qu'ont fait les allemands en Alsace-Lorraine et en zone interdite est en contradiction flagrante avec cette "clause de

- V -

- LES PRELEVEMENTS ECONOMIQUES -

Nanti par ses prélèvements financiers de moyens de paiements fournis par la France elle-même, le Reich va s'en servir pour s'approprier à son profit les richesses et la production françaises.

Dans l'épouvante de Juin 1940, de nombreux français se montrèrent étonnés en constatant que les soldats allemands, contrairement aux récits d'une propagande maladroite, ne paraissaient pas mourir de faim. En fait, c'était précisément pour avoir en parfait état de rendement cette armée de première ligne, son instrument de travail que l'Allemagne, depuis plusieurs années déjà, imposait des privations à sa population civile. Les français qui croyaient découvrir alors le "correct" soldat allemand, ne se doutaient pas que celui-ci de son côté, éprouvait une surprise bien plus grande que la leur, en s'apercevant que, dans ce pays dont on lui avait dépeint les désolures et les malheurs, tout ce qui, depuis longtemps, avait disparu des marchés d'Allemagne, se trouvait encore en abondance et à des prix très bon marché.

Mais les milieux officiels allemands ne partageaient pas cette surprise. Ils savaient parfaitement ce qu'ils pouvaient rapporter une guerre victorieuse contre la France. M. HERMANN, notamment avait dès avant la guerre, fait dresser l'inventaire méticuleux des ressources de la France et de son Empire. Il présenta cet inventaire aux Délégués Français à Wiesbaden, réclamant sur ces ressources, la part du lion pour une Allemagne "contrainte de continuer une guerre à laquelle la France l'avait forcé".

remise en place" qu'ils invoquent ou oublient avec la même facilité, selon leur intérêt du moment.

1°) - Il commença par déclarer qu'il était injuste à un moment où l'Allemagne, "qui en avait", subissait des privations, de voir la France continuer à gaspiller des richesses aux lesquelles le vainqueur s'estimait des droits. Au moment de l'Armistice, le rationnement n'était encore appliqué en France. Les Allemands exigèrent qu'il fut immédiatement instauré et que les taux furent fixés d'accord avec eux, en partant du principe que les besoins de la consommation française ne devaient pas dépasser les besoins de la consommation allemande. En fait, pour la première fois, le beurre et le fromage qui abondaient encore en France mais qui manquaient en Allemagne, la quantité mensuelle de l'ensemble des produits laitiers en Allemagne fut nettement inférieure à celle qui, en Allemagne, était maintenue aux allemands.

Aucune disposition de la Convention d'Armistice n'autorisait les allemands à intervenir en la matière. Le rationnement alimentaire des français aurait dû, s'il s'avérait nécessaire, ressortir uniquement de l'Administration française. Cependant celle-ci n'a pas été libre de fixer la liste des produits à rationner ni de choisir ou de modifier les taux de rationnement selon les possibilités du marché. Par suite d'exigences allemandes qui ont été une violation de la Convention d'Armistice, le rationnement français, tel qu'il est appliqué, non seulement pour la zone occupée mais pour l'ensemble du territoire, est effectué en fonction des besoins de l'Allemagne au lieu de l'être, comme il serait normal, compte tenu des besoins du consommateur français et des possibilités que lui offre la production nationale.

2°) - Ayant fait ainsi, dès le lendemain de l'Armistice, le nécessaire pour limiter les droits du consommateur français sur les marchandises françaises (sans d'ailleurs lui garantir qu'en le lui permettrait exercer ses droits), les autorités allemandes ont procédé à des prélèvements massifs de trois manières différentes :

- a) par des achats individuels ;
- b) par les réquisitions des autorités occupantes locales ou les prestations exigées par elles ;
- c) par les contrats d'Etat.

Esperant éviter le risque de réquisitions imprévues susceptibles de désorganiser la remise en état du Pays et obtenir la limitation des achats individuels, le Gouvernement français a accepté de s'engager dans la voie de contrats de livraison même pour des marchandises qui n'existaient pas, ou presque pas, en zone occupée (huiles d'arachides, ins, oranges, phosphates, etc...). En réalité et bien qu'en négociant ces "contrats d'Etat" le Gouvernement du Reich ait déclaré que les chiffres réclamés représentaient la totalité de ses demandes, les réquisitions (pour les chevaux par exemple) (I) et les achats directs individuels ont toujours continué à s'y surajouter.

(I) En Janvier 1942, l'armée allemande a encore exigé la livraison de 52.000 chevaux, alors que la Commission d'Armistice avait affirmé que les réquisitions de chevaux du printemps 1941 étaient les dernières.

Il en est de même, et plus encore, des prestations à fournir par certains départements ou par certaines communes dans une période donnée, prestations qui se sont substituées aux réquisitions de la Reich à mesure de rendre celles-ci "sans" à fait exception et en". Ces prestations, pour certaines produits (les fourrages notamment) ont représenté souvent 90 % de toute la production locale. Souvent pour parfaire les quantités requises, les départements de la zone occupée ont dû faire appel aux ressources de la zone libre alors que la Convention d'Armistice prévoyait que la zone occupée pourrait, au contraire, venir en aide à la zone libre plus démunie qu'elle de ressources alimentaires.

30) - Les "négociations" qui devaient se substituer à tous les autres modes de prélèvement, sont des contrats de fournitures "négociées" à Wiesbaden, puis à Paris avec l'approbation, la collaboration et la garantie des deux gouvernements. Etant donné la situation respective des négociateurs, les négociations n'ont d'ailleurs jamais pu porter que sur des questions de prix ou de quantités et non sur le principe même de livraisons qui n'était pourtant pas prévue la Convention d'Armistice.

Celle-ci donnait, il est vrai, au Reich un moyen de pression en subordonnant la reprise du trafic maritime commercial français à l'autorisation préalable de l'Allemagne. M. HENRI MOULIER, en juillet 1940, que les relations maritimes entre la France et son Empire ne pourraient être établies que si la France acceptait de livrer à l'Allemagne une quote-part de la production de l'Empire. Toute la politique française de l'époque (c'était au lendemain de l'armistice de l'Éclair) reposait sur l'idée d'affirmer et de renforcer l'unité de la métropole et de l'Empire, le Gouvernement de Vichy eût au chantage dont il était l'objet, sans se rendre compte que les Allemands avaient encore moins intérêt que lui à ce que l'Empire demeurât coupé de l'Europe. La première demande de M. MOULIER visait les bois coloniaux de l'Afrique Equatoriale dont il exigea pour l'Allemagne les 7/10èmes ; la dissidence de cette colonie empêcha seule ce prélèvement massif. En revanche, l'Allemagne se vit reconnaître, entre autres, le droit à 50 % de la production au cacahuète de l'Indochine, à 25 % des quantités d'arachides du Sénégal qui parviendraient dans les ports français et à des contingents importants de phosphates.

Après de laborieuses discussions, elle obtint également la promesse de livraison de quantités telles de bauxite qu'un nouveau rythme qui a dû être donné à l'exploitation, non seulement de bauxite risquent de s'épuiser rapidement.

compte tenu de l'appauvrissement de l'agriculture française en chevaux.

Quant aux contrats de livraison de pommes qu'a dû conclure notre Ministère de l'Agriculture, ils ont eu pour effet, en vidant complètement la Normandie et la Bretagne de leurs fruits, l'empêcher, en 1941, la fabrication du cidre.

4*) - Le relevé des divergences de "prix" venant des commandes opérées par l'Allemagne en France ne serait pas complet si l'on n'y faisait entrer les commandes passées à l'industrie française. Sans examiner plus loin comment l'Allemagne, sans tenir compte de la position prise par la France à Bathoude, de ne rien faire contre ses anciens alliés, a réussi à transformer l'industrie de toute la France (sans libre comme sans occupée) en industrie de guerre, travaillant pour elle. Signalons seulement en ce moment que l'effort étendu à son profit par l'Allemagne, des industries françaises a pour résultat de priver le consommateur français des produits de son industrie nationale.

On évalue, en effet, la part représentée dans la production industrielle française par l'exécution des commandes allemandes entre 75% et 80 % de l'ensemble de cette production. Dans certaines branches ce pourcentage est encore plus élevé. Il en est ainsi par exemple, pour les textiles et les cuirs, dont les industries travaillent à plein mois presque uniquement pour la satisfaction de commandes allemandes.

L'industrie textile du nord s'est vu imposer, pendant l'hiver 1941-1942, la fourniture de 1.150.000 mètres de drap "feligren" pour l'armement allemand. Il a été interdit aux tissages, même à ceux qui n'étaient pas équipés pour la drap militaire, de déviter du drap civil avant que cette livraison ait été complètement effectuée.

Dans l'industrie française de la chaussure, la suppression, avant la guerre, était telle qu'une loi spéciale avait dû interdire la création de fabriques nouvelles et fermer aussi hermétiquement que possible nos frontières aux importations étrangères. Aujourd'hui la même industrie ne connaît plus le chômage, ses chiffres de production sont plus élevés que jamais, et pourtant le Gouvernement, en instituant les bons de souliers, est amené à déclarer qu'il n'y aura, cette année en France, qu'une paire de chaussures nouvelles pour dix habitants. Les commandes allemandes absorbent tout le reste.

La bonneterie troyenne doit fournir les 2/3 de sa fabrication à l'armée allemande. Les filatures du nord (de celles d'Alsace, il n'est plus, hélas, pour le moment question) ne peuvent réserver à leur clientèle française qu'un dixième de leur production. Une seule commande allemande de fils de bonneterie, en cours d'exécution en janvier dernier, atteignait 7.500.000 kilogs.

Alors que la France doit reconstruire ses régions dévastées, elle ne peut disposer que de 10 % de sa production de ciment, l'Allemagne exigeant pour ses propres besoins 90 % de cette production.

anglo.

Les commandes de rails, de wagons, de traverses en bois ont d'une importance telle qu'elles empêchent le rééquipement des lignes françaises.

Car, bien entendu, au sans exemple tout au moins, les commandes allemandes ont la priorité et les fabricants qui n'ont pas d'un premier ne veulent refuser la matière première tant l'Allemagne contrôle la distribution quand elle ne l'effectue pas elle-même.

De même, lorsque pendant l'hiver 1941-1942, le Gouvernement français dut décider de restreindre la distribution du courant électrique et, pour limiter plus sûrement la consommation, à fermer certaines usines, les autorités occupantes ne laissèrent fermer que les usines qui n'employaient pas de commandes allemandes.

Moins apparentes aux yeux du grand public que les autres modes de prélèvements, bénéficiant en outre de la complicité de certains industriels, heureux de profiter de ces commandes et d'intéressés à attirer l'attention que par ce qu'elle peuvent avoir de bienfaisant pour le marche de leur usine ou la réorption du chômage, les commandes allemandes, par leur caractère massif et souvent quasi exclusif, sont peut-être parmi toutes ces ponctions opérées sur l'économie française, les plus inopportunes et les plus lourdes de conséquences.

Ajoutons que ce qui, malgré l'afflux des commandes a pu être fabriqué en sus et sur quoi pourrait donc normalement compter le marché français, n'y échappe pas aux autres modes de prélèvements. Il est bloqué à l'usine avant d'être mis à la consommation, ce qui a été produit sans être commandé par les allemands, fait alors l'objet d'une réquisition de la part de l'autorité occupante, portant généralement sur la moitié des marchandises bloquées.

Ainsi, à chaque stade de leur production et de leur circulation, les produits du sol et du travail français disparaissent, absorbés par l'Allemagne, soit qu'ils soient fabriqués exclusivement pour elle, soit qu'ils soient réquisitionnés par elle avant d'être répartis, soit qu'ils soient prélevés à un des échelons de leur distribution entre le gros et le détail ou intervient encore, pour priver le consommateur français, l'acheteur allemand.

2°) - Dans bien des cas, les prestations imposées ne pouvaient se justifier par aucun besoin militaire. Il en est ainsi, par exemple, pour la fourniture à un "sonderführer du Champagne" dont la nomination est d'ailleurs absolument contraire à la Convention d'Armistice, de 360.000 bouteilles de vin de champagne par semaine, de celle aussi de 144.000 bouteilles de cognac par semaine, de blocage, pour le compte de l'autorité occupante, de tous les stocks de parfumerie de luxe, etc...

Comment prétexter les "besoins de l'occupation" pour les prestations ou les contrats de fournitures de vins faits au nom d'une armée dans laquelle jamais aucune ration de vin ne fut versée au soldat ? Au début de 1942, alors que le rationnement du vin existe déjà en France, les allemands exigent et obtiennent la promesse du Gouvernement français de 1.000.000 d'hectolitres de vins du Midi, 300.000 hectolitres de vins à appellations contrôlées, 500.000 hectolitres de vins propres à

de catégories diverses (soit 2.000.000 d'habitants en tout, sans tenir
pris les prestations locales et les aides familiales).

En réalité, il est douteux que les produits français qui sont
prélevés sur les pays qu'ils occupent, les besoins de l'Alle-
magne, mais parce qu'ils représentent une valeur. Avec la concurrence
des alcools et les vins de l'Alsace, de l'Alsace, de l'Alsace, de l'Alsace,
français, l'Allemagne, qui après sa défaite, a été privée de son droit de
acquisition, n'a pas pu à la revendre, et ainsi, elle a dû se tourner
de la Suisse et, avant la rupture avec les Etats-Unis, de l'Amérique
du Sud. Elle alimente l'autre part les clearing qu'elle doit conclure
avec ses alliés de l'Europe du Sud-Est, alors qu'elle peut, comme nous
l'avons vu, ne pas, sans inconvénients pour elle, le clearing fran-
co-allemand. (1).

Si du point de vue français, ces prélèvements ont une importance
économique, puisqu'ils nous débarrassent de produits vus, dans notre
correspondance à des besoins véritables, du point de vue allemand, ils
rentrent dans la catégorie des prélèvements financiers et c'est pour-
quoi, en ce cas même encore que dans les autres, l'occupant n'a aucun
scrupule à épuiser les stocks, quitte à tarir l'avenir de la production
en empêchant le maintien de la qualité.

Une arrière pensée économique s'ajoute toutefois à ces préoccupa-
tions financières. Si l'Allemagne ne considère dès à présent comme son
rôle de diriger dans l'avenir la répartition des produits français (notamment
concurrents des industries allemandes (articles médicaux, produits
chimiques et pharmaceutiques), leurs fabricants ne peuvent plus tra-
vailler et vendre qu'en "pool", avec leurs collègues allemands, elle
vient ainsi occuper la couronne extérieure des produits qui n'ont pas
de similaires en Allemagne et dont la France a le monopole. C'est pour-
quoi, dès à présent, elle s'est fait l'intermédiaire, le seul com-
voyageur de toute l'Europe et même, selon l'expression à la mode en Alle-
magne, de l'"Europe", devant être l'allemand qui prélèvera ainsi sa
dime sur toutes les transactions des deux continents.

- (1) En outre, devenue maîtresse du marché de ces produits en France elle,
elle peut favoriser les commerçants ou les particuliers qui acceptent
de "collaborer" et de travailler selon ses vœux.

UN RAPPORT CONFIDENTIEL DE LA BANQUE DE FRANCE EN JANVIER 1942
 RASSEMBLAIENT AINSI LA SITUATION :

[illegible]

Non seulement, "les meubles n'ont pas été saisis", mais la France ne peut se prévaloir de la position d'état neutre et des avantages qu'elle comporte.

Un autre rapport de la Banque de France en Décembre 1941, con-
statait :

totalité :

"Notre économie d'activités est étroitement liée à son territoire de culture. Cette association forcée et ses vicissitudes conditionnent pour une large part la personnalité infantile en

(I) Ceci permet de dire que l'augmentation de la mortalité infantile en France qui a été de 30 % en 1941, est due directement aux restrictions imposées par les Allemands.

part l'approvisionnement de la population française et en marge de consommation. Elles régissent aussi plus strictement encore, le marche des usines et l'emploi de la main d'œuvre. Elles déterminent enfin le sort actuel et prochain de nouvelles usines à construire et, si elles devaient se prolonger et se multiplier, elles entraîneraient des changements profonds et décisifs dans la conjoncture économique, dans l'engagement des classes productives et dans la composition du commerce extérieur. Les modifications sont importantes et qui ne peuvent être, quant à présent, ni étalées ni mesurées sont déjà intervenues dans la distribution et la production de nombreuses entreprises ou sociétés.

Tout ceci est d'ailleurs très cyniquement avoué par les allemands. Dans un article qu'il a publié le 10 avril 1942 dans le "Berliner Morgen Zeitung", le Dr MICHEL, chef des Services Économiques du Commandement Militaire allemand, en France a déclaré : "Comme les autres territoires occupés, la France doit apporter sa contribution à l'économie de guerre continentale. Il en est bien ainsi. Mais l'appareil de production tel qu'il existe n'est pas considéré par les services allemands de direction comme quelque chose d'insurable. Il a besoin d'être adapté et transformé par rapport à la situation générale de l'économie de guerre et surtout en vue des buts que poursuit la nouvelle Europe... La répartition de matières premières, en particulier, les attributions de charbon et d'énergie, constitue un moyen très puissant de diriger l'ensemble de l'économie industrielle dans la direction choisie par la direction au Ministère français de la Production Industrielle d'un Comité Central de Répartition des Matières Premières placé sous l'autorité d'un délégué allemand, l'ensemble de l'économie française, y compris celle des territoires non occupés, a été mise à même de satisfaire les besoins de l'économie de guerre allemande... La tâche la plus importante a été de comprimer au maximum les besoins civils. Les nouvelles restrictions de la consommation et une nouvelle réorganisation industrielle sont imminentes. Tout ceci a pour résultat une concentration de l'économie française sur la production des produits indispensables à la guerre".

Il convient d'assimiler aux prélèvements économiques, les prélèvements de main d'œuvre.

Nous y avons déjà fait allusion en parlant des prisonniers et des réquisitions de matériel humain pour l'organisation Test.

Alors que la France non seulement n'est plus combattante mais ne peut même pas être considérée comme neutre par les adversaires de l'Allemagne puisqu'elle collabore avec celle-ci et lui permet de durer, le Reich conserve dans ses camps 1.250.000 français (chiffre

officiel au 1er janvier 1942, un an et demi après l'Armistice, quatre mois après l'entrée et l'installation d'un "Gouvernement des Prisonniers". Il s'en est suivi comme d'une main d'œuvre pénale. On fait des prisonniers, dont une très grande partie ont été livrés par des chefs qui croyaient la guerre finie et la capitulation une simple formalité (voir pages 1 et 3), la France fournit chaque jour au Reich, depuis deux ans au minimum, 10 millions d'heures de travail non rémunérées.

L'emploi des requis civils (voir page 3) qui est absolument contraire au droit international, a été, surtout lorsqu'il a été procédé dans des villages à titre de sanction et que la majeure partie de la population masculine se voyait obligée d'effectuer la partie d'ouvrages militaires allemands, d'une grande gêne pour l'économie rurale française. Quant aux réquisitions de travailleurs pour l'organisation T.O.E., après fermeture de chantiers, elles ont eu pour effet d'interrompre des travaux qui, du point de vue français, étaient d'utilité publique.

Prisonniers de guerre ou requis civils sont des travailleurs forcés. L'Allemagne a cherché aussi des travailleurs volontaires pour remplacer, en Allemagne ou en France, dans ses usines ou ses chantiers militaires, des ouvriers allemands tués pour un service plus actif. Elle a procédé à ce recrutement dans des conditions tout à fait anormales, et désastreuses pour l'économie française.

En effet, le transfert de 150.000 ouvriers français en Allemagne pendant le courant de l'année 1941 (I) n'a même pas été discuté avec l'Etat français qui a assisté impuissant à un transfert de sa main d'œuvre spécialisée, sans avoir obtenu aucune garantie, ni pour lui, ni pour ceux de ses ressortissants qui se sont laissés tenter par les offres allemandes. La plupart de ces ouvriers ont parti sans même avoir un passeport et sans qu'aucune autorité française, consulaire ou autre, put maintenir l'attache avec eux et les protéger. Quelques uns ont été condamnés à mort pour des délits tout à fait bénins. Entre Etats civilisés le recours à une main d'œuvre étrangère a toujours été régi par des conventions internationales. L'Allemagne elle-même en 1940 a conclu des accords de main d'œuvre avec l'Italie, la Roumanie, la Bulgarie, etc... Comme la Convention d'Armistice n'abordait pas la question, rien n'autorisait le Reich, en ce qui concerne la France, à ne pas se conformer aux usages du droit des gens.

A partir de l'hiver 1942 seulement, il accepte que le Gouvernement français contrôle, dans une certaine mesure, ses ressortissants installés en Allemagne mais à la condition que celui-ci l'aide dans

- (I) Bien qu'aucune indication précise n'existe à ce sujet, puisque ce recrutement échappe à tout contrôle, ce chiffre paraît approximativement celui qui avait été atteint en Janvier 1942.

...

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« Nous venons de montrer l'intervention du pouvoir en matière de législation industrielle ou sociale, en fait d'arbitrage, par le ministre, les courriers français à ne vendre à l'Etat que des quilles à griver de commerce français du fait de leur travail. Les ordonnances de mai 1914 obligent de soumettre à l'approbation des ministères occupant tous les projets de construction dans les ports de commerce 100.000 francs. En cas de refus d'approbation, les autorisations de construction pour ces sites sont considérées comme nées et n'ont partiellement pas à l'intérêt. De telles mesures, de telles mesures doivent à brève échéance, paralyser en une seconde tout travail qui ne correspondrait pas à un intérêt purement national. Ce n'est pas là, comme on l'annonçait au moment de l'irradiation et comme l'Allemagne elle-même déclarait le rétablir « le rétablissement de la vie normale en son exemple. »

Rien dans la Convention d'Amstater ne pouvait justifier la mise en tutelle du Commerce Extérieur Français par l'instauration des deux Comités d'Etudes et d'Informations sur les Etats Endormis de l'Economie Nationale (voir page 10).

Rien dans la Convention d'Armistice ne pouvait, non plus autoriser l'ordonnance allemande du 25 Septembre 1944 après laquelle les Résolutions des Assemblées Générales des Sociétés Amalgamées françaises et des sociétés à responsabilité limitée, ne seraient valables qu'après l'approbation du Militärbefehlshaber in Frankreich. Il en est de même des résolutions prises par d'autres organismes de ces Sociétés et portant sur le transfert du siège des Sociétés. Cette dernière mesure concerne une mainmise scandaleuse des autorités allemandes sur la vie économique française non seulement en zone occupée, mais encore dans l'Etat Libre et dans l'Empire allemand. La plupart des Sociétés françaises travaillant dans l'Empire ont leur siège social à Paris.

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l'effectivement de cette main d'œuvre. Comme le recrutement de volontaires ne fournit pas les effectifs désirés par l'Allemagne, les autorités occupantes prescrivent, en avril 1942, l'initiative d'inciter par la durée des heures de travail sera déformée finie en sans compte par les autorités allemandes. Toutes les heures de travail "légal" devront être effectivement accomplies et chaque entreprise s'assure le droit de conserver que le nombre d'ouvriers correspondant à ses besoins actuels, c'est à dire que le patron qui, pour maintenir un salaire à 20 ouvriers, ne les emploie que 10 heures par semaine, devra en envoyer 10 et faire travailler autre moitié 10 heures par semaine. Au même temps les autorités occupantes interdisent aux patrons français d'envoyer de verser des secours aux ouvriers ainsi licenciés qui n'ont plus d'autre ressource, s'ils veulent faire vivre leur famille, que d'accepter un engagement en Allemagne.

De tels procédés qui sont sans aucun précédent puisqu'ils qualifient le traité en pleine Europe, constituent non seulement une violation de la Convention d'Armistice, mais aussi un mépris flagrant aux Conventions Internationales du Travail auxquelles l'Allemagne comme la France est adhérente.

Dans son article déjà cité, le Dr MICHEL n'a pas caché que "L'ouvrier français en Allemagne contribue à gagner la guerre". Et il ajoutait : "Dans la mesure où nous pourrions augmenter le nombre des entreprises françaises fermées, nous libérerons une nouvelle main d'œuvre pour travailler en Allemagne".

La réalisation de ce programme, imposé par les allemands a été annoncé par M. MICHELONNE, Sous-Secrétaire d'Etat à la Production Industrielle dans son interview du 5 Juin 1942. Sous le prétexte entendu que "le blocus est défavorable à notre main d'œuvre qualifiée qui perd de son fait son habileté technique", il a accepté d'encourager en les présentant comme des mesures prises dans l'intérêt des ouvriers français l'augmentation des heures de travail, la fermeture de 1.500 usines (ce qui permettra de frapper les industriels n'ayant pas accepté de travailler pour l'Allemagne) et le recasement des ouvriers ainsi privés d'emploi en Allemagne "où ils seront assurés de ne pas perdre leurs qualités professionnelles" (comme si la présence de blocus imposé pour la France, perdait sa valeur lorsqu'il s'agit de l'Allemagne).

Quant à l'engagement par des entreprises ou services allemands divers d'ouvriers français pour travailler en France, il s'effectue sous la forme d'une concurrence déloyale qui bouleverserait complètement le marché du travail si le patriotisme de l'ouvrier français et sa répugnance à servir directement l'occupant ne constituaient un frein sérieux aux tentatives de débouchage dont il est l'objet.

Contrôlant, par l'"approbation" qu'elle donne au Journal Officiel la législation française (voir page 12), l'autorité occupante n'a même qu'avec difficulté le décret français du 23 Mai 1942 relevant les

LT. COL. R.A. SOLLER
ALGER 5 JUNE 1942

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salaires d'environ 19 % et s'est opposée à toute autre modification des contrats collectifs en vigueur avant la guerre ; mais en même temps elle ne tient elle-même aucun compte de cette législation, façonnée pourtant selon ses vœux, lorsqu'il s'agit pour elle de recruter du personnel français. Les salaires qu'elle offre atteignent fréquemment le double de ceux qui sont stipulés par les contrats collectifs et qui doivent obligatoirement appliquer les industriels français.

Cette coexistence en France, pour la situation matérielle, les aussi sensiblement différentes pour les ouvriers faisant le même travail, selon qu'ils sont sous les ordres de Français ou d'Allemands, peut avoir un jour de graves incidences politiques ou sociales. De toutes manières, elle pèse sur l'économie française, en donnant un caractère particulièrement instable au processus de la main-d'œuvre, aucun entrepreneur ne pouvant être sûr qu'en présence de ces "allégations" dont ils sont l'objet et contre lesquelles il ne peut lutter, ses ouvriers, en proie aux difficultés croissantes de la vie et volontairement mécontents par l'Allemagne dans la mesure tant qu'ils ne travaillent pas pour elle, ne l'abandonneront pas du jour au lendemain.

Nous avons parlé des prélèvements économiques. Ils ont été accompagnés de mesures enlevant pratiquement son indépendance à la France.

Rien dans la Convention d'Armistice ne pouvait justifier l'institution à laquelle il a été procédé, dès l'été 1940 de commissaires allemands auprès de hauts dirigeants français. A la faveur de l'occupation, l'Allemagne a pu organiser un immense réseau d'espionnage industriel et financier, relever les secrets de fabrication, inventorier les fortunes privées françaises.

Une ordonnance de Mai 1942 obligera tous les Français de la zone occupée, à répondre avec précision, sous peine de prison, à tous les questionnaires qui leur seraient adressés par les autorités allemandes "en vue d'enquêtes économiques".

Rien dans la Convention d'Armistice ne pouvait justifier le contrôle de tout le travail exécuté par des Français pour des Français.

- VI -

Par l'article 10 de la Convention d'Armistice, la France s'interdit "d'entreprendre une action contre l'Allemagne". Cet article et la déclaration de Hitler à Reims, qui la France n'a pas signée mais à laquelle les allemands prétendent quand même donner la même valeur qu'à la Convention d'Armistice (voir page 2), comme sans cesse invoqués pour entrainer la France hors de la position de neutralité dans laquelle elle se trouvait d'être mise.

Il convient d'ajouter que la décision prise par Sir RICHARD CAMPBELL, arrivé en France comme ambassadeur d'Angleterre juste à la veille du désastre, de se conformer au précédent de 1918 à l'égard de l'Allemagne qui abandonnait la lutte et d'agir vis à vis de la France comme les franco-anglais, dans des circonstances analogues, avaient agi vis à vis de la Russie, c'est-à-dire de rappeler toutes les missions et de rompre tout contact, a privé la France d'arguments lui permettant de chercher à s'installer comme elle le désirait dans la position d'Etat neutre.

Les premières demandes allemandes qui portaient en effet les allemands, en abusant de l'article 10, prétendant correspondre, par la faute de Sir R. CAMPBELL à un état de fait existant déjà, ce qui explique que le Gouvernement français, sous l'impression d'ailleurs de l'événement de Mers-el-Kébir, ne songe même pas à discuter des exigences qui ne découlent nullement de l'Armistice qu'il a signé.

(I*) - C'est ainsi que la Commission d'Armistice obtient de la France, dès juillet 1940, l'interdiction absolue de toute relation commerciale et financière entre la France et les colonies et l'Empire britannique. Or, une politique et bien souvent des intérêts communs avaient développé, de plus en plus, l'interpénétration des marchés financiers de Londres et de Paris (I) et intégré, dans de nombreuses parties du monde, les affaires françaises et anglaises. L'Empire britannique, plus encore que l'Empire français servait au ravitaillement de la France; Quant à l'Empire français, sa vie normale était presque partout conditionnée par la livraison de charbon anglais. C'est donc à une perturbation de toute l'économie

- (I) Signalons à titre d'exemple le cas des compagnies d'assurance françaises qui, presque toutes, étaient assurées à Londres.

française et surtout de notre déshonneur impérial qu'aboutit cette rupture avec l'Empire anglais. Le Gouvernement français s'en rend vite compte et après avoir accepté le principe et pris les mesures d'application nécessaires, demande à l'Allemagne, en faveur de nos colonies, certaines dérogations. Elles seront toutes refusées (1). Cette position extrême nous conduira à provoquer l'entrée en scène de certaines colonies qui, comme on l'a vu la semaine dernière, ont des liens très étroits avec l'Allemagne de l'Inde et du Pacifique. A nous-mêmes, on verra dans les conditions nouvelles qu'on voulait leur imposer, c'est-à-dire, en rompant tout lien économique avec les colonies anglaises voisines.

2°) - Au mois d'août 1940, la Commission d'Armistice exige le renvoi en France des Ambassadeurs de Pologne et de Belgique, des Légations des Pays-Bas et de Luxembourg, sans prétexte qu'il s'agit de "représentations de pays qui n'existent plus" les puissances des consulates de ces pays devront être retirés et les missions consulaires devront se voir interdire toute activité juridique de leurs nationaux.

C'est une humiliation très pénible pour le Gouvernement français qui s'engageait au début d'août. Le choc qui leur est porté sera très durement ressenti par des personnes qui pour la plupart, avaient toujours été dévouées à la France (2). L'ambassadeur de Belgique ne s'en remettra pas et, mis par sa déception et son orgueil, mourra quelques mois plus tard.

Surveillance surveillée, ou internée dans des camps généralement très insupportables, quand ils ne sont pas enrégimentés dans des compagnies de travailleurs forcés, nos anciens alliés des petits pays et les volontaires étrangers qui étaient venus se ranger au début de la guerre sous notre drapeau, voient la France responsable du destin injuste qui, pour eux, est l'Allemagne, elle leur fait subir. Le fait que, pour la première fois dans notre histoire, nous ayons dû manquer gravement aux lois de l'hospitalité et même de la simple reconnaissance, risque de peser, plus lourdement encore, sur nos relations internationales à venir. Le Gouvernement allemand l'a bien calculé et sa propagande n'hésite pas à dénoncer auprès des Belges, des Polonais, des Tchèques, les agissements qu'il qualifie lui-même de la police française contre leurs compatriotes qui se trouvent en France. Il a trouvé là un moyen particulièrement perfide de saper pour longtemps le prestige de la France chez les peuples qui lui étaient traditionnellement le plus attachés.

3°) - Le Ministère de la Propagande qui, tout autant que celui de la Wehrmacht est un Ministère de guerre, s'est attaché aussitôt après l'Armistice, à faire contribuer la France à ses opérations.

- (1) Notamment une offre de sucre et de thé que l'Afrique du Sud proposait au Maroc à la fin de 1940 et que nous aurions beaucoup aimé accepter étant donné le grand besoin de ces denrées en Afrique du Nord.
- (2) Le Ministre des Pays-Bas, M. LOUBON était le plus ancien diplomate accrédité à Paris où il était arrivé au moment du traité de Versailles.

Présenter la propagande allemande sous un masque français pouvait, en effet, être des plus utiles dans les deux Amériques, aussi bien que dans les pays occupés par l'Allemagne.

Trois moyens ont été employés :

a/ une presse, prenant ses consignes à l'ambassade d'Allemagne à été ordonnée à Paris. Si elle n'a aucun intérêt en son compte, elle a réussi à préoccuper le Gouvernement français au point d'influer parfois sur ses décisions, et ses citations, habilement sélectionnées par des agences à la solde de l'Allemagne, en se contentant d'exprimer l'opinion étrangère par l'intermédiaire de contraires véritables de ses journaux dits français.

b/ pendant les premiers mois qui ont suivi l'Armistice, le Reich, relevant tout ce qui, paru dans la presse de la zone libre, ne lui était pas absolument favorable, a harcelé le Gouvernement français de dénégations, toujours accompagnées de menaces, contre des journaux ou des journalistes qui, prétendaient-il n'étaient pas neutres, montrant ainsi quel poids il donnait au mot "neutralité". Pour mettre fin à ces dénégations et ses menaces, le Gouvernement français s'efforçait assez vite à donner à la presse de la zone libre des consignes de censure strictement conformes aux vœux de l'Allemagne.

c/ le Gouvernement du Reich, avec la complicité de certaines personnalités françaises, a cherché dès l'été 1940 à placer entre des mains allemandes les Messageries Reunies et l'Agence Havas. Les premiers sont aujourd'hui complètement sous le contrôle allemand et dans la seconde, les capitaux allemands ont assez puise mainte pour que l'Allemagne exerce pratiquement un droit de veto. Etant donné le monopole des Messageries Reunies, tout ce qui est distribué de journaux français est donc, même s'il paraît en zone libre, réparti par l'Allemagne qui ne diffuse naturellement que ce qui lui convient. La presse française, dès qu'elle est imprimée, ne peut donc plus être neutre.

4°) - Dans le domaine militaire, nous avons indiqué (pages 4 et 5) les premiers concours rendus de nous par l'Allemagne en violation des Conventions d'Armistice (communication des renseignements météorologiques, aide à apporter aux avions allemands). Après Mers-el-Kébir et Dakar, on essaiera d'obtenir des renseignements l'Axe, par nos patrouilles aériennes et navales, sur ce qui se passe dans la Méditerranée occidentale et sur les côtes africaines de l'Atlantique. Il semble toutefois que le souci de mesurer à la France le réarmement qui lui serait nécessaire pour prêter à cette coopération, s'est fait pousser, avec trop d'exigences, ses tentatives et aie limité les suites qu'elle en pu, à certains moments, recevoir.

C'est surtout lorsque les opérations deviendront actives en Libye que l'en présentera à la France, dans le domaine militaire, des demandes incompatibles avec sa position d'état neutre.

Ce fut d'abord la revendication en Allemagne de tous les soldats de la Légion étrangère de nationalité ou de "race" allemande (1). Par cette mesure, l'Allemagne qui ne disposait plus de "coloniaux" recevait plusieurs milliers de soldats expérimentés et habitués d'Afrique et d'orientaux aux conditions spéciales des combats dans le désert.

Ces soldats rejoignirent les divisions allemandes en Libye, en Tunisie, en Algérie, à l'ouest africain de l'Italie.

a) de matériel de transport et de pièces rechange (2) ;

b) d'artillerie légère ;

c) de canons (il y eut plusieurs demandes pour des canons plus puissants ainsi que de milliers de munitions et des avions qui furent effectivement envoyés dans la métropole qu'en Afrique du Nord) ;

d) après les destructions opérées par l'aviation anglaise dans la zone de Tripoli, du matériel portuaire (grues, remorqueurs, etc...) prélevé dans les différents ports de l'Afrique du Nord ;

e) de blé et de conserves alimentaires ;

f) de secours-aéron.

Après ces démonstrations plus ou moins longues, le Gouvernement français du général Lyautey accorda satisfaction à toutes ces demandes. Il n'eut pas plus empêcher (bien qu'il le vît) l'envoi d'une protestation à ce sujet) la machine italienne d'utiliser les eaux territoriales et les rades de Tunisie. Une concession allemande-italienne fut même installée en Tunisie pour se occuper des nombreux naufrages jetés sur les côtes après les bombardements de convois, identifier les morts et récupérer les vivants (au lieu de les laisser intenter comme on le faisait avant, si elle avait pu se composer en état de guerre).

5e) - La Convention d'Armistice prévoit le stockage des avions français, et ce, entendu que ceux-ci, pas plus que les navires de guerre, ne seraient, en aucun cas, réutilisés par l'Allemagne. En Septembre, l'Allemagne convint par réclamation des avions allemands, alléguant des raisons humanitaires pour en obtenir la livraison.

(1) Ce qui permettait d'y inclure les autrichiens, les alsaciens, les flamands, etc...

(2) Alors que nous venions d'accorder satisfaction à cette demande, les allemands nous refusèrent l'autorisation d'envoyer des toiles de tente à nos troupes à Alexandrie. Ils déclarèrent cyniquement que la toile disponible qui nous restait devait être livrée à la Tripolitaine qui en avait un égal besoin.

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Puis à la fin de 1940, elle exigea la livraison des avions et du matériel de guerre. Les Allemands ont été obligés de livrer des avions et des matériels. C'est là une des violations les plus flagrantes de l'Armistice puisqu'elle porte sur une des clauses qui avaient servi aux négociateurs français à considérer que l'Armistice était signé (voir page 2). Il est bien évident, en effet, que l'on peut sur les mots se déclarer n'avoir livré ni avions ni matériels, cependant seulement les carburateurs, l'on a livré tout ce qui, à l'exception des avions en bateau, était militairement utilisable. Or on fut obligé de les livrer pour les avions.

Quant à ce qui concerne les avions, la Commission d'Armistice a d'ailleurs à plusieurs reprises exigé et obtenu soit la livraison pure et simple, soit le droit de faire examiner des avions allemands qui s'étaient posés en zone libre ou en Afrique et dont les équipages avaient été internés, lorsqu'il s'agissait d'avions de types nouveaux, dont l'Armée allemande avait intérêt à connaître les détails de fabrication. En permettant à l'Allemagne de connaître de tels secrets, il est certain que le Gouvernement français n'a pas agi en Gouvernement neutre.

6*) - Dès l'été 1940, les allemands ont cherché à passer des commandes de guerre à l'industrie française, et la même année.

Or une loi française, datant du front populaire et de la campagne de rationalisation des industries de guerre, interdit aux industriels français d'accepter, sans l'autorisation du Gouvernement français, des commandes de guerre pour le compte de Gouvernements étrangers. Cette loi était et demeure toujours en vigueur.

L'Allemagne qui venait de ordonner une inspection des fabrications d'armement à l'Hôtel Astoria à Paris, constate que certains industriels auxquels elle s'adressait, ne retransmettaient derrière la loi française. Puisqu'elle ne pouvait ne pas ser du concours du Gouvernement français dans cette question que l'Armistice n'avait pas prévu, elle s'adressa à Vichy demandant qu'une dérogation générale à cette loi fut accordée pour toutes que commanderait l'Allemagne. Il fallait modifier la loi. Le Gouvernement français, redoutant la publicité du Journal Officiel mais ne se sentant pas le droit de résister à l'insinuation allemande, préféra installer à Paris un "Service des Commandes de Guerre" qui donnerait les autorisations sollicitées par les fournisseurs de l'Allemagne. Ainsi espérait-il sauvegarder sa position de neutre puisqu'en principe aucun traitement spécial n'était accordé au Reich, comme les autres pays, en ce qui concernait les commandes de guerre, au régime de l'autorisation.

Dans la pratique, les allemands en acceptant cette formule, exigeant que l'autorisation fut toujours automatique et immédiate et ils n'hésitèrent pas à arrêter certains fonctionnaires du Service français dans des cas où les autorisations ne venaient pas assez vite à leur gré. Dans ces conditions, le rôle du Gouvernement français se bornait à ratifier et à entériner obligatoirement les commandes

l'Allemagne en France (1), en peut se demander si la situation par rapport à l'ajout permanent et simplement la loi du plus populaire plutôt que à aucune des autres, en fait de reconnaissance dans quelques domaines de la culture en France l'Armée allemande, la justice et l'importance de son commandement (voir par exemple la guerre en effet l'importance de la position d'Etat contre la la reconnaissance qui ont été la France en présence de 1941, tout l'armement de l'Armée l'équipement des divisions allemandes qui diffèrent, surtout des unités françaises).

Après avoir ainsi, dans la zone occupée, l'Allemagne, pour la guerre les unités, avec la seule loi de la France de l'Armée française, la France va faire état de présence que certaines unités complicité pour obtenir que, dans la zone l'Armée allemande, les unités françaises travaillent pour la France.

C'est surtout dans le domaine de l'aviation, domaine où les unités sont en grande partie nationalisées et où l'Etat français joue un rôle tout particulier dans la production et la maintenance des commandes, que va porter l'effort allemand (2).

A la suite de conversations qu'a eu en France le commandant GOMMAG, une convention est préparée à la fin de 1941 d'après laquelle toute l'industrie aéronautique française des deux zones doit se remettre au travail à la fin de la production seront réaffectés à l'Allemagne, le sixième restant à la France, mais ce sixième sera, en fait et à mesure de sa fabrication, décerné et stocké sous contrôle allemand puisque, d'après la Convention d'Armistice, la France n'a le droit de posséder, comme aviation de guerre qu'une petite aviation coloniale (3).

C'est ce que l'on appellera la "collaboration aéronautique". Les exigences allemandes sont d'ailleurs telles que la négociation entre fonctionnaires va durer de longs mois et que la Convention ne pourra entrer en vigueur qu'en Juillet 1942, après le départ du Général BOYEN de Wiesbaden. Les allemands qui avaient voulu racheter la participation de l'Etat français dans toutes nos usines

- (1) Lorsque des industriels, respectant la loi, le consultent, ce qui n'est pas toujours le cas.
- (2) Peu après l'Armistice, l'autorité occupante s'entend avec la maison Renault pour la livraison d'avions de combat et de transport. Elle éprouve alors le besoin d'indiquer aux autorités françaises qu'il s'agit seulement d'avions de liaison et de transport et non d'avions de combat proprement dits, semblant alors admettre que la construction de matériel de guerre ne pouvait plus être révoquée.
- (3) Toutes les escadrilles reconnaissances sous le prétexte de la défense de la Méditerranée ou de la lutte en Syrie ne l'ont été chaque fois que "provisoirement". Dans le courant de l'hiver 1941 le Gouvernement français ayant procédé à des promotions d'officiers de réserve de l'Armée de l'Air, la Commission d'Armistice protesta violemment qu'il ne pouvait plus exister de réserve de l'Armée de l'Air puisque

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aéronautique ont finalement renoncé à cette demande moyennant l'accord d'un contrôle sur la direction des usines sans les deux autres. L'inspection allemande des fabrications de guerre peut notamment exiger le déplacement ou le remplacement de tout ingénieur ou technicien du personnel de maîtrise qui ne permettrait pas d'apporter à l'exécution des commandes allemandes un rôle suffisant. Le corps du génie aéronautique français se trouve ainsi maintenant dépendre pratiquement du Ministère de l'Air allemand.

Une filiale de la Banque allemande pour l'aviation a été cependant, en même temps, créée à Paris sous le nom d'Aéro-Bank pour s'occuper "du développement de l'industrie aéronautique française".

En juin 1940, le Gouvernement français déclarait que l'Allemagne lui commandait de ne remettre aucun avion à l'Allemagne et faisait adopter la réponse ce point de vue. Un an plus tard il devait accepter de signer avec l'Allemagne un accord de fabrication et de livraison d'avions. Le point de vue sur ce que nous venons de dire l'honneur a-t-il donc changé ?

7°) L'article 75 du Code Pénal français dont les dispositions ont été d'ailleurs aggravées au lendemain de l'armistice à la demande des allemands eux-mêmes, interdit, sous des peines pouvant aller jusqu'à la mort, "l'enrôlement ou la prise de service par un français dans l'armée d'un pays étranger même si ce pays n'est pas en guerre avec la France". Cet article n'a pas été appliqué lors du recrutement de la légion dite antichouchevique qui porte l'uniforme allemand et où les soldats sont vêtus par l'Allemagne.

L'Armée de l'Air française était destinée à disparaître et que sa survivance était seulement provisoirement tolérée pour permettre à la France de défendre sa "neutralité". Ceci est très net et l'Allemagne à la "défense de la neutralité française" prend en l'occurrence une mesure toute spéciale.

L'ARMISTICE et l'EMPIRE

Le 13 juin 1940, Paul REYNAUD déclarait : « On ne peut tenir sur l'Adour, je tiendrai en Afrique du Nord, si je ne peux tenir en Afrique du Nord, je tiendrai aux Antilles ». (1)

L'idée que le territoire français se prolongeait au delà des mers permit alors à ceux qui, quelques semaines plus tard cherchèrent une politique dans l'annexion de l'unité de la France et de l'Empire une conception encore plus folle et plus capable que la volonté de continuer la guerre.

Les mots : « la France seule » que l'on commençait à se mentir, chez certains à prendre pour devise, excluaient en réalité, en juin 1940, dans l'esprit de leurs auteurs, l'Empire français. Des anti-jacobins de tradition, s'inspirant de la phrase fameuse de DANTON : « la suite du défilé s'entraine droite », mais à l'exemple de ROUQUETTE, ministre, que l'on trouvait sur la liste des « défilés » et dans l'opinion officiellement jetée sur le départ du « Massilia », en précisait que par « défilés » s'entendaient du sol national, on vivait tous les français qui s'étaient rendus en Afrique française. « Je n'ai placé en dehors de la France, ni ma personne ni mes espoirs » répondait le Maréchal PÉTAIN à Paul REYNAUD.

Pour la plupart de ceux qui réclamaient l'armistice, l'Empire était en dehors de la France et il leur importait moins, en ces heures tragiques, de le sauver que de conserver dans la métropole une « étroite » « zone libre ». La preuve en est que si des instructions spéciales furent données aux négociateurs français de l'armistice concernant la flotte et l'aviation, rien ne leur fut indiqué concernant l'Empire.

- (1) CLEMENTAUX après la « trêve » de l'armistice, le 11 mai 1940 déclarait : « Qui les allemands peuvent prendre Paris, cela ne m'empêchera pas de faire la guerre. Nous nous battons sur la Loire puis sur la Garonne s'il le faut. Si enfin nous sommes chassés des Pyrénées, on continuera la guerre sur mer, mais quant à faire la paix jamais ». CLEMENTAUX, anti-colonial toute sa vie, ne voyait plus que la mer, une fois la métropole perdue. Entre 1918 et 1940, après toute la propagande pro-coloniale le point de vue semblait avoir changé.

Par chance, il advint qu'à Rotterdam où les allemands, contrairement aux français, ne voulaient pas parler des conditions de paix, il ne fut pas question de l'Empire. La Convention d'Armistice franco-allemande y fait seulement deux fois allusion : pour préciser que la cessation des hostilités y sera ordonnée, pour indiquer que quelques bâtiments de guerre "ont été laissés à la disposition du Gouvernement français pour la surveillance des côtes littorales de l'Empire colonial" (article 5). Plus tard, les allemands, interprétant cette clause, déclareront que la Convention d'Armistice "obligeait expressément le Gouvernement français à rétablir par la force toutes les entreprises anglaises dans ses colonies" (note de France, fort du 6 mai 1942).

La Convention d'Armistice franco-italienne stipule la désarmement de la frontière tunisienne et libyenne de la Libye, la "désarmement entier" de la Côte française des Somalis avec le droit "illimité et permanent" pour l'Italie d'utiliser la port de Djibouti et le chemin de fer français d'Assinie "pour des transports de quelque nature que se soit". Tout le matériel de guerre se trouvant dans ces zones à désarmement ainsi que celui ayant appartenu à des troupes "qui ont été engagées ou déployées contre l'Italie" doit être remis à l'Italie (1).

Contrairement à la Convention franco-allemande, la Convention franco-italienne contient deux clauses importantes visant l'Empire et surtout la désarmement de l'Empire. Il y a d'ailleurs incompatibilité entre cet engagement de désarmement pris vis-à-vis de l'Italie et l'engagement que les allemands prétendent nous avoir fait souscrire, de défendre contre les ennemis du Reich notre Empire.

Servi par les événements de Mars-el-Khi et de Dakar et faisant siennes l'interprétation donnée par l'Allemagne aux obligations que nous aurions contractées vis-à-vis d'elle dans l'Empire, le Gouvernement français va appliquer tous ses efforts à obtenir, par bribes, un certain réarmement dans l'Empire, quitte à s'obliger à se servir de ce réarmement pour se battre contre nos anciens alliés ou les dissidents.

Cette politique, dans laquelle Vichy essaiera de s'appuyer sur les allemands contre les italiens, aura pour conséquences directes de substituer peu à peu dans l'Empire le contrôle allemand au contrôle italien qui seul y avait été accepté à l'Armistice.

- (1) La Commission de Turin décidera que toutes les formations se trouvant à l'Est d'Alger au moment de l'Armistice étaient déployées contre l'Italie. C'est donc l'armement de tous ces corps de troupe qui devra, en ce qui concerne l'Afrique du Nord, être remis aux Italiens.

En Juillet 1940, des Commissions italiennes de contrôle s'installent en Afrique du Nord, à Beyrouth et à Djibouti.

Survient l'offensive puis la demande allemande des adhésions marocaines (voir page 6). Cette demande est rejetée, le Reich insiste d'autant moins que certaines colonies françaises, tout d'abord, sont celles sur lesquelles l'Allemagne ne cache pas ses visées : le Cameroun et le Congo, viennent de passer en discussion (1). Sur les conseils des démocrates, la politique allemande vis-à-vis de l'Afrique française va se faire plus souple. Une coordination sera mise aux revendications territoriales trop précises.

(1) - Car la politique coloniale allemande a deux aspects. Celui de la ligue coloniale et des engagements revues, expositions et affiches qui, surtout depuis la victoire, rappellent à l'Allemand le "rôle colonial" qu'il va avoir à jouer. C'est l'aspect expansionniste. Que le drapeau à croix gammée doive, après la paix, flotter en Afrique sur de vastes territoires est une chose que tout Allemand considère comme acquise. On ne s'est pas rendu compte des territoires que l'Allemagne administrera ainsi directement (2) mais dès à présent, dans des écoles spéciales, on forme de futurs fonctionnaires coloniaux et même (car le national-socialisme pense à tout) des jeunes filles ayant fait le vœu de devenir femmes de colon et de procréer des enfants allemands en Afrique.

Sous son autre aspect beaucoup moins bruyant, la politique coloniale allemande cherche des réalisations plus immédiates et, pour l'avenir, des profits plus certains que la satisfaction de planter un drapeau sur des terres lointaines. C'est la mise à l'œuvre du "Plan pour l'Afrique", énoncé par Goebbels, qui prévoit de faire de l'Afrique une "Pou" imparte, équilibrant les théories, qui prévoit de faire de l'Afrique une "Pou" imparte, équilibrant les théories, qui prévoit de faire de l'Afrique une "Pou" imparte, équilibrant les théories.

- (1) Rappelons que les systèmes de la production de bois de l'Afrique occidentale venaient d'être créés par l'Allemagne (voir page 11).
- (2) Dans son "offre de paix à l'Angleterre" au lendemain de la défaite de la France, le Führer promettait solennellement de ne pas toucher à l'Empire Colonial Britannique, "œuvre signée d'admiration". C'était donc bien, à ce moment tout au moins, uniquement dans des territoires français ou belges que l'Allemagne était décidée à établir les colonies auxquelles elle déclarait avoir droit.

(3) La politique de l'Afrique française va se faire plus souple. Une coordination sera mise aux revendications territoriales trop précises.

comité de la guerre...
 ...
 ...

...
 ...

soient administrées directement par l'Allemagne ou gérées par un autre pays européen, devront toujours harmoniser leur production aux besoins de la seule Allemagne.

C'est le principe que la Commission d'Armistice pour les affaires économiques a, sans attendre la paix, appliqués à l'industrie par exemple dans les colonies françaises (voir page 21).

Dans le plan allemand, tel qu'il se développe, l'Allemagne se réserve de prendre dans celles des colonies françaises d'Afrique qu'elle n'annexera pas, une position équivalente à celle que, d'accord avec elle, le Japon s'est assurée en Indochine. C'est uniquement pour des raisons militaires, parce qu'elle n'est pas maître des mers et parce qu'elle a craint parfois que l'ennemi de l'Afrique Equatoriale ne se reproduise, qu'elle a procédé moins vite et surtout moins extensivement que le Japon. Mais dès à présent des jalons ont été posés et des contrats ont été conclus montrant à l'Allemagne, par priorité sur la France, le bénéfice des ressources de l'Afrique française (1).

L'affaire d'Indochine a suivi deux étapes, un conflit avec le Japon torréfié par un accord politique en septembre 1940, puis par un accord économique négocié aussitôt après à Tokyo et un conflit militaire avec le Siam dans le courant de l'hiver 1941, conflit auquel mit fin un arbitrage japonais.

L'Allemagne était alliée au Japon et le Japon (on en eut la certitude plus tard mais ceci apparut dès l'arbitrage qui fut d'une partialité surprenante) était allié au Siam (2). Officiellement neutre, l'Allemagne cachait la France de se défendre dans l'empire dont son Empire était l'objet de la part d'un pays pourtant aussi faible que le Siam. Les troupes stationnées en Siam à l'époque que nous étions forcés de délocaliser, devaient être dirigées sur l'Indochine où l'on en avait alors un urgent besoin. L'Allemagne s'opposa à leur départ, bien que celui-ci fut été en cours précédemment à Wiesbaden et à Paris. Elle déclara en même temps accepter que ces troupes demeurassent armées en Côte d'Ivoire Somalie mais à la condition qu'elles assurassent la défense du front de mer de notre colonie. Ne croyant pouvoir faire autrement, le Gouvernement français se rallia à cette décision qui lui faisait quelques craintes.

(1) La plupart des envois de vivres de l'Algérie dans la campagne 1941-1942 ont été déviés vers l'Allemagne. Toutes les oranges envoyées pendant l'hiver 1942 d'Afrique du Nord en nous occupant ont été réquisitionnées par l'Allemagne. En Mai 1942, les envois de légumes de l'Algérie vers la Métropole sont retardés jusqu'à ce que puisse être totalement exécutée une commande de légumes et de fruits pour les troupes allemandes de Russie, commande qui doit embarquer par priorité.

(2) Il est piquant de rappeler que toute la presse française voulait voir à cette époque, dans le Siam, "un instrument de la politique anglaise".

à un endroit qui, il est vrai, n'était pas celui où il avait besoin de s'en servir.

Telle est l'origine du Bloque anglais de la Côte des Somalis. La Commission allemande d'armistice a essayé de faire un accord pour l'Indochine du porte-avion "Blanc" qui se trouvait à la Martinique ayant 100 avions prêts à son bord (1). Les Etats-Unis avaient pourtant garanti le libre passage de ce navire par l'océan et dans le Pacifique. Son arrivée au large des côtes américaines est donc venue bouleverser l'équilibre des forces mais d'une manière telle qu'elle ne voulait pas les allemands.

L'attitude de l'Allemagne dans l'affaire d'Indochine qui avec la guerre d'importance sessions territoriales et des concessions politiques et économiques très lourdes au Japon (2) montre quel est dit peut être réservé à l'affirmation du Reich qu'il désire voir le Gouvernement français défendre son Empire colonial. En réalité, il considère cet Empire comme à sa disposition, les Français étant seulement chargés d'en interdire l'accès aux anglais et à l'Amérique, comme n'hésiterait pas à le faire, en cas de besoin, à se servir de fractions de cet Empire pour s'assurer le concours de ses alliés japonais et siamois.

(3) — C'est sous des prétextes économiques, voire militaires, que le Reich va tenter d'obtenir le retour de ses agents dans les colonies françaises.

Fin Août 1940, la Commission allemande d'Armistice pour les Affaires Economiques décide l'importation de produits allemands à l'usage du Gouvernement français à bord d'un navire qui l'Armistice n'a rien prévu de tel. Deux avions allemands se posent en route le 10 Septembre 1940 pour Dakar. Dans une séance présidentielle qui les accueillera à Casablanca, le Gouverneur Général LORAIN n'aurait pu le 15 Septembre donner au Reich qu'il n'y avait pas d'allemand en A.O.F. On se demande ce qui se serait passé, si, se conformant à leur habituel, les avions à trois places avaient pris dans le ciel de Dakar à peu près au moment où se présentaient devant le port les parlementaires gaullistes du "Savorgnan de Brassac". Le Reich, les représentants allemand, qui n'a eu assurément aucun doute à ce sujet, préfère ne pas poursuivre son voyage et à domicile à Casablanca où sa mission "provisoire" fut bientôt transformée en mission définitive et permanente.

- (1) Il s'agissait d'avions américains que le Reich était en train de transporter au Maroc au moment où intervint l'Armistice.
- (2) Le Japon bénéficiait pour son commerce en Indochine d'un traitement préférentiel par rapport à tous les autres pays y compris la France. De plus, la récolte de certaines produits indochinois lui sera exclusivement réservée.
- (3) Pour l'envoi de Docteur Von Weizsäcker en Syrie, en Janvier 1941.

Le 10 septembre, le Gouvernement allemand a fait la proposition de tentative pour prendre pied en Afrique du Nord. Cette proposition consistait de signer des accords à Paris. C'est la suite de ces accords qui a entraîné l'attaque de Dakar par les allemands et les anglais. Les allemands en ont d'autres non moins importantes. Le 10 septembre, les allemands qui avaient rejoint les troupes allemandes la flotte française de la Méditerranée à Mars-el-Matruh, déclaraient qu'il n'y avait plus lieu de continuer un statut provisoire, reconnaissant en raison de circonstances exceptionnelles, et qu'il convenait, en matière maritime et aérienne, de revenir à la stricte application de l'armistice. La stipulation des marins et aviateurs de Wiesbaden et de Vöck, il leur était donc rappelé qu'à l'exception de petits contingents coloniaux, ils devaient tous être mis immédiatement en congé. C'est au combat de Dakar, après lequel la question fut reprise, que marine et aviation françaises doivent d'exister encore.

4*) - Peu après l'arrivée de M. ONER au Maroc, la Commission allemande d'Armistice décida que, dans toute la partie occidentale de l'Afrique du Nord, le contrôle italien serait à nouveau remplacé par un contrôle allemand.

Si la Convention d'Armistice avec l'Italie accordait certains droits aux italiens en Afrique du Nord, les allemands ne pouvaient se priver de rien de semblable. Le contrôle militaire allemand au Maroc, qui allait comprendre des effectifs très supérieurs à ceux du contrôle italien (200 officiers) est une violation absolue de la Convention d'Armistice.

Ce contrôle militaire a d'ailleurs été complété par l'envoi en Afrique du Nord de "délégues au rapatriement" qui se sont arrogés le droit d'interroger les légionnaires, les travailleurs étrangers et d'intervenir dans les conflits entre l'autorité locale et les personnes dites "allemandes de race". Il a été prouvé, en outre, que les avions de liaison de la Commission allemande ne cessent d'apporter en Afrique du Nord des caisses d'armes, de tracts et de l'argent que l'on trouve ensuite répandus chez les populations indigènes.

On a découvert en Algérie et au Maroc des arabes qui, après avoir suivi des cours de propagande à la mosquée de Berlin ou dans une officine créée spécialement à Paris pour l'action national-socialiste en pays arabe, avaient débarqué munis de faux papiers fournis par les allemands et largement pourvus d'argent.

La radio allemande en langue arabe, quoique moins courtoise que la radio italienne de Berlin, n'établit d'ailleurs aucune différence dans ses appels des populations musulmanes à la révolte contre leurs maîtres français ou anglais.

Ce n'est donc pas pour conserver l'Afrique du Nord à la France que les allemands s'y sont établis et y travaillent (I).

(I) D'après certaines confidences allemandes, la seule région de l'Afrique où l'Allemagne nouvelle aurait intérêt à maintenir une administration...

20) - A la fin de 1941, le Gouverneur de Syrie, le Général allemand von HANTING, sous l'inspiration du Général allemand HANSEN, qui, pendant l'année écoulée, avait soulevé les tribus de l'Arabistan contre les Anglais.

Sous prétexte d'archéologie, von HANTING voyagea à Damas en Syrie. Il prend contact avec divers chefs arabes, avec le Grand Mufti de Jerusalem qui était réfugié à Beyrouth où il avait d'ailleurs promis aux autorités françaises de ne se livrer à aucune politique.

A peine von HANTING a-t-il quitté le pays d'Arabie, en 1941, la surréction de Rechid Ali. Aussitôt, la Commission d'Arabie Intervient. Elle demande à la France d'aider l'Arabie à élever les promesses que, par la voie de von HANTING, elle a faites aux Arabes ou même de les exécuter pour elle. La Syrie doit servir de base de ravitaillement et même d'opérations pour le front que l'Allemagne n'aura pas en Irak.

L'Allemagne exige et obtient :

a) la libre disposition des marchandises syriennes et des stocks d'essence qui s'y trouvent. Elle en profite pour envoyer la colonie, via Alep, une certaine quantité d'aviateurs à Bagdad.

b) l'armement par la France des troupes de Rechid Ali, grâce à du matériel prélevé sur les dépôts de Syrie (notamment la fusille et munitions d'infanterie) (1).

c) la conscription, sur le sol syrien, de corps francs, destinés à participer à la surréction irakienne, corps placés sous les ordres du chef arabe Kassabji, dont le programme auquel il se rendait compte pas alors que nous lui fournissions le moyen de lever chez nous des troupes, a toujours été de chasser la France du Levant. Kassabji, que les communiqués officiels présenteront comme un de nos fidèles partisans, avait été condamné à mort par le Général Doyard.

d) l'installation en Syrie d'une mission militaire allemande commandée par le Général de MANTEUFFEL, mission qui n'ira jamais jusqu'en Irak.

A la fin de Mai, la révolte irakienne est matée. Rechid Ali s'enfuit de Bagdad. Certaines de ses bandes se réfugiant en terre syrienne où elles ne sont pas démantées.

Le 6 Juin 1941, les troupes anglo-gaullistes entrent en Syrie française serait le Sénégal, les Français et les Noirs de l'Inde s'étant bien adaptés mutuellement.

- (1) Ces prélèvements, surtout ceux d'essence, placèrent pratiquement le Général DENTZ, malgré les effectifs relativement importants qui lui restent, dans l'impossibilité de défendre la Syrie. Quand l'ordre lui sera donné de le faire, en enverra soiemment à un sacrifice inutile des troupes auxquelles leurs stocks de réserve venaient d'être enlevés pour être livrés aux irakiens.

6e) - Tandis que se poursuit la lutte en Syrie, l'alliance fait valoir comme une importante occasion de ville ouverte à la France, la fait qu'elle nous autorise à envoyer des troupes et des munitions en Syrie (1), qu'elle nous laisse passer à travers son territoire et qu'elle fait pression sur la Turquie pour que celle-ci nous accorde également le libre passage (2). Elle demande donc, avec exigence, des contre-parties.

[illegible]

- (1) Alors que c'est elle qui vient d'en démunir la Syrie au profit de l'Irak.
- (2) La Turquie, arguant de sa neutralité, refusera.

invitant la présence allemande. Le Gouvernement de Berlin a estimé
 que cette attitude valait la peine d'être prise. Le 10 mai, le
 vicaire de Vichy annonça que la France avait demandé à la Turquie
 l'engagement de retirer immédiatement les troupes allemandes de son territoire
 sous peine de voir sa neutralité mise en question. La Turquie a
 refusé de faire cette concession. Le 12 mai, le Gouvernement de Berlin
 a demandé au Conseil d'ambassadeurs de Berlin de demander à la
 Turquie, le 13 mai, de retirer ses troupes de Syrie.

60) - Tandis que se poursuivait la lutte en Syrie, l'Allemagne
 fait valoir comme une importante concession qu'elle accorde à la
 France, le fait qu'elle nous autorise à passer des troupes et des
 munitions en Syrie (1), c'est-à-dire les laisser passer par son territoire
 et qu'elle fait pression sur la Turquie pour qu'elle leur ac-
 corde également le libre passage (2). Elle demande aussi, avec ap-
 pui, des contre-parties.

Des négociations ont été engagées à Paris et, dans les premiers
 jours de juillet, un accord a été signé entre le Gouvernement de Vichy
 et le Général HUGENOT, ministre allemand à Paris, autorisant l'Allemagne à se
 servir des bases navales de Beirut et de Latakia.

Cet accord ne sera pas ratifié par le Gouvernement français,
 mais le Gouvernement allemand déclarant qu'il n'a jamais compris
 que le texte signé n'était pas définitif, jetera désormais sans
 cesse de la menace d'en exiger l'application, pour obtenir d'autres
 concessions. C'est ainsi qu'il exigera que l'Allemagne
 du Nord livre à l'armée allemande de Libye, des canons,
 de l'essence et du blé, et que, d'une manière générale, elle contri-
 buera de plus en plus au ravitaillement de cette armée. A partir de
 janvier 1942, nous pourrions le voir appliquer un accord qui,
 de nos jours, n'existe pas, et qui fait le contre-partie paradi-
 gmatique que nous donnait l'Allemagne de remplacer, trop tard d'ail-
 leurs, en Syrie, les armes qu'elle nous avait prises, le Gouver-
 nement français autorisera l'Allemagne à faire transi-
 ter par l'Afrique du Nord, le matériel qu'elle envoyait en Gé-
 nie.

- (1) Alors que c'est elle qui vient d'en démunir la Syrie au profit de
 l'Irak.
- (2) La Turquie, arguant de sa neutralité, refusera.

76) - Si les allemands ne paraissent pas pour le moment s'opposer à ce que se développe en France une sorte de "psychose de l'Empire", c'est qu'ils y voient un moyen de détourner l'attention des Français de ce qui se passe dans la Métropole, c'est surtout parce que l'Empire comporte des positions importantes aussi bien du point de vue militaire dans la guerre présente que du point de vue économique dans l'avenir, positions que l'Allemagne ne peut atteindre directement et sur lesquelles elle ne peut actuellement avoir de prise que par le canal de Vichy.

Mais en déduire qu'elle ait une sympathie quelconque pour l'œuvre coloniale française et qu'elle cherche à laisser la France, la paix revenue, essayer de reconstruire une France dans ce qui lui restera de son Empire, serait mal connaître l'Allemagne.

A maintes reprises depuis l'armistice, la presse allemande a indiqué combien les Français s'étaient montrés indignes d'un Empire qu'ils n'ont pas su mettre en valeur. Dans l'organe officiel du Parti national-socialiste, le "Völkischer Beobachter", on a même pu lire : "Ils ne l'ont véritablement colonisé qu'à moitié comme la France et l'Espagne, un terrain, dans un allemand. Il est donc juste de dire que le Maroc, œuvre de Lyantey, est une œuvre allemande". Quant aux chefs et aux soldats noirs qui se trouvaient en France, ils ont manifesté leurs sentiments en s'opposant aux mouvements élevés en sons occupés à la gloire de l'Empire. De même que ces premières ont été arrachées de l'histoire la défaite allemande de 1918 en faisant disparaître le monument de la victoire, de même qu'ils croient effacer le souvenir des atrocités allemandes de l'autre guerre en détruisant à coups de pioches les monuments à Nîmes, à Calais, et aux victimes de l'Empire, ils s'en sont pris à tout ce qui rappelle la participation de l'Empire à la guerre de 1914 avec autant de haine qu'à ce qui commémorerait l'ancienne collaboration franco-allemande. Aussitôt après l'armistice, les autorités occupées ont fait sauter à la dynamite le monument élevé en Champagne à la ferme Navarin à la gloire du Corps Colonial et des troupes noires, le monument élevé à Paris au Général LAFONT, considéré comme le chef des troupes noires, le monument surmontant dans l'anneau le tombeau de l'ancien Gouverneur Van Vollenhoven, mort au champ d'honneur "après avoir recruté l'armée noire".

Ce vandalisme haineux, qui est sans doute ignoré en Afrique occidentale, est suffisamment significatif.

(1) "Le Monde", 27/11/40, p. 1. "L'Europe Nouvelle", 27/11/40, p. 1. "L'Europe Nouvelle", 27/11/40, p. 1. "L'Europe Nouvelle", 27/11/40, p. 1.

... et de la part de l'Allemagne, l'intention de donner aux conditions de son armistice un caractère humiliant pour la France et prétendu en même temps établir une comparaison entre la situation présente et celle de Novembre 1918 qui fut démentie par le peuple allemand comme la honte la plus profonde de tous les temps.

VIII HONNEUR et DIGNITE

A Reims, le 8 Juin 1940, l'Allemagne n'a pas l'intention de donner aux conditions de son armistice un caractère humiliant pour la France et prétendu en même temps établir une comparaison entre la situation présente et celle de Novembre 1918 qui fut démentie par le peuple allemand comme la honte la plus profonde de tous les temps.

L'Allemagne n'a pas, il est vrai, la même conception de ce que l'honneur permet selon qu'il s'agit de ce qu'elle endure ou de ce qu'elle impose.

Déjà en 1918, parlant du traité de Brest-Litovsk, exemple-type de "diktat", le Chancelier HITLER déclarait au Reichstag : "comme vous le remarquerez, l'Allemagne a fait preuve de modération et de générosité, ce traité ne contient aucune condition déshonorante pour la Russie", cependant que le Congrès des Soviets, en ratifiant le 16 Mars 1918 ce même traité, eut à proclamer solennellement qu'il s'agissait d'une "paix pénible, forcée et déshonorante".

Depuis l'Armistice de 1940, le Gouvernement français n'a eu devoir rien proclamer de tel. C'est au contraire le langage du Comte HERRMANN que l'on a retrouvé à plusieurs reprises dans les paroles des Ministres de Vichy ou de notre radio officielle, quand il s'est agi d'apprécier la façon dont s'était comporté et se comportait vis-à-vis de la France son vainqueur. A vrai dire, c'est la première fois dans l'histoire qu'un Gouvernement se déclare aussi honore d'être battu.

Entre l'Armistice de 1940 et celui de 1918 il y a pourtant, entre autres, une différence fondamentale. En 1918 l'armée allemande fut autorisée à rentrer en Allemagne sans abandonner ses armes (1). En 1940, les troupes françaises se trouvant en territoire à occuper durent déposer leurs armes et leur matériel aux endroits où elles se trouvaient au moment de l'entrée en vigueur

(1) Ce fut, disait le Maréchal Lyautey en 1918, en préface du livre d'André PRIMOUC "la victoire des vaincus", une faute initiale essentielle qui pesa lourdement sur l'avenir.

de la Convention (article 4) (1).

Tout le matériel de guerre français qui se trouvait en zone non occupée ou qui y avait été ramené par voie d'échange ou autrement, et, à l'exception de ce que les commissions d'armistice, établies, par la suite de l'armistice, ont remis aux Français, restant tenu en entier, la disposition de l'Allemagne et de l'Italie (voir dernière, entrée en guerre avec un matériel important, depuis la médiation des livraisons d'armes).

Une comparaison entre les forces doit surtout souligner les sommes par les vaincus, mais les deux commissions ont d'ailleurs à faire, ne serait-ce que pour noter ce que l'Allemagne déclarait jadis "insupportable avec l'honneur".

Rappelons notamment que si la flotte française a eu le droit de battre pour exécuter les ordres de la Commission d'Armistice et pouvoir aller se faire démanteler dans un port occupé en contravention, la flotte allemande, placée sous des conditions semblables en 1918, s'est, elle au contraire, soumise pour se voir exécuter de tels ordres. L'Allemagne qui "réclame" la marine française de son attitude à Mars-el-Kébir (et surtout "la réclame") a refusé à exécuter comme un acte d'État de sa propre marine, de "démantèlement" à Scapa Flow.

Rappelons que les allemands qui s'étaient engagés à remettre à la France les drapeaux de 1918, les traitèrent en silence de jour de joie sur une place de Berlin en juin 1919 pour célébrer l'annexion de cet engagement à leur avis "contraire à l'honneur". Mais qu'en 1940 nous n'ayons signé aucune clause semblable, nous nous en sommes vu imposer non seulement la remise des trophées par ordre de paix le 17^e siècle d'Allemagne ou l'Autriche qui se trouvaient en zone occupée et dont nous ne pouvions empêcher l'envolement par les occupants (entre autres les canons et les drapeaux des Invalides) mais aussi de ceux qui se trouvaient en zone libre (drapeaux de la Commission d'Armistice de Janvier 1941).

Rappelons enfin, sous qui concerne la région d'occupation, qu'après l'assassinat en Haute Silésie du Commandant français MONTAIGNE, assassinat qui ne fut malheureusement pas un cas unique, son meurtrier, un nommé JOSCHKE qui avait eu touché une prime des organisations nationalistes pour avoir abattu un officier français, fut condamné par un tribunal international à cinq ans de réclusion seulement. Quand en 1941, un commandant allemand sans abatteur, cinquante otages français innocents furent fusillés. Et cependant c'est l'occupation de 1941 qui est déclarée "correcte".

(I) De plus, par une extension abusive de l'Armistice, les troupes enrégimentées durent se constituer prisonnières (voir page 5).

... l'Allemagne a voulu à tout prix se présenter à un monde qui "collabore" tandis qu'en 1919 et 1920, dans le monde déchaîné, pouvait librement circuler les Français, à des "bâtons ferrés" liés contre la possible population (soudaine) et que, dans toutes les libérations d'Allemagne, on combattait des bandes injuriant le vainqueur français, bandes dont les livres seuls sont déjà suffisamment évocateurs : "Les esclaves de l'Allemagne", "Haine", "Ce que l'ennemi nous a fait", "La peste en Europe", "Partir sur le Rhin", "Nous, les esclaves blancs", etc...

Ce qu'en 1919 l'Allemagne considérait comme "particulièrement contraire à l'honneur" et que jusqu'à la dernière minute, elle essaya de faire retirer du traité de Versailles est indiqué dans les notes envoyées les 22 et 23 Juin 1919 par M. Von MEYER, plénipotentiaire allemand à Versailles, au Président de la Conférence de la Paix.

L'Allemagne estimait alors "insupportable pour l'honneur et la dignité d'un pays libre" de se reconnaître responsable de la guerre (I) et de livrer des personnes condamnées par l'ennemi d'avoir violé les lois internationales en commit les actes contraires aux usages de la guerre.

En 1940, dans le "préambule à l'Armistice" la France accuse la France d'être responsable de la guerre et déclare juste qu'elle ne supporte les conséquences. Si les plénipotentiaires français n'ont pas à souscrire à cette accusation, il ne leur est pas permis, comme ils avaient pu le faire, à moins bon titre, BROCHET, RASTIAU et Van HANDEL, de protester contre elle. D'ailleurs la propagande allemande sait opérer de telle sorte que bientôt des hommes politiques français, loin de nier cette responsabilité mise à charge de leur pays, s'en emparent pour des fins de politique intérieure sans réfléchir aux conséquences que le vainqueur peut tirer de leur "aveu spontané".

Quant à la livraison de personnes, la France a dû s'engager par l'article 19 de la Convention d'Armistice à remettre au Reich ceux de ses ressortissants qui étaient réfugiés en France et qu'il lui réclamerait. L'industriel anti-nazi THIERMANN, ancien Président du Conseil de Prusse HILPERDING, Otto BAUER qui travailla pour nous dans la Sarre, des nationalistes autrichiens ont été livrés par nous à la Gestapo.

En 1919 d'ailleurs l'Allemagne n'a livré personne car il a été admis qu'elle jugeait elle-même, à Leipzig, ses ressortissants "qui avaient violé les lois de la guerre". En 1941 elle a prétendu agir de même, non plus à l'égard de ses propres ressortissants mais à l'égard des français qu'elle avait pu saisir dans ses camps de prisonniers ou en zone occupée. Mais alors qu'en 1921 la Cour de Leipzig qui ne jugeait d'ailleurs que quelques cas, a acquitté tous les allemands y compris le Général ST. NAUR reconnu pourtant coupable d'avoir donné l'ordre d'achever les blessés français, en 1941 les

...

travaux de construction de l'usine, de l'usine de
 leurs, un an après la capture des civils allemands qui
 sont, qui, se consacrant aux travaux de l'usine,
 avaient, en mai ou juin 1940, été
 tirés ou d'aviateurs allemands.

Dans son rapport de l'usine allemande, le directeur
 cite le cas de cet officier de la Wehrmacht qui, chargé par son
 gouvernement de faire exécuter les travaux de la construction d'usines
 dans la région de l'usine, fut arrêté par les Allemands
 dans des Corps francs et allemands dans la région de l'usine.
 L'heureux officier est complètement capturé, mais c'est à l'usine
 qui a coupé de bombes. L'usine contre l'usine et que l'Allemagne
 a élevé des statues, l'usine pour ceux des Corps francs allemands, ce
 sont eux aujourd'hui les compagnons d'usine.

(I) Le jour même où l'on a vu, à l'usine, l'usine allemande en train
 les journaux allemands finissent l'usine de civils allemands qui
 avaient contribué à la capture d'aviateurs allemands. Ce que les
 de la guerre permettent aux allemands ont par eux pour ce sont
 quand c'est obscur contre eux.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

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TO: Colonel William J. Donovan

DATE: November 2, 1942

FROM: Captain O. C. Doering, Jr.

SUBJECT: Proposed limited collaboration with the Fighting French.

Summary

The attached memorandum proposing limited collaboration with the Fighting French was proposed by SI and SO. It has been considered by the Planning Group, which unanimously recommended it to your favorable consideration.

[Signature]

Attachment

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

SECRET

November 2, 1942

FROM: Director of Strategic Services
TO: Joint Psychological Warfare Committee
SUBJECT: Proposed Limited Collaboration with the
Fighting French.

Submitted herewith for your consideration is
an estimate of the situation regarding proposed limited
collaboration with the Fighting French.

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October 31, 1942

PROPOSED LIMITED COLLABORATION WITH THE FIGHTING FRENCH

Objectives:

To strengthen resistance in France, to facilitate strategic sabotage at the proper moment and to facilitate in all possible measure concerted action among various resistance elements in France.

The Situation:

There are various resistance elements in France-- that of de Gaulle, that of certain generals, that of the Communists, trade unionists, peasants, and certain liberal groups. Indications from various sources show a growth of sentiment for the cause of "de Gaullism" since this phrase embodies the meaning of resistance to the Germans rather than allegiance to a person. De Gaulle, while difficult personally and doubtless ambitious politically, is unique in possessing the machine for a measure of purposeful action.

De Gaulle has applied to the British and ourselves through a memorandum dated July 21, 1942 for certain weapons, among others weapons of a para-military character (sub-machine guns, ammunition, and sabotage materials). It is

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with this class of weapons that this paper deals. There are further indications that certain of the Generals, notably Giraud, are preparing resistance movements and encouraging resistance efforts. There are further indications that certain of the liberal elements, including labor elements, have been unwilling to collaborate with the Generals because they were anti-de Gaulle. Thus it becomes apparent that the resistance effort would be strengthened if a unity of action could be achieved between the two elements.

With the political situation as between the various elements of the French we have little concern. Our objective is a military one and we believe that every element ready to resist Germany should be encouraged without the injection of political considerations. Nevertheless political interests weigh strongly with each Frenchman. It may well prove impossible to bring various elements together in concerted action even against Germany. Indeed, experience over two years has demonstrated this difficulty. Nevertheless, concerted action would be so advantageous to our cause that the effort would be worthwhile.

Relations are complicated with General de Gaulle because of his resentment arising in respect of the United States from the lack of understanding of American policy toward

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Vichy, and in respect of Great Britain from conflict in Syria, disagreement over Madagascar, et cetera. Certainly part of this is due to irritation at the fact that he is not being brought fully into the counsel of United Nations strategy and, too, from clashes of personalities.

Purpose:

It is proposed that General Eisenhower be requested to examine and report upon two possibilities:

(a) De Gaulle's request for para-military weapons opens the possibility of equipping, through his organization and with our material aid and collaboration with the British, groups of Frenchmen located at points of strategic importance who, at the proper moment, would be ready to disrupt the communications system of France and destroy certain German stores.

It is proposed that this present exploration be confined to the purely military objective of aiding de Gaulle to equip his followers in Metropolitan France for the purposes set forth in the above paragraph. The term Metropolitan France includes both occupied and unoccupied continental France. The introduction of arms into occupied France, which is enemy territory, seems to present no need

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for consultation with the State Department, but the plan for introduction into occupied France calls for at least an informal acquiescence of the State Department in the project.

As to the availability of necessary materiel of a para-military character, investigations are now being undertaken in the O.S.S. to this end.

Any discussions with General de Gaulle should be confined to this field, and any proposals of political considerations should be politely but firmly sidestepped. Obviously, preliminary talks with the British would be necessary.

It is clear that the availability of materiel is a most essential factor. Hence it is proposed to acquaint General Eisenhower with the Free French situation as it appears to us in Washington, requesting such verification as he can supply from London and to furnish his comment upon the feasibility and desirability of the operations suggested.

To this end a draft telegram from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to General Eisenhower is appended.

(b) Since General de Gaulle is in London and since it may be possible from there to reach certain persons who can communicate with and speak for certain of the generals

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in France, any exploration of the possibility of concerted action in resistance by French elements could be carried on best in London.

It is, of course, unnecessary to elaborate the obvious advantages of concerted action rather than dispersed action by the many resistance elements.

There are also advantages in having an exploration of this possibility by military persons who do not carry any implication of commitment on political policy and who are completely dissociated from the State Department. Further, an exploration by military personnel would enhance the security of this very delicate and confidential examination.

It is proposed, therefore, that a second telegram be dispatched by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to General Eisenhower suggesting an exploration of this possibility, and to that end a proposed draft is submitted as Appendix B.

Recommendations:

That the Joint Chiefs of Staff authorize the dispatch to General Eisenhower in London of the two telegrams submitted in draft.

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The F. F. situation as it appears here seems complicated by de Gaulle's political ambitions, elements of personality, his feeling that our policy toward Vichy is inspired only by a desire to thwart his movement and finally by his conflicts with the British over Syria, Madagascar, et cetera. Your (meaning General Eisenhower's) appraisal of the F. F. situation as it appears in London would be appreciated in order to make it possible for us to make a more complete study.

Nevertheless we believe that de Gaulle offers the unique means by which resistance groups in Metropolitan France can be strengthened and purposefully supplied with necessary materiel.

Having in mind General de Gaulle's request for materiel of July 21, 1942, which included certain para-military requirements, we would like to explore the possibility of furnishing to de Gaulle for the purpose of equipping para-military organizations and groups in Metropolitan France adjacent to strategic points against which they might operate when the time is right.

Obviously, such an operation would involve consultation with the British S.O.E., but we would like your independent recommendations.

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Examination is being made here as to the existence of para-military materiel and possible dates of delivery. In the meantime it is requested that you make most discreet exploration in order to give us the advantage of your considered opinion as to the advisability and feasibility of this operation. We will expedite the examination of the materiel question in every way and hope to have our results in hand at an early date when they can be considered with your views and recommendations.

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It is hoped that the obvious difficulties of bringing the Fighting French and the Resistance Groups aligned with the de Gaulle Movement, together with the elements of the Armistice Army and other French elements which may be prepared to cooperate with us, may not be insurmountable. A real effort in this direction seems most desirable in order to avoid conflict amongst various elements in France which will benefit the enemy and hamper our operations.

It is, therefore, suggested that you examine with competent British and Fighting French authorities the possibility of finding a basis of agreement on joint or parallel action by the Fighting French and other French elements and advise us as to what, if any, action you find feasible, and whether a meeting between representatives of various French elements is desirable and could be arranged.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Colonel William J. Donovan

DATE: November 4, 1942

FROM: Captain O. C. Doering, Jr.

SUBJECT: Proposed limited collaboration with the Fighting French.

In connection with the proposed limited collaboration with the Fighting French, you may wish to have available the original proposal, prepared by Mr. Roseborough, and also the memoranda commenting upon the proposal, prepared by R&A and FN. All of these papers were considered by the Group in arriving at the conclusion to recommend to you the final paper enclosed with my memorandum of November 2.

Attachments

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

October 23, 1942

Secretariat
Office of Strategic Services

We submit herewith memoranda making certain recommendations with respect to the Fighting French, and action to be taken in collaboration with the British, in connection with para-military and resistance groups in France.

It is hoped that these memoranda will be brought to the prompt attention of the Planning Group for study and examination, with a view to the presentation of the suggestions made therein to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for action.

David Bruce.
Major David Bruce

Ellery Huntington
Lt. Col. Ellery Huntington

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MEMORANDUM

THE PRESENT POSITION OF THE FIGHTING FRENCH WITH RELATION TO
RESISTANCE WITHIN FRANCE AND OUR POLICY TOWARD THE FRENCH

Much of our thought in regard to the Fighting French and Resistance Groups and Movements within France is based upon facts or assumptions which may have been true some six months ago, but which no longer correspond to reality.

Our "official attitude" -- that of the State Department as well as of the Army insofar at least as the Command in England is concerned -- has been influenced by the tendency to look upon De Gaulle and his Movement as something of a creation of the English which we should leave to them while we play the Vichy side and pin our hopes upon its better elements.

There have been many points of friction between De Gaulle and the British.

De Gaulle has definitely refused to play the role of an "English creation". He and his Movement are intensely French and the friction between them and the British has caused them to become more and more so.

The old traditional distrust between the English and the French has been responsible for much of the misunderstanding between them. Pashoda has always remained just under the surface of Anglo-French relations. The fact that many Englishmen see but will not admit

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that the British Empire as we have known it is most seriously menaced, if not doomed, causes them to adopt an attitude with regard to French colonial possessions which rightly or wrongly arouses the suspicions of De Gaulle and of the French in general. Syria is an acute illustration of the type of friction which develops.

It is no secret that certain circles in England would like to see Syria incorporated in a great Arabic Kingdom under the domination of Iraq and, therefore, under British influence. De Gaulle has repeatedly stated that he is a trustee for France and will hold for the French nation all French possessions which come under his control. He has approved Catroux's declaration of the eventual independence of Syria, but maintains that this is an obligation for a French nation to fulfill after the war. If he permits the English to proceed with their plan now with respect to Syria he feels that he will not have kept his trust with the French nation and that Syria may be merely an entering wedge on the part of the British to bring at least certain parts of the French Colonial Empire under their influence.

The growing friction between De Gaulle and the British has led the latter to endeavor to ignore De Gaulle and to reduce him to a state of impotence. The more this tendency has become apparent, the more "difficult" and demanding De Gaulle has become and the more he has insisted upon respect for himself and his position as the representative of the French nation. He does not have an "easy" personality but it is highly probable that many of the "incidents" which the English cite as proof that he is "impossible", have been brought on by their own atti-

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tude and conduct toward him and his Movement.

This opposition and lack of understanding between De Gaulle and the British explains in large part the fact that the De Gaulle Movement has taken on more and more of a political, and less and less of a military complexion. The English have discouraged and hindered military participation on the part of the Fighting French and have, as indicated above, adopted the policy ^{of} rendering him militarily impotent. The reaction on the part of De Gaulle and his entourage has been to cause them to turn their thoughts to "political" matters in order to safeguard what they believe to be the interests of France.

It is not intended to imply that all those in the Free French Movement are actuated solely by the highest type of patriotism and self-sacrifice. One of the greatest handicaps and weaknesses of the Movement at the outset, and even today, has been and is the lack of really competent and experienced personnel. As a consequence, many were given or assumed positions for which they were neither trained nor fitted. This led to the discrediting of the whole movement in the minds of those who saw only its superficial manifestations.

While from the point of view of internal politics the political base of the Movement may have been narrow and far to the right at the outset, this base has in recent months been greatly broadened by the assumption of dominate places in the Movement by such men as Philip, Brosselette and Gouin -- all liberal leaders of undoubted sincerity and integrity.

What is of far greater significance and importance for us is

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the fact that in recent months there has been a solidification of the active Resistance Groups in France behind De Gaulle, not as a man -- he is virtually unknown to them -- but as the symbol of French resistance. Whatever may have been the basis for the oft-repeated statement -- based largely upon British Intelligence Reports and information obtained from Vichy -- that De Gaulle has no following within France, this is no longer true today.

German and Vichy propaganda undoubtedly blamed the effect within France of De Gaulle's gesture in "raising the tricolor from the mire" and continuing the fight, and without doubt most Frenchmen, particularly in the Unoccupied Zone and in North Africa, looked for many months to Petain, Weygand, and even Darlan for eventual leadership in driving the Germans out of France. However, as each of these "leaders" failed successively to fulfil this hope, and Laval came into power (with Doriot treading on his heels), the active Resistance Groups and Movements in France have turned to the outside for leadership. Here they found only De Gaulle and have grouped themselves behind him. This is true today in the Unoccupied Zone as well as in the Occupied territory where De Gaulle's following was originally greater and more active.

As the power in Vichy has passed into more and more unsavory hands, and as they, under German pressure, have been forced to resort to more and more drastic measures to retain this power, the hatred in the hearts of the French people toward the collaborationists and those whom they feel have served as the traitorous tools of the Germans, is as great and in some cases perhaps even greater than the hatred which they feel

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toward the Germans themselves.

In the minds of many -- the more functional no doubt, but it is always these who rise to leadership in time of crisis -- even Giroud has become tainted and has become identified with the other leaders of Vichy. There is a very serious risk that the leaders of the best organized Resistance Groups would look upon any Movement led by Giroud, or other generals who have "ridden along" with Vichy, as merely representing the Vichy ideology under a somewhat different cloak -- an attempt to save the regime and maintain its elements in power.

It can, no doubt, be assumed that many who have in appearance acquiesced in the policies adopted by Vichy are at good Frenchmen and at heart desire the defeat of the Germans as ardently as do those who have run greater risks and made greater immediate sacrifices. The difference between them is, perhaps, only one of method and timing and both may be striving for essentially the same end. It can also, no doubt, be assumed (and we have some evidence for such an assumption) that Giroud and other French Generals have worked quietly on secret plans and preparations for action when they judge the time to be ripe. They represent a potential of assistance in the final defeat of Germany which certainly cannot be overlooked. However, it is improbable that they will act until actual allied operations on French soil have developed to a point giving reasonable prospect of success.

It must be assumed that before such operations have reached this point the Germans will have occupied the balance of France and taken effective steps to immobilize the French Armistice Army.

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It is at least uncertain that we can count upon effective assistance on the part of the French Armistice Army within France itself, whatever may be the eventual disposition of the leaders of this Army. However, it is to be hoped that certain elements of the Armistice Army and of the French Legion may, if properly directed, render effective assistance in guerrilla operations.

On the other hand, the Fighting French Special Services are confident that, in addition to their present Intelligence Network, they could rapidly perfect their para-military organization in the Occupied Zone and provide a force of 25,000 men, strategically placed in small groups, with a perfect knowledge of definite objectives such as railway centers, central telephone posts, airfields, etc., provided they receive our moral and material support. Even a small number of men so placed might well be of greater combat value and could more effectively disrupt enemy communications and transport than could several divisions of parachute troops.

In the (presently) Unoccupied Zone the Resistance Movements more or less definitely allied with De Gaulle have organized para-military groups, variously estimated to total from 25,000 to 50,000 men. These groups have grown rapidly in the past few months.

Mention must also be made of the communist groups which are reported to consist of some 25,000 men and are the best organized of the para-military Resistance Groups in France, particularly in the Occupied Zone. While the communist and the other Resistance Groups have agreed to consult with each other and to work along parallel lines for the

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defeat of the Germans, the De Gaulle groups have so far refrained from any direct and definite agreement or collaboration with the communists.

The problem of providing armaments and demolition material for these groups in both senses is an urgent and difficult one, but by no means insoluble, provided -- (a) the needed arms and material (small arms, submachine guns, munitions, and explosives, rather than heavier combat material) are provided promptly and the necessary transport equipment (aircraft and small boats) is made available; and (b) the growing opposition and conflict between the De Gaulle elements and groups aligned with them, and the elements of Vichy from whom eventual assistance may be hoped for, is conciliated.

Unless this conflict is promptly eliminated and a basis is found on which all elements in France who are disposed to ^{do} so can be brought to work together toward the immediate objective of the defeat of Germany, there is the gravest danger that each of the two opposing forces will render impossible the effective development of the military potential of the other, and will expend their force in conflict with each other to the sole benefit of the Germans.

The situation calls for immediate action. It may already be too late to bring the opposing forces together and to develop their potentialities. The existence and possible disastrous effects of the opposition between them is illustrated by the report recently received from the chief representative ^{of OSS} in Switzerland (and from other sources), to the effect that the approach made by certain Vichy Generals to French labor leaders with the proposal that they both fly to North Africa and

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not jointly there, was rebuffed by the labor leaders because the generals were "anti-De Gaulle".

By memorandum dated July 31, 1948, De Gaulle submitted to our Theater Command in London and to the corresponding British authorities, certain proposals for the military participation of the Fighting French, and made certain requests for materiel for the rearming of his troops, the arming of para-military organizations in France, and for the use of his Intelligence Services.

Despite our recognition of De Gaulle and the Fighting French as military allies, and the appointment of two official military representatives to De Gaulle (at the time in question General Dahlquist and Admiral Stark), it was apparent from discussions held in London between members on the staff of the Theater Command in London and representatives of OSS, that the former were still awaiting the lead of the British, and that the British were not inclined to depart from their policy as indicated above. It was also apparent that those on the staff in London charged with our relations with the Fighting French had no real conception of the overall situation, or (prior to the designation of Colonel White to replace General Dahlquist in these duties) any adequate knowledge of, or experience with, France and the French in general.

The matters under discussion should be treated solely on the basis of the military potentials involved. The picture should not be confused by the injection of political considerations and speculations. It is not intended to deny the importance of these considerations. They belong to another sphere and should not be permitted to prevent the

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greatest possible development and utilization of the various elements in France in the accomplishment of the immediate objective, which is the winning of the war.

It is understood that the development and utilization of the various French military potentialities, whether in Vichy or the Free French, would in no way conflict with the present policy of our State Department. It is suggested that we cannot afford to leave this to the British who have, in some instances at least, shown a lack of sympathy and comprehension, and who are hindered in their relations with the French by points of friction and a traditional distrust as indicated above.

To recapitulate:

1. The Fighting French and the groups within France aligned with them represent a very definite combat potential quite apart from their troops and naval units outside of France. This potential cannot be ignored. It can be supported, developed, and used for the defeat of Germany or, if it is not recognized and supported, it may well nullify and destroy the effectiveness of other possible resistance elements in France.
2. The British have failed and are disinclined to recognize and develop this potential and we are undoubtedly in a better position to do so.
3. Arms and other materiel and means of transport are urgently needed and have been requested both of the OSS and the Theater Command in London.
4. It is highly desirable that an endeavor be made to facilitate and reconcile the opposing French elements. This should be

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viewed and dealt with as a purely military matter and the initiative should come from us.

5. It is, therefore, recommended that:

a. The request of De Gaulle for arms and material should be carefully examined and acted upon; the equipment being promptly furnished to the extent this is found to be desirable.

b. There be added to the staff of the Theater Command in London, officers with a thorough knowledge of France and the French, an adequate command of the French language, and a familiarity with, and comprehension of, the De Gaulle Movement and the various Resistance Movements in France, and that such officers, acting under Colonel Waite (or such other officer as may be designated), be charged with the duties of developing the military potentialities of the Fighting French and other French elements and of implementing such general program as may be elaborated to this end in consultation and in collaboration with the appropriate British authorities.

c. General Eisenhower be advised that the Joint Chiefs of Staff feel that prompt effort should be made to bring representatives of De Gaulle and of Giraud, or possibly other French Generals (Frere or Weygand) together in the hope of finding a basis for joint or

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collaborative military action, and that General Eisenhower be requested to inform the Joint Chiefs of Staff if he is in a position to arrange such a meeting. If not, other means should be promptly explored for bringing about such a meeting -- e.g., through representatives of the OSS or through Murphy.

W. A. R.

Annexed Are:

1. Copy of memorandum dated September 28, 1942, prepared at the request of General Dahlquist and submitted to him, summarizing the discussions which took place in London in September between representatives of OSS and representatives of the Fighting French Special Services, and British SIS and SOE, with special reference to the development of the potentialities of the Fighting French Intelligence Services.
2. A note calling special attention to the possibilities of collaboration with British SOE in the arming of the Fighting French para-military organizations and Resistance Groups.

W. A. R.

October 21, 1942

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

FROM: W. A. Roseborough

TO: Colonel Wm. J. Donovan

DATE: October 22, 1944

SUBJECT: Possibilities of Cooperation with the Fighting French Secret Intelligence and Subversive Operations Services.

At Major Bruce's suggestion I send you attached a copy of a memorandum which I prepared toward the end of my stay in London, primarily at the request of General Dahlquist, who at the time was on General Eisenhower's staff, and with Admiral Stark, the official representative of the United States Government, in connection with all matters involving DeGaulle and his movement. (General Dahlquist has since been replaced by Colonel Waite in this capacity.)

As a result of various discussions which I had with General Dahlquist, he asked me to prepare a memorandum setting forth our analysis of the possibilities of cooperation with the Free French Special Services and our recommendations. The attached is an endeavor at such an analysis and recommendation which was, of course, submitted to and approved by Mr. Shepardson and Mr. Phillips before being handed to General Dahlquist. General Dahlquist indicated that he had been requested by General Eisenhower to give the latter a memorandum setting forth Dahlquist's recommendations. Dahlquist stated that he would attach a copy of the attached memorandum to the one he was preparing for Eisenhower.

W.A.R.
W.A.R.

Attachment

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The attached note is an attempt to summarize the situation developed as a result of recent conversations with the British and the F. F. Special Services. These conversations having been undertaken after consultation with General McClure and General Dahlquist, the attached note is submitted as a further report thereon to them. As, however, it was written as an endeavor to clarify our own thought on the matters dealt with, it may contain statements which would be misunderstood by those who are not familiar with the background of the conversations. It is suggested, therefore, this note should not be given more than the most limited distribution.

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POSSIBILITIES OF COOPERATION WITH THE FIGHTING FRENCH
SECRET INTELLIGENCE AND SUBVERSIVE OPERATIONS DIVISION

As the result of a careful and extended examination of the situation, it is our opinion that the Fighting French "Special Services" present actual and potential possibilities, both in the field of Secret Intelligence and in that of subversive and para-military operations which should not be neglected. Rather, we are convinced, they should be exploited, developed and expanded to the greatest extent compatible with the other factors involved in the situation of the Fighting French and that of France in general.

There are, however, certain definitely limiting factors, of which the most serious are:-

- a. The preoccupation of de Gaulle and his "National Committee" with political as well as military matters and the equivocal position taken by our own government in recognizing de Gaulle as a "military" ally, while continuing diplomatic relations with Vichy as the recognized political government of France.
- b. The risk to "security" which would be involved in disclosing any of our strategic plans to the Fighting French.
- c. De Gaulle's insistence that all Frenchmen must work with him and under his orders and not with or subject to the control of any other government of the United Nations.
- d. The reluctance of the British to permit their control over secret intelligence and subversive operations, and the information obtained thereby, to be weakened or reduced by the development of any organization not under their direct control and supervision.

As against these limiting factors, it must be recognized that:-

- a. It would appear to be highly desirable that our military and naval authorities and commanders, both in London and

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in Washington, should have direct access to the greatest possible volume of the "raw material" of secret intelligence, and the greatest possible control over and knowledge of subversive operations.

- b. The possibilities of the rapid development of an extensive organization of our own in these fields in Continental Europe are severely limited by our geographic position, lack of secret communications, lack of experienced personnel, and absence of any reserves, such as the British have enjoyed (and have now virtually exhausted) from which field agents can be drawn.
- c. The Special Services of the Fighting French have, in the past, been effective in the gathering of secret intelligence, and, while the effectiveness of their organization in this field may be somewhat impaired at the moment, the flow of military intelligence from it has by no means ceased.
- d. Properly oriented by and with the required material support from the British and ourselves, the Fighting French Special Services and their organizations (or those affiliated with them) in France represent a potential force in both the fields of intelligence and subversive activities or paramilitary operations which may well be a vital factor in an invasion of Europe.
- e. While in the past the strength and activities of the Fighting French movement within France has been concentrated in the Occupied Zone, there is definite evidence of a growing wing, amongst the resistance groups and elements in the Free Zone, toward de Gaulle as the symbol of resistance.

To comment briefly upon the abovementioned factors which tend to limit the possibility of effective cooperation with the Fighting French in the field under discussion:-

1. While there is no doubt that de Gaulle and certain members of his "National Committee" have devoted a large proportion of their thought and energy to matters more definitely concerning with the political future of France than with the more immediate problem of the defeat and expulsion of the Germans, these phases of their activities may well have been engendered in the minds of some and may, in part at least, be the consequence of our failure to support and cooperate with the more purely military

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aspects and elements of the de Gaulle Movement. Whatever may be the political aspirations of de Gaulle and certain members of his entourage, he and they fully appreciate that the Germans must first be defeated. The Special Services of the F. F. offer a potentially effective instrument for the accomplishment of this immediate end. A serious endeavor should be made to develop and utilize this instrument.

This need not necessarily involve or result in any commitment on our part in connection with the broader military and political questions presented by the F. F. These questions are outside the province of the O.S.S. It is quite conceivable that de Gaulle may take such a stand as to render it impossible for us to cooperate with his Special Services unless and until the broader questions of his military and political status are settled. However, this is by no means certain and a sincere endeavor should, we feel, be made to find a basis for cooperation with the Special Services of the F. F. without prejudicing the position and ultimate decision of the American authorities competent in the other fields.

2. Such cooperation need not entail the disclosure to de Gaulle, or to his Special Services, of our strategic plans in advance of the time at which they must become generally known. To do so would no doubt be dangerous. However, de Gaulle and his movement do exist and they cannot be made to disappear by simply ignoring them. If we adopt this course, the risk to "security" will no doubt be increased rather than diminished. Whether we like it or not, the F. F. are an element which must be reckoned with. It is impossible to keep them wholly in the dark as to any major military operation. If they are made to feel that we are sincerely endeavoring to cooperate with them, within at least a limited field, it is

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reasonable to believe that they will present less risk to the security of these operations than they would if they were to be wholly ignored. 3. De Gaulle's insistence that all Frenchmen shall act under his orders rather than those of any of the United Nations, renders it impossible for the suggested collaboration to take the form of the F. F. recruiting agents to be trained and used by either the British or ourselves. On the other hand, virtually the only agents capable of keeping cover in France today are those who can be brought out, trained and returned within a reasonable time. This means that both we and the British will, to an increasing extent, be dependant, in connection with secret operations in France, upon some cooperation with the F. F., and that (unless de Gaulle is to be ignored entirely which is not feasible) this cooperation must take such a form as to permit the F. F. to have at least nominal control of the agents brought out of France for training.

It is not suggested that we should bind ourselves in any way to deal exclusively with de Gaulle or to refuse to contact or accept the assistance of other groups or elements in France. It is quite possible that such groups or elements (in particular the French Staff Major and the "Armistice Army") may eventually prove to be more effective than the F. F. On the other hand, it is quite possible that, in the Occupied Zone, if not elsewhere, the F. F. intelligence service and the para-military organization which they are endeavoring to build up can, with our cooperation and support, render far greater assistance than any other element in France. This may even be true in the Free Zone, if, as must be anticipated, that Zone is occupied by the Germans, or they, in collaboration with Vichy, take other effective measures to immobilize the Armistice Army at or prior to

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the time of any major operation by our forces.

It is reasonable to believe that unless, by ignoring him, we bring de Gaulle to take a position which will force us to choose between him and other French elements, we can secure an effective measure of assistance from both. When the time comes, de Gaulle and these elements will be brought together on some basis by the very force of circumstances. If not, there will be time enough for us to choose between them in the light of actual developments and the then existing conditions.

4. It is normal that the British should be reluctant to have secret operations conducted from their territory which are not under their direct control. This reluctance is perhaps more marked in the case of those in charge of secret intelligence (S.I.S.) than in the case of those conducting subversive operations (S.O.M.). This reluctance on the part of the British to admit us to full partnership in a tripartite "Joint Account" with them and the Fighting French is the more natural in view of the fact that our immediate contribution can be little more than the supplying of material. This is needed on a far greater scale for the carrying out of S. O. M. operations than in the case of S. I. S. operations. This may explain the apparent difference in attitude between the two British organizations. Indeed, those in charge of British S. I. S. have indicated that they, under "Lend-Lease", may be better placed to secure the needed materiel from American sources than are we ourselves insofar as the Office of Strategic Services is concerned. They have also indicated that if the suggested "Joint Account" with the F. F. Special Services were undertaken, they would consider it to be inadvisable that the resulting "raw material" should not be made directly available to us. They propose rather that

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they should continue as at present, to evaluate and sift the "raw" intelligence, which would then be distributed by them to the appropriate British Services for further processing, from which it would, no doubt, be received by our Armed Forces, in the processed state. It is impossible, however, that this position would be maintained if our Military Authorities were to express the desire to have the "raw material" made available directly to them.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

Despite the limiting factors, it is our belief that a basis for cooperation between us and the British for the development of the potentialities of the Special Services of the F. F. exists and that we should endeavor to expand and exploit these potentialities by:-

Joining with the British and F. F. Special Services in an arrangement under which the latter will supply the man-power, the former the bases and facilities, and we will supply such material as is not more easily and quickly obtained locally, it being understood that each of the three "partners" will be represented on a joint planning board which will determine what operations should be carried out and in what order of precedence, and that each will have direct access to the intelligence material obtained.

(In view of the sharp division maintained by the British between their S.I.S. and S.O.E. organizations, it may prove to be necessary to set up two such "Joint accounts").

As noted above, the material required, and which we might furnish, for subversive operations, is much greater than that presently needed for intelligence work. In the latter connection the most urgent need is for a type of plane capable of landing and taking off in less

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space than is required by the Liberator now used by the British. If a small number (say six) of such planes, with a range of 800 miles and capacity to carry at least three persons could be obtained, the number of raids utilisable for secret operations in both zones of France would be greatly increased and the frequency and security of these operations greatly augmented.

It appears that the British S.I.B. now has an officer in America endeavoring to arrange for planes of the required type (presumably under "Lend-Lease"). It also appears that they are obtaining from America, in the same manner, the component parts of the radio sets used for clandestine operations in sufficient quantities so that no shortage of this material is anticipated by them. Further, the representatives of the S.I.B. indicate that, in their opinion, it is not feasible to conduct clandestine operations by sea by means of small power boats, so that such equipment is not needed except perhaps in the Mediterranean. They state, however, that the distances there are too great for the range of such boats. There would appear to be some differences of opinion between them and the F. I. on this point, and the matter should be given further study.

The materiel required for the proposed S.O.E. operations covers a much wider range; e.g. explosives, small arms and ammunition, light and heavy aircraft for communications and transport etc. A list of this materiel has been supplied by the British to Colonel Huntington, who, upon his arrival in Washington will examine the possibility of obtaining it.

Title to and the right to recover possession of such materiel as we may place in the "pool" should be retained by us as a means of assuring our influence in the orientation of the operations undertaken.

London, September 28, 1942

W.A.R.

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NOTE

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POSSIBILITIES OF COLLABORATION WITH BRITISH S.O.E. AND
THE TRIPARTITE ARRANGEMENT WITH THE FIGHTING FRENCH

As a result of discussions between officials of British S.O.E. and representatives of O.S.S. in London in September, the basis was laid for Tripartite joint action with the Fighting French Special Services, with respect to both the carrying out of subversive operations and the arming of the Fighting French para-military organizations and the resistance groups in France.

It was agreed that British S.O.E. will make available their facilities (landing fields, aircraft, clandestine radio communications, etc.) for these purposes. This presents concrete possibilities for the instrumentation of such programs as may be agreed upon for the arming of the para-military organizations, provided the required materiel and additional aircraft for the transporting of arms can be obtained.

It is hoped that, as a result of recent discussions with General Arnold and General Deane, at least a limited number of Liberation Bombers will be made available by our Air Corps to fill, in part, the urgent need for means of transportation of the small arms and materiel required by the Fighting French para-military organizations and resistance groups.

October 23, 1942

W.A.R.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

FROM: Hugh R. Wilson
TO: Captain Doering, Secretary of O.S.S.
SUBJECT:

DATE: Oct. 27, 1948

With reference to the French proposal forwarded to you by SI and SO for examination by the Planning Group, I append herewith a memorandum from Mr. Roseborough in this office which might well be appended to the proposal as background for this examination.

HRW

Hugh R. Wilson

Enclosure

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MEMORANDUM

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It is impossible to emphasize too strongly or too often the necessity of an intimate knowledge of what has taken place in France and what has happened to the French since the Armistice. If we are to avoid what may prove to be tragic mistakes in our conclusions and actions with respect to the French, reliance must not be placed upon assumptions based upon familiarity with the French as they were in the last war or in the years between the two wars, or even as they were eighteen months ago. Unless there is a full appreciation of the tremendous change which has taken place in France since her defeat, and in particular during the past few months, the risk of our being led to erroneous assumptions and conclusions is most serious.

During the past few months the French have begun to arouse themselves from the stunned and bewildered conditions into which they were thrown by their defeat and by the Armistice. We must constantly bear in mind the fact that the mental processes and reactions of the French differ from our own in subtle but profoundly important ways. If we assume that the present French reactions to given facts or circumstances will be the same as ours would be, or theirs might have been twenty-five years or even eighteen months ago, we will run a most serious risk of being mistaken in our conclusions and in plans which

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may be based upon them.

France today is divided between those who think with their heads and those who think with their hearts.

Those in "power" in Vichy today, whether in military or civil circles, "think with their heads" and are moved not by their sentiments, but by that logic and realism peculiar to the French.

The Armistice itself was the result of this fact and the conduct of those who have assumed responsibility in France since the Armistice is the logical projection of the mental processes and attitude which made them sign the Armistice. If we understand these processes and attitude we can judge within limits what these presently in power in Vichy will do in the future.

However much they might wish for it, the leaders of Vichy, both military and civil, do not believe in a complete United Nations victory. The professional French soldier has a respect for another successful professional soldier which he cannot have for one whom he considers to be an amateur. The German Army are professionals and have been successful. The French soldier looks upon the English and ^{upon} as amateurs. The Frenchman who "thinks with his head" is interested primarily in France and, therefore, in the Continent of Europe. His logic and realism convince him that the Germans cannot be beaten on the Continent, that the Continent cannot be wrested from their grasp. They are convinced that the Germans and their allies have the men, the essential resources and means of production, and above all, the "military know-all", which render them unbeatable on the Continent of Europe. A

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touch of professional jealousy may influence their reasoning on this point. They and their professional army were crushed by the Germans. They cannot admit that the English and Americans with their amateur armies can beat a professional army which crushed them.

The defensive successes of the Russians may have shaken this conclusion in the minds of some French military leaders, but it has added a fear -- the fear of a Bolshevik Europe -- which makes them cling the more tenaciously to their belief in a German victory, or at least in the impossibility of a decisive German defeat on the Continent. In the minds of some the very success of the Russians has caused this logical conviction to be allied with a hope born of the fear of Bolshevism.

These Frenchmen are essentially continental minded. They know, or at least believe, that neither we nor the British are primarily concerned with the Continent of Europe, or will make it our primary concern at the end of the war. They believe that a German victory or a compromise peace is infinitely more probable than a decisive over-all victory of the United Nations. If the Germans win, the French must live with them or be destroyed. If the war ends in a compromise, as virtually all wars do, these Frenchmen do not believe that we can be counted upon to make of the Continent of Europe a place in which France can be secure unless she herself can come to a livable arrangement with the Germans. They believe that we will be primarily interested in the Western Hemisphere and the Pacific, and that the British will have quite enough to do to save their Empire without expending much time, thought, or energy on the future of France or that of any other continental European people. It

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would indeed by no means surprise them if England proved to be more interested in picking up some of the bits and pieces of the French Empire, than in assuring its integrity and the security of France. France, even in the event of a United Nations victory, would, these Frenchmen believe, be left, as at the end of the last war, primarily to their own devices. She must, therefore, conserve what strength she has left and not incur the additional enmity of the Germans who have proved that they are the dominant people of the Continent of Europe.

The present military leaders of Vichy have, with the rest of France, literally and figuratively fought, bled, and died for the cause we profess to be fighting for. They have not, however, shared in the spiritual rebirth which is going on in certain other elements of the French Nation. They may have had little faith in "democracy" and they have lost what faith they did have. They desire the freedom and independence of France, but will not respond to vague appeals based on sentiment or ideology. They are realists and they think first of themselves and of France, as they see her present position within the steel ring which Germany has thrown around the Continent of Europe.

These being the convictions and the frame of mind of the military (as well as the civil) leaders of Vichy today, what can we expect of them in the way of independent resistance to Germans or by way of collaboration with our effort?

- 1) We cannot expect them to take the initiative -- their traditional instinct is to await orders and to follow them.
- 2) We cannot expect them to risk themselves and what little

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strength France has left in an "adventure."

3) They would unquestionably like to see France liberated (provided they were sure she would not find herself exhausted and abandoned after the liberation), and they will no doubt discuss with great interest and agree in principle with any plan for this liberation. They cannot, however, be counted upon to act until we have proven by our own force our capacity and determination to accomplish the utter defeat of the Germans. When we have given proof of this, when we have defeated the Germans to a point where we shall have little or no further need of their help, the military leaders in Vichy will join with us. We must not, however, count upon them to deliver North Africa ^{or} any other French territory to us until we arrive with such force as to leave no doubt of the outcome and no doubt as to our ability, not only to take the territory in question, but to use it as a base for the complete and rapid defeat of the Germans.

4) Until we have given clear proof that we possess and are determined to use the required force, we must expect that the present military leaders of Vichy, whether they be Giraud, Weygand, Frere, Nogues or whoever, will continue to reason with their heads and not feel that they can risk the remaining strength of France in an effort which will not surely result in the complete defeat of the Germans. They will reason that it would be better to husband this strength and endeavor with it to win the peace whatever may be the military outcome of the war. We must not lay our plans in any other belief.

October 26, 1942

W. A. R.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

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TO: Mr. Donald C. McKay

FROM: Sherman Kent

DATE: 30 October 1962

SUBJECT: Attached comment upon memorandum.

In accordance with your request Mr. Gooch and I studied and discussed the memoranda bearing upon a tripartite agreement between ourselves, the British, and the Fighting French. The comment appended hereto has not been read by Mr. Gooch, but I have included in it those views upon which he and I were in verbal agreement. I have no reason to believe that he would differ with the substance.

Sherman Kent
Sherman Kent
Chief, African Section

Attachments

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Comment upon the Memorandum
"The Present Position of the Fighting French with Relation to
Resistance within France and our Policy toward the French,"
and Other Documents Addressed to the Secretariat of O.S.S.,
21 October 1943

Summary

Any formal tripartite agreement for the use of the Fighting French combat and intelligence potential for S.O. and S.I. work will greatly benefit the United Nations' war effort provided that:

- a) the Fighting French can be trusted to enter it on a strictly military basis, and
- b) they can be closely watched lest they attempt to turn it to their political advantage.

If operative in these terms the arrangement could be extended to the Vichy areas of Africa with comparable benefits.

The difficulties of separating political aims of the Fighting French from the planned military cooperation under the tripartite agreement must be carefully considered before final action is taken.

Argument

Specific reference is made to the recapitulation on pages 10 and 11 of the document cited by title above.

Item 1. It is unquestionably true that "the Fighting French and the groups within France aligned with them represent a very definite combat potential . . ." It should

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be noted, however, that there is

a) certain combat potential in France which has operated without regard to any central directing force, and which may choose so to operate in the future;

b) specifically the communist combat potential would probably not be willing to collaborate with de Gaulle the man or de Gaulle the symbol.

Item 2. No comment.

Item 3. The indubitable advantages of supplying aid to this combat and intelligence potential should be qualified as follows:

a) The use of personnel with unduplicable facilities of cover and of existing local organizations (possessed of their own local contacts) will probably be limited by de Gaulle's inability to reach them all. Whatever may be said about the recent addition of liberals to the National Committee in London, de Gaulle will have great difficulty in winning the confidence of all phases of the underground--most notably that of the Leftists and Communists as mentioned above.

b) However strongly argued to the contrary, it would appear extremely difficult to believe that use of the Fighting French in mustering S.O. or S.I. personnel in France could be accomplished without raising political issues in London.

1) The National Committee has amply demonstrated an interest in the extension of its political power, and past experiences show that it is prone to use every possible opportunity

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to forward this interest. There is little reason to feel that the Committee will not sooner or later endeavor to make political capital of the arrangement under consideration.

2) Unless this contingency is foreseen and specifically and forcefully provided against, the National Committee, with enhanced bargaining power, may be able to cause the United States and Britain considerable embarrassment. As to the embarrassments which an extension of the political power of the Fighting French can cause, see the recent O.S.S. memorandum to the J.I.C., "Military Significance of the Recognition of deGaulle".

Item 4.

a) It is unquestionably "desirable that an endeavor be made to facilitate and reconcile the opposing French elements". Whether it will be possible through the London National Committee in its present composition is most debatable.

b) That it should be "dealt with as a purely military matter" expresses a hope difficult of realization. If the military advantages outweigh potential future political difficulties, the strongest possible guarantees should be exacted.

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October 20, 1942

MEMORANDUM:

Considerations in Regard to Proposals
for a Closer Military Collaboration
with the Fighting French.

The proposals under discussion -- namely, to supply material aid to the Fighting French and to encourage collaboration between the Gaullist organizations and other elements of resistance -- must be determined basically on military grounds. "The picture should not be confused", as the memorandum of W. A. R. states, "by the injection of political considerations and speculations." Nevertheless the feasibility and desirability of these proposals cannot be wholly divorced from factors on which a knowledge of political conditions may throw some light.

Assuming that it is to the advantage of the United States to exploit to the fullest possible extent the military potentialities of the Fighting French, the five following considerations may well be taken into account:

- (1) The problem of military cooperation to the Fighting French is complicated by the fact that General de Gaulle has made it clear that he desires for his movement political recognition as the representative not merely of France in exile, but of France itself.

Since the National Committee was formed in the Autumn of 1941, the political aspirations of the movement have become increasingly plain. De Gaulle's first

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attempts to establish contact with the underground resistance in France seem to have been prompted as much by a desire to strengthen his political position as to increase the military significance of his movement. Andre Philip, the Socialist who has recently been chief spokesman for the Fighting French, has avowed that the movement is fundamentally political, and during his visit to this country is reported to have insisted firmly on the need for political recognition. Vallin's welcome into the Fighting French was justified by Brossolette not on the grounds that the vice-president of the Croix de Feu brought with him valuable elements of resistance, but rather on the grounds that the movement must contain within it representatives of all French parties.

A victory for de Gaulle's political ambitions was achieved when the Soviet Government, on September 28, 1942, recognized the French National Committee as the directing instrument of Fighting France, "the only one qualified to organize the participation in the war of French citizens and territories and to represent in respect to the government of the U. S. S. R. French interests....".

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General de Gaulle has appeared anxious to make his full military participation in the conflict conditional upon political recognition by the United Nations. His spokesmen in this country have insisted that although the success of a second front in Europe depends upon the cooperation of the Fighting French, that cooperation will not be granted unless the General's conditions are met. If the General should make such military collaboration as is set forth in these proposals dependent upon diplomatic concessions, the plan might well be jeopardized at the outset.

Whether or not such concessions would be advisable lies beyond the scope of this report; though it may be added that the State Department sees little possibility of American policy going beyond the degree of recognition which the British have already accorded or may accord de Gaulle.

- (2) Fuller American participation in the affairs of the Fighting French is complicated, in the second place, by de Gaulle's attitude toward both the United States and Great Britain.

It is known that for a number of reasons the British have found de Gaulle a difficult personality

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to deal with. The General's insistence -- perhaps in the long run well-founded -- that he maintain his dignity as the embodiment of the French nation, has made him appear unyielding and non-cooperative. Difficulties over Muselier and deep-rooted dissensions over Syria have added to a growing sense of resentment between de Gaulle and British officials. The result has been that when for military reasons, as at Madagascar, the Fighting French have been given an insignificant role, de Gaulle has taken the act as a deliberate insult. Churchill has expressed his own feelings in the remark that of all the crosses which he has to bear, the Cross of Lorrains is the heaviest.

Toward the United States the Fighting French have at times adopted an attitude as apparently hostile as toward Great Britain. Certain members of the National Committee have spoken freely in disparagement of America, and Pleven (recently appointed "Foreign Minister" of the National Committee) has written in a private letter that the St. Pierre-Miquelon coup was designed primarily to remove these islands from the threat of American domination. Some of

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de Gaulle's statements have seemed to place more emphasis upon keeping the French Empire safe from Anglo-Saxon hands than on freeing France from the Germans. This attitude may be attributed in some degree to de Gaulle's determination to remain at all costs a true Frenchman in French eyes, independent of foreign influences.

Deeply felt in State Department circles has been the failure on the part of the Fighting French to look with any understanding upon the American policy. Representatives of the movement who have shown the slightest disposition to cooperate sympathetically with American officials have been recalled; those who remain in office have assumed that our relations with Vichy were continued solely to thwart de Gaulle, or they have argued that the policy was devised as the basis for a negotiated peace.

The record of British and American relations with the Fighting French, thus unpleasantly summed up, is a fact to be taken into account in all plans for closer collaboration. Yet a more active policy of military collaboration may in itself lessen de

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Gaullie's inflexibility; and ill-tempered words need not jettison clear strategic advantages.

- (3) Relevant to the question of military collaboration is the extent of underground support which de Gaulle has actually achieved.

Support for Gaullist elements of resistance within France is frequently opposed on the ground that these elements are insignificant in numbers, lacking in organization, and not representative of the French community. A case has been made by competent observers to show that the Liberation movement does not have trade-union backing, that it is in fact a Gaullist propaganda organization, and that the three underground journals connected with it -- Liberation, Combat, and Franc Tireur -- speak for the National Committee in London rather than for the French population.

While it is true that Liberation is a movement of recent origin, and that its management has too often lacked secrecy and prudence, it cannot be denied that, starting in the winter of 1942, de Gaulle succeeded in establishing relations with resisting elements within France. These contacts have steadily increased, while the representation in London has been strengthened by the coming of such underground leaders as Philip,

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Genin, and Brossolette. Although it seems clear that large portions of the trade-union movement and of the Communists stand apart from the de Gaulle organization, it is not unreasonable to suppose that in military matters they would collaborate closely with it.

Arguments which oppose the giving of material aid to strengthen Gaullist resistance are usually made by those who are anxious to see resistance promoted by the trade unions alone, or by those who are fearful lest an increase in the General's military control of internal French affairs lead to dictatorship. These considerations, even in so far as they are valid, do not affect the determination of the purely military issue at stake.

- (4) Related to the question of the extent of de Gaulle's underground support is the degree to which he is recognized by public opinion as the military leader of resistance.

It can be stated categorically that in occupied France General de Gaulle is looked on as an unchallenged symbol and that any additional weight which he may be given through American aid will receive the thorough approval of the population. However,

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in the unoccupied zone there has been until recently a tendency to look toward certain generals on the fringe of the Vichy regime -- notably Giraud and Weygand -- for ultimate resistance to the Germans. In this region also Vichy propaganda has been fairly successful in discrediting de Gaulle. In North Africa, the General's military position is still less enthusiastically recognized. Here public opinion is not so significant a factor as the opinion of the civil service and of the military and naval castes. These elements are inclined to look with professional jealousy upon a soldier who only a short time ago was a comparatively unknown colonel and now aspires to supreme leadership.

The diffidence with which de Gaulle is looked on both in the unoccupied zone and in North Africa need not be considered, however, a constant factor. Time passes and conditions change. The military occupation by the Germans of all metropolitan France could well increase General de Gaulle's authority. Moreover, it is not inconceivable that recognition by the United Nations of the National Committee as the provisional

- 9 -

government of liberated France would so enhance the General's prestige as to make his leadership more palatable to all regions.

Thus, although future conditions may alter, it must be concluded for the present that an exclusive military "alliance" with General de Gaulle would be looked on by the population of North Africa, and to a lesser degree of unoccupied France, with a resentment which would largely nullify its military usefulness.

- (5) Assuming that there are elements of resistance apart from the Gaullist organizations, the question remains whether aid extended to de Gaulle need jeopardize the chance of our receiving help from other resisting groups.

The Fighting French have tended jealously to guard their own supremacy and have worked to belittle such a military leader as Giraud or such a political leader as Herriot. For the same reasons they have insisted, as in a radio speech of Andre Philip, that those who come to their side at the eleventh hour will be "pitilessly rejected".

Nevertheless it is well known that much of the potentially-effective resistance will come from sources which until now have been silent or have

- 10 -

been making their preparations in secret. North Africa in particular contains many figures both in civil and military life whose opinions have changed with the tides of Anglo-Saxon fortunes, and who will wait until the coming victory of the United Nations is plain before declaring themselves openly in opposition to the Germans. These figures it would be unwise to neglect.

It is possible, as the proposals under consideration suggest, that contact with Giraud be established and that practical cooperation between him and the Gaullist organizations of resistance may be secured. Unfortunately nothing in the history of the Fighting French suggests that they are willing or able to work in harmony with outstanding personalities. As in the civil field they have lacked or lost the support of such figures as Alexis Leger and the philosopher Jacques Maritain, so in the military field Admiral Muselier, General Sice and General Odic have all found themselves unable to work with de Gaulle. De Gaulle's temperament is in part no doubt responsible, and in part the jealousies characteristic of a professional caste.

- 11 -

Even if cooperation between de Gaulle and other leaders of internal French resistance were not able to be secured, there appears to be no reason why aid given to the Fighting French should preclude the fostering of other centers of resistance. As military commitments need not give de Gaulle a monopoly of material aid in all the regions of France and of the colonies, so these commitments need not eliminate the possibility of aiding individual leaders within a given area. General Odic, formerly Weingand's chief of air, might, according to this reasoning, be profitably used to keep dissident North African elements in line.

CONCLUSION:

From the above considerations, the following conclusions and suggestions may be drawn:

(1) In any negotiations with the Fighting French, American representatives should foresee the possibility that political conditions may be introduced by the Fighting French negotiators. These conditions may range from a direct demand for political concessions on the part of the American Government to more indirect efforts to restrict American contact and

- 12 -

collaboration with French elements of resistance outside the Fighting French cadres.


(2) American representatives should be prepared to meet an attitude of reserve or even of apparent hostility on the part of the Fighting French. It is unlikely that this attitude should prove controlling in negotiations over military support.

(3) Since the Fighting French underground support is not at present equally effective in all regions of France and of the colonies, and since circles of resistance remain outside of de Gaulle's control, it is suggested that military collaboration vary from region to region and be kept free of any conditions which might prevent support to other leaders than the Fighting French. In carrying out this regional approach to the problem, many different bases of collaboration might be used: For example, although England must necessarily be the base for activities in metropolitan France, operations based on Portugal, Spain and Switzerland (not involving British intelligence and S. O. E.) might be negotiated on a more independent basis.

(4) Finally, it may be suggested that any policy of military collaboration be capable of adaptation to a rapidly changing situation, the final contours of which are not now

- 18 -

foreseeable. It would seem unwise at this time to commit all eggs to the de Gaulle basket.



SECRET
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

16 940
J. Edgar
* 0054
* Theatrical
* Distribution
28 June 1945

MEMORANDUM

TO: Colonel Buxton *JB*
FROM: William L. Langer

With reference to Colonel Forgan's memorandum of June 2 addressed to you and me, in which request was made for the transmission of R&A studies to the French DGER, I should like to report that this matter has been discussed with all those persons in the R&A Branch who are concerned. One shipment of material has already gone forward to Paris, and further materials are on the way.

The map problem is being worked out with the Map Division in London. Arrangements have furthermore been made by which R&A studies, when suitable, will be forwarded to the DGER as they appear.

William L. Langer
William L. Langer
Chief, Research and
Analysis Branch

SECRET

Office Memorandum


RECEIVED
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
16490
12 June 1945
1. [Signature]
2. [Signature]

TO : Mr. Richard Hartshorne
 FROM : Charles E. Fahn *CMF*
 SUBJECT: Reports for DGER

We are listing below the Far East Division reports which we recommend be sent to the Paris office for distribution to DGER.

<u>R & A No.</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Classification</u>
1000 ✓	Japan's Electric Power Industry	Confidential
1307 ✓	Japanese Films; A Phase of Psychological Warfare	Restricted
1330 ✓	Japanese Administration; Department of Education	Restricted
1567 ✓	Okinawan Studies	Confidential
1743 ✓	Summary of Strategic Information on Japan's Motor Truck Position	Secret
1928 ✓	Japan's Wooden Ships	
1822 ✓	Summary of Strategic Information; Far East Axis Economy	Confidential
1823 ✓	Summary of Strategic Information; Far East Axis Economy	Confidential
1852 ✓	Japanese Shipping and Commodity Movements	Secret
1987 ✓	Mobilization of Labor in Japan	
2101 ✓	Listing of Japanese Electric Power Plants	Confidential
2129 ✓	Indexes of Economic Activity in Japan 1934-43	Confidential
2155 ✓	Japanese Aluminum Production and Fabrication	Secret
2220 ✓	Concentration of Employment and value of Production in Selected Japanese Cities, and Prefectures	Confidential

<u>R & A No.</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Classification</u>
2220.1	Concentration of Employment and value of Production in Selected Japanese Cities, by Industry '34	Confidential
2250	Summary of Estimates of Area Concentration in the Japanese Controlled Iron and Steel Industry	Secret
2262	The Role of Small-Scale Industry in Selected Japanese Cities	Secret
2271	Industrial Distribution of the Population of Japan	Confidential
2594	Selected Industrial Installations in Indochina	Confidential
2604	Radio Laboratories in Japan	Restricted
2629	Financial Programs of Japan in Japan and Occupied Areas	
2719	ARP Organisation in Tokyo City	Confidential
2836	The Japanese Ministries: Table of Administrative Structure	Restricted
2989	Wartime Distribution of Food in Japan	Restricted



NO & NO DETACHMENT
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS
U. S. ARMY
APO-887

112321

MEMORANDUM

1 June 1965

TO : Colonel Norton *gub.*
Dr. William L. Langer
FROM : Colonel Fergan
Chandler Morse and Lt. Sawyer
SUBJECT: Distribution of material to the DMER

An answer to your 24054 of 24 May to 109 was cabled on 1 June, listing the immediate requests of the DMER for Far Eastern maps and basic studies, recommending that you steer the necessary French application to JCS for JAHIS studies, and proposing a program of providing RAA studies to the DMER.

We feel that as large a distribution of these materials as security considerations permit should be made to the French; and that this distribution should be made through Paris. Such a distribution would enable us to strengthen the GDS position in France by rendering a substantial service to the DMER which they would associate with our presence here; and would provide a partial explanation of the kind of overt research work RAA personnel engage in. The handling through Paris allows for a possible final screening here where we can be most closely on top of certain matters of special delicacy in relations with the French. (This should not, however, be taken to relieve RAA/Washington of its original responsibility in selecting materials, since it alone will know of the sources from which certain studies are compiled.)

Because a great part of the material being currently produced in RAA/ETO or MEDTO cannot, for obvious reasons, be distributed to the French, we will have to rely on RAA/Washington to provide the volume of material for this distribution. Certain classes of material are obviously out of the question, but there should be a significant amount of basic and current material that could be used, especially on the Far East, Germany, and perhaps some studies on France. Maps may actually be the item on which we can be of the greatest service with the least inhibitions as to security.

It was with these considerations in view that we asked in our cable, and confirm herewith, that RAA/Washington lay on the following program:

- (1) Two sets of maps, 1:400,000 scale, of the Far East, especially China. No further identification was given. Also—since the French were virtually stripped of maps of the Far East by the German—please send a list of Far East maps which would be available for French distribution; and ship immediately any selected maps you know would be of current interest to the French.

- 2 -

SECRET

(2) All TI and basic IMA studies on the Far East that can be given to the French.

(3) Regular selection and forwarding to IMA/Paris of basic and current IMA studies on the Far East and Europe that can be given to the French.

To avoid mix-up, all such material intended for this distribution should be pouched separately, clearly marked and designated as such, and directed to the attention of Lt. Sawyer, who will appoint an officer to handle distribution.

If for any reason you are unable to initiate this program in the immediate future, would you so notify us directly.

James R. Forgan

James R. Forgan
Orlando, ORO
Commanding

CONFIDENTIAL

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Maj. Gen. William J. Donovan

FROM : Richard Southgate TTS.

SUBJECT:

DATE: 10 May, 1945

You will note from the attached memorandum to Mr. Lyon that a translation of the document from the DGER was handed to him on May 15.

70 Lt. Thurn

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

13 May, 1945

MEMORANDUM

TO: Mr. Frederick Lyon, Chief, Division of Foreign Activity
Correlation, State Dept.

FROM: Richard Southgate, Special Assistant to Director, OSS

There is attached hereto a translation of the report which I showed you this morning from the General Administration of Study and Research (commonly referred to as DGER) of the Presidency of the Provisional Government of France. The report concerns the "Duke Street Murder" myth.

It would be appreciated if this could be added to the file concerning the visit of Colonel Passy to the United States, as it has a bearing on some of the questions included therein.

CONFIDENTIAL

These are the translations
you requested.

Arrange for copy
of this to State
then investigate in
regards to
Office of the Executive of the

30449)

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

To <i>Miss O. Connell</i> (old here)	
Room	Date
	Bldg.
For your information	
Note and Return	
File	
Comments	
Investigate and Report	
See Me About This	
Mail and Files Unit	
Take this up with	
Per our Telephone Conversation	
Prepare Reply	
Signature	
Remarks: We have made a copy of the attached memo for forwarding to Mr. Keat at San Francisco. <i>Thank you.</i>	
(old here for return)	
From <i>McClendon, R.A. (Mr. Keat's office)</i>	Date
Room <i>2021</i>	Bldg. <i>Connell</i>

RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE

LIBERTÉ - ÉGALITÉ - FRATERNITÉ

PRÉSIDENCE
DU
GOUVERNEMENT PROVISOIRE

DIRECTION GÉNÉRALE
DES
ÉTUDES ET RECHERCHES

PARIS, le 19 Avril 1946

201 / 805 / 114 - 12

Le Directeur Général
des Etudes et Recherches

Monsieur le Général DONOVAN

Vous avez bien voulu me demander de vous
établir un résumé succinct sur les événements qui ont donné
naissance à la légende des "Duke Street murders".

En fait cette légende est née de deux affai-
res dites respectivement : "Affaire DUFOUR" et "Affaire
MANUEL".

Affaire DUFOUR -

Un aviateur du nom de DUFOUR, après avoir
traversé l'ESPAGNE, a rejoint en 1942 les Forces Françaises
Combattantes à LONDRES.

Comme tout volontaire ayant rallié ces
Forces, il a été l'objet d'un interrogatoire de contre -
espionnage.

Au cours de cet interrogatoire il est appa-
ru rapidement que ni les galons, ni les nombreuses décora-
tions dont s'ornait la poitrine de DUFOUR, ne correspon-
daient à la réalité.

.../...

= 2 =

Il y avait donc là port illégal de galons et de décorations, faute grave qui ressortit au Tribunal Militaire.

Au cours de cet interrogatoire un soupçon plus sérieux est né, du fait que des témoignages antérieurs nous avaient signalé DUFOUR à HANSEILLE en uniforme d'officier, arborant les mêmes décorations que celles avec lesquelles il avait rejoint LONDRES, et circulant librement au Fort St. JEAN dans lequel étaient détenus, comme vous le savez, un certain nombre de ressortissants britanniques et français.

Personne en FRANCE ne pouvait ignorer que DUFOUR n'avait droit ni aux galons, ni aux décorations qu'il arborait. Le fait qu'il circulait librement à HANSEILLE et dans une prison de détenus politiques impliquait qu'il était couvert par une autorité puissante.

Le Gouvernement de VICHY, portant les autorités d'occupation, au courant de toutes les activités de ce gouvernement, avait seul l'autorité nécessaire pour contraindre les agissements de DUFOUR. Nous n'avons pu retenir contre lui cette grave accusation, n'ayant qu'un seul témoignage dans ce sens. Pour des raisons évidentes, il ne nous a pas été possible d'en recueillir de complémentaires.

DUFOUR a donc été transféré à la prison de CAMBERLEY, sous la seule inculpation de port illégal d'uniforme et de décorations.

Il est parvenu à s'évader de cette prison, a été pris en charge par certaines autorités alliées, qui non seulement l'ont caché, mais encore lui ont fourni les moyens nécessaires pour tenter un procès dans lequel il citait conjointement le Général de GAULLE, le Colonel DENIAVRIN et un certain nombre d'officiers du B.C.R.A. et d'autres services dont la plupart n'avait même jamais vu DUFOUR et ignorait tout de son affaire.

Vous n'ignorez pas la position prise par le Général de GAULLE qui, fort de l'accord signé en 1940 avec Mr. CHURCHILL, se réservait le droit de faire juger par des tribunaux militaires français un délit essentiellement militaire. Je rappelle que DUFOUR, lors de son passage à GIBRALTAR, avait signé un engagement dans les Forces Françaises Combattantes.

.../..

- 3 -

Des influences étrangères ont voulu se servir de DUFOUR pour transformer le procès purement militaire en un procès politique. Le Général de GAULLE a refusé de céder à une manœuvre en contradiction formelle avec les engagements pris par Mr. CHURCHILL. Quelques jours avant le procès, DUFOUR, écoutant la voix de la raison a renoncé à sa plainte.

Affaire MANUEL -

Un volontaire ralliant les Forces Françaises Combattantes, ayant passé par l'Espagne, nous a été ramené un jour par Patriotic School. Les autorités britanniques ont attiré notre attention sur le fait qu'elles avaient quelques doutes à son égard, et nous ont demandé de l'interroger avec une attention toute particulière.

Ces mêmes autorités britanniques avaient gardé plusieurs semaines MANUEL à Patriotic School sans pouvoir rien en obtenir. C'est grâce à l'un de ses camarades de Patriotic School que nous avons pu confondre MANUEL. Ce camarade nous a en effet conseillé de demander à MANUEL d'enlever sa chemise, ce qui nous a permis de trouver deux magnifiques swastikas tatoués sur ses bras.

Se voyant découvert, MANUEL a avoué être un officier du S.R. allemand. Il s'est pendu dans sa cellule, comme le confirme le certificat du coroner dont je vous prie de trouver ci-après copie. (voir annexe).

Voilà à quoi se ramènent les "Duke Street murders".

Il reste encore une chose : les accusations politiques contre le Colonel DEWAVRIN. Celui-ci serait un cagouillard et aurait été secrétaire de DELONGUE.

La simple étude chronologique des faits montre l'inanité de ces accusations.

En effet, le complot de la cagoule se place dans les années 1932/38.

En 1932, le Colonel DEWAVRIN avait 21 ans.

.../...

- 4 -

Il était élève à l'Ecole Polytechnique. A sa sortie de l'Ecole il a suivi pendant un an les cours de l'Ecole du Génie puis comme Lieutenant du Génie il fut envoyé en garnison à GRENOBLE.

En 1938, il a été nommé professeur à l'Ecole Militaire de ST. GYM.

Inutile que j'ajoute qu'il m'a jamais rencontré DELONCLE.

Je vous remercie de m'avoir permis, par une explication très franche, de préciser mon point de vue et de détruire une légende qui, malgré le bon sens et l'évidence, continue à entacher les rapports entre nos deux pays.

de Fontenay

A N N E X E

(Arrêt britannique)

Coroner for
Northern District of
County of London

St. Pancras Coroner's
Court
Camley Street,
N.W.1

The Coroners Society
Founded 1846
W.B. Purchase, M. C.
Hon. Sec.

Telephone : Euston 1691 - 1692
Victoria 6616
(Westminster Coroner's Court)

3rd. April 1945

CERTIFICATE OF THE HOLDING OF AN INQUEST

On 13th. January 1943, and by adjournment thereafter on 2nd. February 1943, I held an inquest upon the body of Paul MANOEL at Westminster Coroner's Court, Horseferry Road, S.W.1

On 13th. January 1943, I made an order under the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, 1939, S.6. directing that no disclosure of the fact of the inquest or of the evidence in the matter should be made.

On 2nd. February 1943, the following verdict was returned :-

" Paul MANOEL died at Wigmore House, Duke Street, on 9th. January 1943, and the cause of his death was asphyxia due to hanging himself by means of certain pieces of fabric taken from his clothing and suspended from a point in the cell at Wigmore House in which he was then being confined, and I do further say that Paul MANOEL did kill himself."

Such a verdict is one of *felo de se*.

(signé) : W.B. PURCHASE (cachet)

H.M. Coroner
Northern District
County of London.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC DEVELOPMENT
Washington, D. C.

4-11-61

M. Jacques Soustelle
Le Directeur General
des Etudes et Recherches
Paris, France

DEAR H. Smeatelle,

It would give us all a great deal of pleasure if you would permit Colonel Christian and Lie Colonel Verneuil of your service to visit the United States as guests of the Office of Strategic Services. If convenient to you and to them, we suggest that a suitable time would be the latter part of May or early June.

I hope you will find it possible for these men to make this visit, and I can assure a cordial welcome to your representatives in the United States.

Thanking you for your many courtesies and particularly for a delicious luncheon a week ago, I am

Slavery years,

WILLIAM J. DONOVAN
Major General, U.S. Army

P.3. You were good enough to say that you would need us: a report on the concentration camp near Wiener.

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

16.127

7 May 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL DONOVAN

FROM: James R. Murphy *JRM*

You might be interested in seeing the attached article, which is the second article written by a member of X-2 in Paris and printed over the signature of Pierre Bloch. I am attaching our copy in English.

✓

SECRET

LE MONDE

SILENCE

A LA CINQUIÈME COLONNE

PAR PIERRE BLOCH

CES derniers temps, les critiques et les protestations s'élevaient contre les Américains, un peu partout, dans le monde, dans la rue, au café. On leur en veut. On leur a reproché à quel point, dans la rue, au café, on vendait sensiblement par rapport à l'hiver précédent, qu'ils se conduisent un peu comme les Allemands ; qu'ils évitent de nuit sur les routes les phares allumés ; qu'ils ont réquisitionné plus d'immeubles que les Allemands ; qu'ils sont bruyants et souvent très entreprenants vis-à-vis des femmes.

Il est nécessaire de mettre les points sur les i. Ces bruits, ces rumeurs, ces étonnements et sont soigneusement entretenus par la cinquième colonne qui, toujours vigilante, même du côté des mécontents entre eux.

Mais s'il y a mécontentement, il faut le diriger. Soyons francs : malgré tous les excès, les erreurs, les fautes, les chefs militaires alliés, au moment de notre plus grand enthousiasme de la libération de Paris, nous avons prêté notre optimisme idéologique (et aveugle, après tout ce que nous avons souffert) qui précipitait une fin rapide, presque immédiate, de la guerre. Or, la liquidation de la puissance nazie n'est pas une affaire de quelques jours. Et nous voilà déçus, comme des enfants que l'on a pris de la douceur.

Nous trouvons des choses obscures à dire dans notre mauvais humeur. Les Américains ne traitent pas les prisonniers allemands comme leurs propres soldats. Les Américains ne font la guerre chez nous que pour conquérir des marchés. Ils ont tué d'innocentes victimes par leurs bombardements. Ils resteraient chez nous en occupants quand la guerre sera finie.

La cinquième colonne ennemie, ennemie et propagande en prose, en vers, en musique, que nous jetons sur nos alliés est un échec pour la propagande nazie.

Mais voyons ces reproches de près :

En nourrissant les prisonniers comme leurs propres soldats, les Américains ne font que respecter la règle la plus élémentaire des conventions internationales. Croyez-vous qu'en violant ces traités, la grande démocratie américaine et des Roosevelt gagnent en prestige (et vous le monde) ? La guerre pour conquérir les marchés ? Et est-ce certain qu'après la démolition ne recommencent même pas, et il est difficile pour l'humanité de parler de la répartition des marchés mondiaux à l'heure qu'il est. Mais si les Américains dans leur intérêt de faire prospérer notre pays pour que nous soyons bons payeurs. Le chômage et la misère en France n'encourageraient pas la production américaine, car nous serions obligés de nous passer d'importations.

Et il ne s'agit pas de minimiser le mal qui a frappé plusieurs familles lors des bombardements alliés. Mais il est inutile de croire que ces bombardements étaient inutiles. Dans toutes les guerres il y a des milliers de victimes non-combattantes, et à la lumière de ce qui s'est passé, nous pouvons faire confiance aux chefs militaires qui ont réussi à éliminer l'ennemi de chez nous, en paralysant les navires importants des transports, en le harcelant sans cesse, en incendiant ses réserves d'armes et de munitions.

Ils resteraient chez nous après la guerre ? Les mêmes bruits démentent récemment nos l'Afrique du Nord ? Or, aujourd'hui, il n'y a plus d'Américains à Alger. Ne croyez-vous pas qu'ils auront autre chose à faire — chez eux, ou en Allemagne — après la victoire ?

FRANCE and SAN FRANCISCO
The Problem of Atrocities

by Pierre-Bloch

A firm and realistic foreign policy must be the framework of the attitude of the French mission to the Conference at SAN FRANCISCO. Our delegates should avoid all false exaggeration of our national sensitiveness on the subjects in which we are especially interested: the question of the German frontiers on which our territorial security depends, participation in the occupation of Germany, the reparations imposed on Germany for our reconstruction, etc...

Certainly we have the right to consider ourselves a power like each of the Big Three. However, we must clearly understand our present position, without becoming overexcited through our national hypersensitiveness, aggravated by the issues and sufferings of these last years. This is the cause of nearly all of our misunderstandings with our Allies.

The American nation, whose guests we are to be, is essentially a realistic power and fails to understand our attitude in some cases of our foreign policy. Our representatives have asked America for what is necessary to sustain the life of our country: trucks for transportation of food, credit for rebuilding our factories, raw material for reorganising our industry, uniforms and arms to form again our army. We have received all of this - and at the very moment when we refused to accept a clumsy invitation from the President of the U.S.A.

The Americans also wonder - for example - why we took only ten per cent of the oil they had granted us, and why the French food supply is now lower than ever before. There realism has reason to be surprised.

We also must be realistic and remind ourselves of our present weaknesses, the decay of administration, the decay of organization. But there is one point on which we have the right to speak in a loud voice at the San Francisco Conference in the name of France and all the martyred countries of Europe. This is the punishment of the responsables for German atrocities.

2

Here we can make use of American realism. We must inform our Allies, giving them for study the many files we have prepared on atrocities, showing them the evidence of the monstrous world engendered by German Hitlerism. When these crimes were perpetrated, the Americans were far away. Because of the exaggerations of Allied propaganda in 1917 concerning the German atrocities in Belgium, the Americans were suspicious of these new atrocity stories; this is the inevitable fruit of falsehood, wherever it comes from. But today, they must realize that it is quite different.

Children murdered by freezing or gas, women tortured; these are not rumors. "Life" has published a terrible reportage on the slaughtered American prisoners of war... Truth makes its own way: it is our duty to underline it, to purify it by our testimonies and proofs.

It is not through a primitive emotion of vengeance that we insist, but because the punishment of these guilty of the atrocities is the duty of many peoples, for whom France is still the speaker.

At San Francisco, we must demand justice. To forget would mean becoming guilty too and by all means, we must not become the accomplices of the guilty.

AMBIAANCE, 25 April 1945

Une politique intérieure forte et saine doit être la condition de l'efficacité de la politique étrangère. C'est pourquoi, dans le cadre de la République, nous devons nous efforcer de maintenir une situation d'équilibre et de stabilité. C'est la seule voie qui nous permette de réaliser notre programme de développement et de prospérité. C'est la seule voie qui nous permette de défendre nos intérêts nationaux et de contribuer à la paix et à la coopération internationale.

[illegible][illegible][illegible]

SECRET

24 January 1948

MEMORANDUM

FOR : General Donovan

FROM : J. R. Murphy *RL*

You might be interested in the attached copy of a French magazine "Ambiance", edited by Pierre Bloch, who is former Minister of the Interior in Algiers. He has recently been ousted from the Government but continues to maintain close contacts, and is recognized as a future candidate for high office. We have a very close relationship with him, and, in addition to obtaining information, he has agreed to publish many suitable articles which we prepare. I have shown this to Ambassador Caffrey and he was very pleased and suggested that we continue to prepare articles to be published over the signature of Bloch, or some other Frenchman. We have told no one else of the matter and, of course, would not want to compromise Bloch in any way by having the matter known.

This particular article has caused a great deal of favorable comment and was broadcast on the French radio, in addition to being reproduced in several newspapers. Bloch stated that he received high praise for it from many people in France, including one whom he characterized as "the highest French official".

SECRET

Je crois que la contre-offensive allemande des derniers jours de 1944 nous a démontré ce que signifie d'avoir obtenu à temps l'aide américaine.

Pendant quatre durs et longues années, nous l'avons attendue avec une inquiétude angoissée. Pendant quatre ans, nous avons vécu dans les souffrances et la misère, n'espérant qu'une issue: la délivrance, le débarquement des Alliés.

Et maintenant qu'ils sont ici depuis quatre mois, après une brève période d'enthousiasme et d'acclamations, voici qu'un malentendu, une tension, s'est établie entre Français et Américains, fomentée, entretenue par des rumeurs provocatrices qui ne peuvent venir que de la propagande de la 5ème Colonne.

Les critiques contre les Américains que nous entendons tous les jours, dans la rue, dans le métro, sont multiples.

On leur reproche d'abord de se conduire trop souvent en France comme le faisaient les Allemands: nous avons changé d'occupant, et c'est tout. Les Américains occupent les immeubles ou s'installent les Allemands. Ils réquisitionnent les quelques réserves qui nous restaient. Ils méprisent nos règlements, circulent de nuit sur les routes tous phares allumés, etc. Bref, ils se comportent en colonisateurs chez nous.

D'autre part, ils ne soupçonnent pas les souffrances et les privations que nous avons dû endurer sous l'occupation. Ils jugent les Français d'après les rades du café noir qui fréquentent les grands restaurants, les cabarets, toutes les boîtes où quelques profiteurs se sont toujours moqués de nos privations et de notre misère. Les Américains ne sont pas en contact direct avec les travailleurs, avec tous ceux qui ont souffert de la sous-alimentation, du manque de vêtements, de chauffage, ceux qui n'avaient ni les moyens ni le loisir de bien vivre et de s'amuser pendant que nos frères, nos pères, se battaient ou étaient prisonniers en Allemagne.

Nous reprochons d'autant plus vivement aux Américains leur attitude vis-à-vis des prisonniers allemands, bien nourris et bien traités.

Nous leur reprochons toutes les victimes des bombardements, tuées par des bombes qui ne tombaient pas toujours sur des objectifs militaires.

Nous leur en voulons de n'avoir pas encore reconstruit nos usines. Nous les accusons de n'être venus en Europe que pour soulever un nouveau mouvement économique et de vouloir empêcher notre production nationale de reprendre, pour nous contraindre à leur acheter tous les produits dont nous avons besoin.

Il est facile de reprendre au détail à chacune de nos critiques, mais je veux maintenant envisager la chose tel qu'il se passe.

Ce qui me frappe d'abord, c'est la disproportion flagrante entre la réalité vitale de notre but de guerre commun, et l'importance de nos reproches aux Américains :

- Pourquoi sont-ils ici ? Quel est le but qu'eux et nous avons attendu ?
- La défaite du Nazisme.
- Que reprochons-nous aux Américains ?
- De circuler les phares allumés et de courir leurs prisonniers.

Quand les Américains sont arrivés, nous avons d'abord été stupéfaits de l'importance, de la perfection de leur matériel de guerre, qui représente des années d'étude et de travail dirigées uniquement dans le cours de la guerre. Maintenant, nous ne songeons plus à nous étonner de ces machines multiples et précises, ni à les admirer. Nous ne voulons plus connaître que des critiques de détail, assorties par une propagande de provocations, et sur lesquelles nous allons parfois jusqu'à baser un jugement définitif.

Il faudrait nous demander quelquefois ou nous en serions sans l'aide des Américains. Nous rappeler l'hiver dernier. C'était la guerre - au jourd'hui, certes, c'est encore la guerre, c'est à dire les privations et les souffrances. Mais, il y a un ça, les Allemands étaient là. Nos jeunes gens devaient se cacher, fuir leurs maisons, les rues sombres, s'ils ne voulaient pas être arrêtés et déportés en Allemagne. Nos privations étaient dues non au manque de transport comme au jourd'hui, mais aux prélèvements allemands. La nourriture dont manquaient nos enfants était pour le soldat allemand. Il y a tout de nous quelques chose de change.

Et nous devons maintenant envisager le problème d'un autre côté. Pensons un instant aux Américains, à la façon dont ils se battent, à l'irrésistible élan qui leur a fait briser le fameux mur de l'Atlantique, enfoncer la résistance allemande en France, qui leur fait envoyer la violente contre-offensive allemande.

Les Américains n'ont pas vécu nos années de misère, ils n'ont pas connu nos souffrances ? C'est vrai, mais ils en connaissent maintenant d'autres. Pensons quelquefois que ces garçons ont quitté leur foyer, leur pays, qu'ils se battent maintenant à 3.000 kilomètres de chez eux, dans la boue, la neige, le froid auquel ils ne sont pas habitués. Peut-être n'ont-ils pas réalisé toutes les atrocités commises par les Allemands en France. Mais je crois que les assassinats de soldats et d'officiers américains, comme il s'en est passé sur le front belge la semaine dernière, aura appris au dernier Américain qui est son ennemi.

Croyons-nous vraiment que de simples garçons américains puissent dans ces conditions, risquer leur vie tous les jours avec l'enthousiasme élan que nous avons rencontré chez eux dans les Vosges, en Belgique, aux Pays-Bas, comme chez ceux qui se battent en Italie et partout où ils ont étendu le front, s'ils n'étaient pas animés de convictions sincères ? Ils ont quitté leur foyer, leur femme, leurs enfants avec la volonté de libérer l'Europe envahie par le Nazisme, de permettre aux hommes de redevenir libres, comme eux-mêmes sont accoutumés de l'être.

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Il faut à un peuple un idéal élevé de liberté pour qu'il traverse deux fois en 25 ans l'Atlantique et se jette dans une guerre terrible dont la situation géographique le préservait naturellement, venant au secours de l'Europe en péril. La simple ambition d'ouvrir un débouché économique ne suffit ni à exciter ainsi l'élan de tout un peuple, ni justifier les terribles sacrifices qu'il consent en combattant ainsi dans la guerre.

D'autre part, l'Amérique ne s'occupe vraiment d'intérêt à nous empêcher de reconstruire nos usines et de reprendre notre production. D'abord, à quoi servirait, comme client, une France improductive et donc incapable ? Pour que l'Amérique s'intéresse à la France du point de vue commercial après la guerre, la France doit être un Etat en mesure de payer ce dont il a besoin et pour cela, il faut que la France produise de nouveau. L'Amérique a donc intérêt à ce que reprenne notre industrie nationale, typiquement française, sa production massive compte moins que l'inspiration et le goût, ce qui donne à notre production tout son prix sur celui de nos acheteurs d'Outre Mer.

Il est vrai, sans doute, que les Américains occupent davantage d'immeubles et de bâtiments que les Allemands n'en occupaient. Mais nous devons nous rappeler que ces réquisitions sont une nécessité militaire, et que cela prouve seulement la supériorité numérique des Américains sur les Allemands, leur arme étant plus importante, ils ont besoin de plus de place.

Enfin, il faut admettre qu'il nous est désagréable de voir nos compatriotes mal habillés et mal nourris, tandis que les prisonniers allemands sont traités comme le sont les soldats américains.

Les Américains, ici, ne font qu'observer la Convention de Genève qui établit que les prisonniers seront traités de même que les soldats du pays qui les a fait prisonniers. Et ce n'est pas en violant tous les traités internationaux que les Américains abâtissent le barbarisme allemand.

D'autre part, ce bon traitement des prisonniers par les Américains s'est révélé être un facteur important de la guerre psychologique. Les Allemands, sachant qu'ils seront bien traités et bien nourris, résistent peu, en certains cas, à se rendre sans combat. Cette méthode a déjà donné de tels résultats, que nous-mêmes, dans notre secteur du sud-ouest, avons commencé à l'employer, envoyant des tracts et passant des messages par radio, garantissant un bon traitement aux soldats allemands qui se rendraient.

Le bombardement des objectifs non militaires est une question très délicate. Nous sommes mal à nous de nous rendre compte des nécessités militaires à un moment donné. D'autre part, mal d'autre nous n'était aucun renseignement pour savoir si tel bâtiment est l'innoffensive apparence civile n'était pas un objectif militaire camouflé par les Allemands.

Le reproche parfois fait à l'Amérique de vouloir "coloniser" la France est trop absurde pour mériter une réponse. Rappelons nous seulement qu'un moment du différend Giraud-de Gaulle, on a reproché au Ministère des Affaires Étrangères américain de n'avoir pas de politique extérieure déterminée. Et voici que maintenant, tout d'un coup, c'est simplement de coloniser la France ?

D'ailleurs, ceux qui, parmi nous, étaient en Afrique du Nord, se rappellent que de faux bruits n'ont cessé de circuler, disant que les Américains, une fois arrivés en Afrique, ne lâcheraient plus jamais l'Algérie ou la Tunisie.

Or maintenant, il n'y a même plus une seule unité américaine en Afrique du Nord.

Pas un seul Américain venu en France s'oublier la beauté de notre pays, ni le charme de Paris. Mais les soldats américains venus du front pour quelques jours de permission s'oublieraient-ils non plus leur Amérique devant les critiques occasionnelles de leurs notes qui souvent refusent de penser que ces moments sont pour eux une très courte détente avant de reprendre la dure et austère vie du front, d'où ils viennent. Surtout, pensant à cela, oserait-on leur reprocher de profiter de ces brèves absences pour se débarrasser aussi complètement qu'ils le peuvent? Un matin prochain, ils s'en retourneront peut-être moins vers la boue, la neige, le froid et les obus, et continueront de confirmer dans ce dur pays leur courage, leur endurance et leur volonté de vaincre.

N'oublions pas qu'en temps normal, les échanges de vues politiques ont fait la politique extérieure d'un pays sont l'appanage d'un petit cercle de diplomates. Par le fait de la présence sur notre sol de nombreux Américains de toutes les classes de la société, nous avons aujourd'hui la chance unique de pouvoir influer sur toute l'opinion publique américaine. Saurons-nous profiter de cette chance en faveur de la France et éviter des malentendus sur des choses sans importance pour favoriser le développement de l'amitié profonde de nos deux pays.

Je voudrais avoir par ces quelques précisions, mis au point dans l'esprit de certains de nous, la position de nos alliés américains à notre égard. Nos deux peuples ont trop d'affinités l'un pour l'autre, ils ont trop à apprendre l'un de l'autre, et, surtout, nous devons trop de reconnaissances aux Américains pour l'aide qu'ils nous ont apportée et qui permet aujourd'hui notre reconnaissance, pour laisser une prépondérance erronée tenter de susciter entre eux et nous des malentendus.

SECRET NOT TO BE ACCESSIONEDOFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
630 FIFTH AVENUE
NEW YORK 20, N. Y.

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XX 76372

Subject: Observations on Current Conditions in France
and the Low Countries.

To: The Director, Office of Strategic Services.

Press comments, which I have seen since my return to the United States, and conversations I have had with intelligent and, presumably, informed citizens of Washington and New York during the past two weeks, have led me to believe that there is a serious lack of knowledge, here, of current conditions in Western Europe.

The French, Belgians and Dutch are lacking in a great many things which many among them would normally have and enjoy. They are not, by any means, however, starving or destitute. The conclusion is inevitable, likewise, that their privations during the days of German rule were exaggerated just as, indeed, have been those of the people of other occupied areas such as Yugoslavia, for example, on which I have already reported.

I had an opportunity, on a recent trip, to talk to many individuals in and about Marseilles, Dijon, Paris, Marle, Soissons, Mons, Namur, Liege, Maastricht and Brussels. I made several stops, too, at small establishments in country districts on a journey which carried me from Paris to Maastricht, Holland, Aachen, Germany, and back again via Brussels. On this trip I interviewed, at some length, farmers, shop-keepers, local police and other members of the community. While my stay in this part of Europe was brief, I covered a considerable amount of territory and saw a fair cross-section of the local agrarian and merchant class. I had no opportunity to consult with representatives of labor and no desire to interview Government officials.

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Everywhere people were coldly polite. There was, however, the warmth or friendly hospitality with which Americans were received during the last war. Direct questioning, at stops made near Marie, Sclissen, Liege and Namur, elicited the following: Existence was not too difficult under German occupation. There was no difference, in fact, insofar as the small farmer had been able to discern, between life under German rule and his lot in so-called "normal times". There had been little or no seizure of livestock or crops and no great disturbance of daily routine. Large owners had, perhaps, suffered through wholesale requisitioning. Small proprietors had been left, pretty much, alone. The situation is more difficult now, I was told, by reason of the rigid military discipline being enforced by the Allies. It was recognized, of course, that some sort of control is required in the interest of security (although the clear intimation was that this control is more severe than need be the case).

The American traveler in this part of the world is struck by the atmosphere of apathy - if not actual antagonism - which is so evident. This is a regrettable impression to be compelled to record but it was the undeniable fact as at the early part of January, 1945.

I have seen, in the places where I have been on this last trip, no evidence of starvation or serious lack of nourishment. People on the streets look surprisingly plump, rosy-cheeked and well fed. At two of my stops in the country I saw meals in the process of preparation which, even before the War, I (who was at the time, eating emergency rations) would have been delighted to enjoy.

In the areas covered on my trip, I observed that surprisingly little damage had been done. Homes were in good condition and few factories had been destroyed. The great industrial centers of Liege and Namur, despite buzz-bombs,

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